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Abbreviations and Glossary  
 
Boe/d  Barrels of oil equivalents per day. „Oil equivalent‟ is used to 
standardize natural gas production with oil production. „Barrel‟ is an 
American measure equaling 159 liters 
 
Carried interest  a company which has its initial expenses in a licence covered by 
another party has a carried interest  
 
Concession  refer to a large block granted to the operator by the host government for 
a certain time and under certain government conditions which allows 
the operator to conduct exploratory and/or development operations 
 
Crude oil Liquid petroleum as it comes out of the ground, as distinguished from 
the refined oils manufactured out of it; also simply called „crude‟.  
 
Economic rent Financial surplus derived from an industry which exceeds investments 
and work-created value.  
 
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
 
FPSO    Floating production storage and offloading vessel 
 
GNPC    Ghana National Petroleum Company 
 
Governments take Taxes and royalties from oil and gas production that go to the 
government.  
 
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, in Ghana 
called the German Technical cooperation  
 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
 
IOC    International Oil Company 
 
Joint Venture Investment undertaken by a consortium of companies, usually with one 
member acting as operator 
 
License Agreement An agreement whereby a government gives an oil company the rights to 
explore for and produce oil in a designated area 
 
Local Content   portion of a product or the share of hiring that must come from 
domestic sources 
 
Majors The „oil majors‟ are the oil and gas companies involved in all stages of 
the industry – exploration, production, refining, trading, marketing, 
and, sometimes, transport. 
 
MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
MPE    Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
 
viii 
 
ME    Ministry of the Environment 
 
MF    Ministry of Finance 
 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
 
NDC    National Democratic Congress 
 
NORAD  Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
 
NOC    National Oil Company 
  
NPD    Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
 
NPP    National Patriotic Party 
 
OFD     Oil for Development 
 
Operator  Company  having majority ownership in a license, making the decisions  
 
PETRAD   Programme for Petroleum Management and Administration 
 
PDO    Plan for Development and Operation 
 
PSC/PSA Production sharing contract/agreement. Agreement between an energy 
exploration company and a host government in which the company 
bears the costs and risks of exploration and production of a petroleum 
or mining project in exchange for a share of the production.  
 
SDFI   The Norwegian State‟s Direct Financial Interest 
 
Signature Bonus  Payment made by a firm to a host government for the right to develop a 
natural resource such as oil, gas, or a mineral deposit. Bonuses are 
often paid in stages: at the start of a project and when various stages of 
development are reached 
 
Stabilization Fund  A fund that can be used to stabilize the government budget against 
commodity price volatility.  
 
Supermajors  The six largest, non state-owned energy companies, also called 
International Oil Companies (IOC). These are ExxonMobil (US) 
(XOM), Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/United Kingdom)(RDS), BP 
(United Kingdom) (BP), Chevron Corporation (US) (CVX), 
ConocoPhillips (US) (COP), and Total S.A. (France) (TOT) 
 
Upstream  Term used to describe exploration, drilling, production and transport of 
crude oil by an oil company, whereas downstream companies deal with 
processing and sale of petroleum products  
 
WB   the World Bank   
ix 
 
Map of Ghana, Gulf of Guinea and Ghana’s oil fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four decades, the petroleum sector has grown to become the 
cornerstone of the Norwegian economy. By the early 1990s the state had 
ownership and control over the petroleum industry; its next move was to 
contribute to the internationalization of state-owned Statoil and the supply 
industry. While the industry was looking abroad, the Petroleum Directorate 
started consulting petroleum-producing developing countries on resource 
management through a small unit called Petrad.
1
 However, it was not until the 
establishment of Oil for Development (OfD) in 2005 that petroleum aid turned 
into a prestige project for the Norwegian government. The OfD initiative, which 
involves a range of state agencies and aims at enhancing competence and 
expertise in resource management aid, engages the petroleum industry in its 
activities. The intention is to provide the government with a coherent strategy 
where it can draw on competence within the state and within the industry.     
Through OfD the Norwegian state engages in 25 developing countries 
which have petroleum resources. Cooperation is structured along three main 
themes: resource management, revenue management and environmental 
protection, with good governance as an overarching theme.
2
 OfD aid is provided 
by supporting governments and governmental agencies with human resources, 
assisting in institution building and the development of regulatory frameworks 
for the petroleum sector in other countries. The programme does not allocate vast 
amounts of capital: the total budget for 2009 was 264 million NOK.
3
 The focus is 
more on knowledge transfer through meetings and educational seminars. Ten of 
the states involved in OfD are so-called core countries, signed up for „broad and 
long term cooperation‟. Of these, six are located in Africa, a continent holding 
                                                                                                                                    
1Petrad is part of the Norwegian oil and gas competence cluster, which includes institutes, oil and gas companies, 
universities and the authorities: http://www.petrad.no/default.asp?fid=1000 12 May 2010 
3 http://www.norad.no/Satsingsomr%C3%A5der/Energi/Olje+for+utvikling 9 March 2010 
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10% of the world‟s remaining petroleum resources4, whose oil reserves are 
considered especially attractive to international oil companies (Ghazvinian 2007). 
Ghana came to the limelight of the global petroleum industry when it made the 
world‟s largest oil discovery in 2007. Norway and Ghana signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) in February 2008, where Ghana registered with a 
budget of 14.5 million NOK for 2009.
5
 The cooperation has so far consisted of 
official visits with delegations from and to both countries, including visits by 
Ghanaian officials to Statoil and Intsok,
6
 and Norwegian technical advice on oil 
production and regulatory frames for Ghana‟s petroleum industry. Statoil is also 
mapping out Ghana as a potential country of operations (Interviews Statoil), and 
Norwegian companies are increasingly interested in Ghana, so the Norwegian 
market sphere remains close to OfD‟s aid activities. 
OfD has become one of Norway‟s best-known aid programmes – and a 
disputed one. The Norwegian government holds about 2/3 of the oil company 
Statoil, thus balancing the dual role of serving as an aid provider and a business 
agent at the same time. International criticism of the role of the Norwegian state 
emerged as early as 2006, in the Financial Times, expressing the view of other oil 
companies as to the benefits involved for the Norwegian industry, and for Statoil 
and Hydro
7
 in particular, 
 
Energy company executives point to conflicts of interest as Norway advises oil-
rich governments on licensing rounds in which Norwegian companies are 
bidding. „Even if they are not given preferential status, they often have access 
to data – such as seismic information – before their competition‟, said one 
senior executive at an oil company active in Africa. Indeed, a presentation by 
Norwegian officials highlights the state's partnership with the private sector, 
naming Statoil and Norsk Hydro, Norway's two biggest, partially state-owned, 
oil companies.
8
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
4 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023769&contentId=7044915 March 9 2010 
5 http://www.norad.no/Satsingsomr%C3%A5der/Energi/Olje+for+utvikling March 9 2010 
6 A hybrid industry-government supported organisation working for internationalisation of Norway‟s oil industry. 
7 The petroleum division in partly government-controlled Hydro was merged with Statoil in 2008. 
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This raises questions of the relationship between the Norwegian state and 
government-controlled oil companies. The effect of OfD on the competitiveness 
of the Norwegian oil industry, have been scrutinized in the Ghanaian paper The 
Enquirer The underlying motives for creating OfD in the first place, questioning 
the awarding of a contract for the South Deep Water Tano block on the Ghanaian 
shelf to the Norwegian company Aker ASA. The Enquirer voiced concern that 
Norway‟s close relation to the Ghanaian government was a factor that influenced 
Ghana‟s National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) in assigning the licence to 
Aker: “The Norwegian Government‟s support to Ghana in restructuring the oil 
and gas industry and the keen interest of the Norwegian Ambassador in GNPC 
became a plus in favor of Aker ASA”.9 The Norwegian government, however, 
was not unaware that OfD could involve problematic issues. As noted in the Econ 
Poïvry report (2004:31) which formed the backdrop to creating OfD:   
 
The need to sustain a dynamic industrial development around the [Norwegian] 
oil complex challenge conventional boundaries between business promotion 
and development cooperation, and thus call for innovative approaches and 
close cooperation across ministries and industry groups. Certain holy cows may 
be up for slaughter.  
 
Is, then, aid a powerful means for establishing contacts for the industry of a donor 
country? As the Norwegian petroleum industry is showing increased interest in 
Ghana, we may ask whether or how establishing OfD in Ghana benefits 
Norwegian companies. The OfD initiative can be examined in light of the current 
trend of increased reliance on involving business actors to achieve development 
goals and the subsequent greater use of private partners in aid. This trend was 
introduced by the UN under leadership of Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
established through the Global Compact.
10
 Research has shown that when 
                                                                                                                                    
8 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d824630-e153-11da-90ad-0000779e2340.html 12 May 2006 
9 http://business.peacefmonline.com/industry/201002/37739.php28.4.2010 (The Enquirer does not have a website, 
but the article is quoted on this news web page) 2 May 2010 
10 Voluntary initiative drawing on business resources to create public good, www.unglobalcompact.org April 9 2010 
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development interests and private profit interests meet or are combined, profit 
interests tend to have the strongest influence and weigh more, though the 
premises and starting point for cooperation was to reach developmental goals 
(Bull and McNeill 2007). This thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly debate on 
the greater use of public–private partnerships in development governance, by 
contextualizing and analysing the Norwegian OfD aid programme. 
 
1.1 Research Question  
The thesis pays specific attention to how the aid programme Oil for Development 
balances relations to commercial actors in Norway‟s petroleum industry. Starting 
points are why the programme came into being and what it provides as a part of 
Norwegian foreign policy. Thus my main research question becomes: 
  
What constitutes the OfD nexus, and how does it advance public–private 
relations? 
 
A nexus means a connection, correlation or interaction. The term is here applied 
to indicate that OfD is not only a programme or an initiative, but consists of 
various actors and strategies, as well as plans, policies and ideas, which are 
connected and interact through the programme. The OfD nexus thus refers to the 
initiative as a whole, drawing attention to its actors and strategies, and that OfD 
as a case may be seen as including a set of actions, plans and ideas, turned into a 
policy which is implemented to achieve certain goals. The OfD nexus represents 
an institutionalization of a governmental strategy that incorporates public and 
private actors, and affects relations between the two through practices of 
cooperation. I will explore whether or how OfD may be seen as a coherent 
strategy that advances relations between the public and the private by enabling 
cooperation within certain frames. In this thesis, public refers to state actors, 
5 
 
whereas private actors are oil companies and industry-led bodies, including partly 
government-controlled companies and foundations such as Statoil, Aker ASA
11
 
and Intsok. These are characterized by having profit or industry objectives. 
Statoil‟s role is under constant political negotiation. It operates as a private 
company, while government holds the majority of its stocks.  
To understand public–private relations in the OfD nexus I will compare 
and critically analyse views of actors in Norway and a given cooperation country. 
The question of private–public relations must be studied in a definite context, as 
argued later in the theory chapter. Ghana provides such a specific case, though 
my overall aim is to understand the role of OfD in Norwegian foreign politics and 
whether or how it provides new spaces for interaction between the Norwegian 
state and oil industry. The main theory challenge in this thesis is to understand 
and reflect upon the exercise of power in public–private interaction as manifested 
in the OfD initiative.   
1.2 Rationale for Choice of Topic and Case  
This thesis is concerned with questions arising from the relations of public and 
private actors in the aid programme OfD. As a conceptual approach to answering 
the research question, OfD is here analysed as a public–private partnership (PPP). 
PPPs have been increasing used in development activities since the late 1990s, 
when Kofi Annan brought a shift towards a pro-business attitude in development 
(Bull and McNeill 2007:8), a shift that must be viewed in relation to the global 
neo-liberal trend. There is no unitary definition of a PPP, and various meanings 
have been applied to the concept. A working definition may be that a PPP is a 
voluntary effort of actors from more than one sphere, sharing risks and benefits to 
obtain a public good. PPPs are debated: some see them as beneficial contributions 
to development, others see them as contributing to privatization and neo-
                                                                                                                                    
11 Aker ASA is the mother company of Aker companies. The Norwegian state owns shares in Aker companies. The 
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liberalization. I argue that Norway‟s OfD may be seen as a PPP because it 
coordinates government- and industry-led organizations, drawing on resources 
from both spheres, in order to advance development. 
A study of OfD can highlight discrepancies in the Norwegian self-image 
compared to the political reality of Norway‟s engagement on the global scene. 
The initiative combines the two areas where Norway may be seen as a significant 
world actor: as an energy nation, and as a humanitarian „great power‟ (Tvedt 
2003, Leira et al. 2007). Norway‟s role as an energy power is geographically and 
naturally founded. Huge incomes from this sector give the relatively small 
Norway an opportunity to play a larger role on the international scene than its size 
would indicate. This do-good nation legitimizes its acts on the international arena 
by promoting them as part of „doing‟ development, whereas the energy nation 
Norway has since the 1990s emphasized internationalization of the petroleum 
industry. Media and politicians constantly re-create Norway‟s identity as the 
„Good Samaritan‟ and environmental avant garde nation, while the state 
simultaneously encourages fossil-fuel activities worldwide and earns increasingly 
greater proportions of company income from international petroleum activities.  
As a new partner for OfD Ghana provides an opportunity to study an 
initiation phase of the initiative, including how approaches were made and how 
contacts were established. Ghana is a new oil producer. Its discovery of oil on the 
Jubilee field in 2007 was described as one of the largest recent findings in 
Africa,
12
 representing a great opportunity to the low-income country
13
 but a 
challenge for financial steering and litmus test for the young democracy.  
                                                                                                                                    
group represents a very complex owner structure. The precise share of the state is thus worthy of a study in itself.   
12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6764549.stm February 5 2010 
13www.web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:641331
~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Low_income 
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1.3 Choice of Method 
In addressing the research question I wanted to understand stakeholders‟ views, 
motives and expectations, and therefore chose a qualitative case study, an 
approach well suited for getting rich information about peoples‟ perceptions 
(Thagaard 2003). The primary data source is open-ended interviews, which are 
good for getting nuanced information, combined with observation and study of 
documents. Data were gathered through fieldwork in Norway and Ghana: the 
fieldwork period in Ghana was two months, while interviews in Norway were 
carried out along with the writing process. Interviews were conducted with actors 
involved in creating OfD or working with the initiative from the government or 
industry side, in addition to oil companies and civil society representatives. A 
total of 31 interviews were conducted, nine in Norway and 22 in Ghana (see 
appendix 8.1).  
1.4 Contextual background: global neo-liberalism  
The extensive debate on how globalization and neo-liberalization have affected 
policymaking over the past decade has focused on state strategies and objectives. 
Global discourses of neo-liberalism also affect Norway, manifesting themselves 
in structures enabling or constraining a range of opportunities for Norway as an 
international actor. These structures are constantly re-shaped by actors, so that 
there is a constant struggle of defining reality. I will briefly introduce these 
discourses as a backdrop to studying the formation of Norwegian foreign policy. 
 „Globalization‟ was a catchword of the 1990s. It is still debated whether 
globalization leads to a weakening of the state, a return of the state or a mere 
changing of the role of state (Held et al. 2007). Many see globalization as having 
brought about global political consensus on the need of economic liberalization: 
commonly referred to as neo-liberalization, which may be understood as a 
consensus allowing for effective state intervention in the ways firms achieve 
global reach (Bridge and Wood 2005). A challenge is to study neo-liberalization 
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as a changing, contingent process, and not as an end process (Peck and Tickell 
2003). Neo-liberalism represents a strong discourse that emphasizes 
competitiveness and market-based approaches to organizing public policy, often 
in terms of privatization. In this sense it may be seen as an ideology, a policy, a 
technique of rule, or „governmentality‟ (in the words of Foucault) (Pierre and 
Peters 2000:195). In this context, forms of governance have altered state-market 
relations in ways that further imply a shift towards the market.  
As a consequence of how the discourses of globalization, neo-liberalism 
and governance affect decisionmakers, there has been a change in the relationship 
between nation-states and private capital (Strange 1996). Most Western regimes 
emphasize relaxation of regulatory frameworks towards private business, opening 
in governance for private standards, rather than public, and increasingly see 
private companies as political actors (Newell 2004). Researchers have noted how 
the increasing political power of global corporations represents a growing 
divergence in resources between business actors on the one hand and the state 
and civil society on the other, resulting in power imbalances stemming from 
allocations of resources (Balanya et al. 2000, Korten 1995). However, there has 
been little research on the power of business in general or its role in governance 
(Fuchs and Lederer 2007). This is important to study in relation to the petroleum 
industry, a high-profile business sector controlled by international oil companies 
(IOCs), and increasingly by national oil companies (NOCs).  
1.4.1 The Norwegian petroleum sector 
Norway is the world‟s fifth largest exporter of oil and the third largest exporter of 
gas, and the state holds a strong position in the Norwegian petroleum sector.
14
 Its 
tax system collects 78% of the companies‟ net surplus, far more than the average 
for petroleum-producing countries; it also controls most of the Norwegian 
                                                                                                                                    
14 The data in this section are from Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Facts 2009, Available on 
/www.npd.no/no/Publikasjoner/Faktahefter/Fakta-2009/ 12 May 2010 
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continental shelf through the company Statoil, where the government owns 67%. 
In 2009 Norway‟s petroleum sector was responsible for 26% of the country‟s 
GDP, 34% of the state income, 23% of all investments and 50% of Norwegian 
export. Further state surplus is invested in the world‟s second largest fund, the so-
called „pension fund‟ (the name reflects the expected demographic changes in the 
Norwegian workforce, and the need to provide for this). By the end of 2008 the 
pension fund accounted for 2275 billion NOK, and is estimated to reach 3090 
billion NOK by the end of 2010,
15
 putting Norway in a favourable financial 
situation. Petroleum activities represent a formidable concentration of capital and 
resources in the Norwegian economy. However, offshore development has now 
reached a mature stage regarding oil discovery and development of fields in 
Norway, as petroleum production peaked in 2006, and this provides an incentive 
for the companies to move on to new markets.  
1.4.2 Ghana: oil discovery and Norwegian involvement 
Ghana is seen as a promising country due to its political stability, recent 
economic growth and now the chances of regulating a promising petroleum 
sector before unfavourable power structures consolidate. Great optimism 
flourished among Ghanaian leaders after the oil find. For instance former 
president Kufour stated: „we are already doing so well. Now, with oil like a shot 
in the arm, we are going to fly‟16. Ghanaian citizens, however, are concerned that 
oil will lead to corruption, doing little for the common people but exerting a 
destructive effect on democracy and development, as seen in neighbouring West 
African countries (Gary 2009). Explanations as to why petroleum resources, 
instead of contributing to development in a country, may seem to fuel conflicts, 
inequality and poverty, are often grouped under the term „resource curse‟ (Auty 
1990). Government and the companies, eager to start oil production, have 
                                                                                                                                    
15 Revised National Budget 2020, Ministry of Finance, available on  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-
center/Press-releases/2010/Revised-National-Budget-2010.html?id=604521 12 May 2010 
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demonstrated the will to proceed fast in developing the Jubilee field, before a 
proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) is completed or proper 
regulations for the petroleum sector have been developed. At an early stage – less 
than half a year after the oil discovery – Norway entered as the main donor on 
petroleum issues in Ghana. The aid cooperation was a fact.  
1.4.3 Norwegian aid  
Along with the other Nordic countries, Norway is known for basing its aid 
programmes on altruism (Stokke 1989, Kolstad et al. 2008). Norway‟s self-image 
is largely built around the concept of altruism. More recently, however, 
Norwegian aid seems increasingly linked to interests within national trade and 
industry, as the government encourages industry partnerships within 
development. This stand was established in Stortingsmelding (White Paper) no 
13, Climate, Conflict and Capital (2009:99), „the government will contribute to 
development of private–public partnership between Norwegian government and 
commercial actors‟. The aim of coordinating commerce and aid policies is 
asserted in speech by Minister for Development and Environment, Erik Solheim, 
in an article about prospects for West Africa:
17
 
 
West Africa is among the areas I am most interested in. It is a huge paradox 
that while the Norwegian government has focused almost exclusively on East 
Africa and Southern Africa, Norwegian industry and commerce have made 
massive investments in West Africa. West Africa is an incredibly important 
political area, it is very vulnerable, and there are huge Norwegian commercial 
investments there. (My translation) 
 
The Econ Pöyry report (2004:2), West African Oil, curse or blessing?, which was 
the analytical backdrop to forming the OfD initiative, noted precisely this gap in 
lack of official connections to West Africa compared with Norwegian business 
interests in the region. A country‟s aid motives may range from altruistic to 
                                                                                                                                    
16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6764549.stm 12 May 2010 
17 http://www.xmag.no/id/1271 7 February 2010 
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political and commercial (Alesina and Dollar 2000), with the commercial factor 
often seen as the most important, as expressed by a former Danish foreign 
minister, „the flag follows the flesh‟ (Helgesen 2008). Aid is an integral part of a 
nation‟s foreign policy; it may be seen as a foreign policy objective in its own 
right, or as an instrument to achieve other objectives (Stokke 1989:9). 
1.4.4 The OfD nexus: actors and strategies 
The initiative is a joint effort of the four Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE), Finance (MF), and Environment (ME), who form 
the steering group for the initiative, with the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) coordinating daily activities. A range of actors are further 
connected to OfD, among them Petrad, Intsok, Statoil and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD). In addition, projects draw on resources from 
various governmental units, petroleum consultants, legal experts and transparency 
organizations; and OfD collaborates with multilateral institutions and (to some 
extent) NGOs. Actors, public and private, have varying interests and policy 
objectives, which may be conflicting or concurrent. The Norwegian state and 
companies have certain goals, and they develop strategies aimed at achieving 
these goals. For the state, engaging through the OfD nexus may promote Norway 
as a „humanitarian great nation‟, strengthening the voice of a small state on the 
international arena. For the oil industry, OfD spreads positive impressions of 
Norwegian companies, creates contact spaces and contributes to reputation 
building. As this thesis will show, aid often navigates in a complex landscape of 
foreign and domestic politics, as well as private and public actors‟ agendas. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure  
 
In the introductory chapter I have proposed a research question, described my 
justification for choice of topic and case, and provided some contextual 
background for the study. In chapter two I propose a theoretical framework using 
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an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on international relations (IR) and 
international political economy (IPE) theory. The third chapter deals with 
methodological concerns, data collection in the field, as well as practical and 
ethical considerations. The empirical material is presented in chapters four, five 
and six, with context and findings. In chapter four I discuss the motivation for 
creating OfD, and Norway‟s potentially conflicting dual roles as a „Great 
Humanitarian Power‟ and an „Energy Nation‟. In chapter five, I consider OfD in 
relation to West Africa, assess some challenges in Ghana related to oil discovery 
and OfDs role in addressing them. In chapter six, I discuss whether or how OfD 
serves to promote public–private relations through its institutions and practices. I 
relate OfD to global trends that influence Norway in the making of its foreign 
policy, and examine whether aid may be understood as a business political 
strategy. The final chapter summarizes and offers some reflections and 
conclusions.  
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2. THEORY FRAMEWORK 
This thesis examines the (re)formation of Norwegian development policy with 
regard to the significance of internationalization in Norway‟s petroleum industry 
for the OfD initiative. I have formulated the following research question(s): what 
constitutes the OfD nexus? How does it promote public–private relations? At first 
glance OfD is an aid programme, and aid falls within the domain of a country‟s 
foreign policy. International relations theory (IR) is the study of interactions and 
the behaviour of actors engaging in international politics (Mingst 2004), so IR 
would seem a logical theoretical starting point for answering the research 
question. I found, however, that more is involved in OfD than what mainstream 
IR encompasses. As a state-led aid initiative OfD is distinguished by its close 
connections to Norway‟s petroleum sector. State-centred mainstream IR theory 
might prove inadequate for grasping this dimension of what constitutes the OfD 
nexus.  
Globalization has radically altered the world‟s economic structures and 
how states and other actors engage internationally in politics. This brings a need 
for theories that focus more on the presence and role of non-state actors. 
International Political Economy (IPE) can be of relevance here, as it provides a 
linkage between „private‟ and „public‟, „foreign‟ and „domestic‟ concerns. A 
study of relations between the Norwegian state, private actors and Ghana will 
necessarily involve the analysis of power. With OfD, who is exercising power, 
how, and over whom? The analytical framework must consider who the relevant 
actors are and how they exercise the forms of power available to them. To 
establish such a framework I lend support to theory contributions from the IPE 
tradition, in particular Fuchs and Lederer‟s multidimensional assessment of 
power (2007), Falkner‟s neo-pluralist perspective (2008) and Nye‟s 
conceptualization of soft power (2004). First let us reflect on what 
interdisciplinarity means for theory in a master thesis such as this. 
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My aim has been to adopt a theoretical framing and a methodological 
approach well suited to my specific research questions. In a constantly changing 
world, not being restricted to the boundaries of one discipline can be fruitful for 
defining and responding to research questions. Coming from an interdisciplinary 
background of development studies, I considered various theoretical perspectives 
for understanding my question: sociological actor-network theory, theories about 
globalization from human geography and IR contributions from political science. 
I found IR and IPE to be the perspectives which could best illuminate the 
question of public–private relations in aid. The theory framework adopted in this 
thesis is not interdisciplinary, although it might be argued that IPE, deriving from 
international relations, is itself an interdisciplinary theory that draws on a range 
of academic schools such as political science and economics, as well as 
sociology, history and cultural studies. IPE is usually seen as a subset of IR 
(Strange 2000). 
2.1 Mainstream IR Approaches  
The field of international relations has been subject to studies by great thinkers 
such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Rousseau, and was established as a political 
science discipline with the publication of E. H. Carr‟s The Twenty Years Crisis in 
1939, and H. Morgenthau‟s Politics Among Nations in 1948. Three theoretical 
approaches have been most significant for studying international relations within 
IR: these are realism, liberalism and radicalism, with the more recent contribution 
of constructivism becoming increasingly important (Mingst 2004:58). Of these 
perspectives, realism, which may be traced back to Hobbes and Machiavelli, has 
been most influential (Hovi and Malnes 2003). As a model for scientific 
explanation realism is claimed to avoid both positivism and relativism, and to 
acknowledge the fallibility of our knowledge (Mingst 2004). The realist 
perspective sees individuals as power-seeking, primarily selfish beings who are 
organized in states that are held to act in a unitary way in their pursuit of their 
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own national interests. Self-interest provides a powerful incentive for one state to 
take advantage over another:  
 
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask, not 
„Will both of us gain?‟, but „Who will gain more?‟ (Waltz 1979:105) 
 
To realists, the state is an autonomous actor, constrained by the anarchy of the 
international system. Liberalism differs by seeing human nature as basically 
good, and the expansion of human freedom as best achieved in democracies and 
through market capitalism (Mingst 2004). Here humans are held to be rational, 
and the state as reflecting both governmental and societal needs. This in turn 
differs from the radical perspectives, based on Marxism, imperialism literature 
and core-periphery theory, which all see the international system as being 
hierarchical. Radicals tend to view the state as an executing agent of the 
bourgeoisie, influenced by pressures of the capitalist class, and each state as 
constrained by the structures of the international capitalist system. Developing 
countries are seen as constrained and dependent on the actions of the developed 
world, with dominant states exploiting the „underdogs‟. The most recent 
perspective, constructivism, takes into account the fact that the world looks 
different depending on one‟s situation: „the world is in the eye of the beholder‟ 
(Mingst 2004). Thus, any view adopted from a particular point located in social 
space yields a perspective which is shaped in its form and content by the 
objective position from which it was adopted (Bourdieu 1979). In the 
constructivist perspective, the analytical focus includes the power of culture, 
ideas and language, and power is seen also in discursive terms.  
  These theoretical traditions can be applied to three levels of analysis: the 
individual, national and the international. Broadly put, studies that concern the 
individual level look at personality, perceptions, activities and choices. Studies at 
the level of the international system examine alliances, norms, rules, 
intergovernmental organizations and multilateral corporations. My research 
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question concerns, first and foremost, the state level. This involves looking at 
state interests, and cooperation between nation-states through foreign aid, as well 
as cooperation between the state and interest groups. However, as an empirical 
study, this thesis also shows that in real-life politics, the boundaries between what 
concerns the international, the state and the individual level may become blurred 
and can be transcended.  
2.1.1 Criticism of IR: a state-centred world view 
The strongest criticism of IR as a discipline is that it operates with a state-centric 
reading of questions of the world order (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). IR tends to 
view states as unitary actors, autonomous of other social and political agents, and 
as pursuing their social interests based on rational calculations of costs and 
benefits. This view has, it is held, led to the neglect of non-state actors, so that 
mainstream IR approaches have failed to see that the state is but one actor among 
many in the global system (Rosenau 1992). Due to the statist reading of the world 
in IR, studies of power within this discipline have tended to focus on state power, 
often minimizing or ignoring the power and influence of other actors, and this has 
led to neglect of the role of business in international relations (Cox 1996).  
Within functionalist perspectives, business tends to be viewed in terms of 
problem-solver potential (Newell 2004). Participants in global or state 
governance often apply a functionalist perspective to the role of business, and 
with the growing focus on the „new‟ political role of business have come new 
forms of activity and collaboration between states and other actors, such as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the UN‟s Global Compact. These 
arrangements express a functionalist perspective on business inclusion – but fail 
to consider and link the new role of business activities to the core issue of power 
(Levy and Newell 2004). Even few scholars use a frame for analysis that pursues 
interests and struggles for political influence (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). In light 
of this, Newell (2004) asserts that we need to understand how corporate strategies 
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and interests are formed when developing within a mix of the market and the 
political sphere.  
IR theory would thus appear inadequate for analysing business cases in 
international relations. One reason why there are few studies of the role of 
business linked to power in global governance is because it is difficult to capture 
the many facets of business power in today‟s world (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). 
International globalization has brought changes to the sources of power today and 
the allocation of actual powers of non-governmental actors. Globalization thus 
implies a changing mode of interaction between states and non-state actors 
(Bieling 2007). A newer sub-stream of IR, International Political Economy (IPE), 
places state–market relations at the heart of its enquiry (Strange 2000). 
2.2 IPE: Acknowledging Countervailing Forces to State 
Power 
IPE scholars analyse international relations in combination with political 
economy, emphasizing the importance of firms in the global economy (Newell 
2004). Theoretical perspectives within this field deal with the effects of economic 
interaction on political structures and outcomes, and the ways in which states, 
institutions and individual actors shape the systems through which economic 
interactions are expressed. Susan Strange is among the political scientists who 
have articulated how the state seems to have lost much of its position as a 
superior holder of power due global neo-liberalism, and indicates how this can 
lead to altered relations between the state and market actors: 
  
Where states once were the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on 
many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. (Strange 
1996:4)  
 
She asserts that, in this context, politics and policies are no longer formed by and 
between states, as presupposed by the mainstream IR view. Rather, policies today 
are shaped in struggles between states and market actors. The strengthened 
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position of corporate powers in relation to the state is important for understanding 
how a state‟s policies are formed.  
OfD is a rara avis in Norwegian development policy. It involves a range of 
actors, including private-sector ones, and should, I suggest, be seen as a political 
strategy involving exercise of power by the various actors concerned. A 
framework well suited for studying this must analyse not only state power, but 
also the power and means of influence available to private actors. It should also 
open for an analysis of how policies are formed in the intersection of various 
actors‟ interests. „Power‟ itself is, however, a vague concept. It appears in many 
forms – sometimes easy to identify, other times in forms that can be hard to 
discover. It ranges from hard coercion, via economic inducement and agenda-
setting, to changing the behaviour of others through share attraction (Nye 2004). 
In IPE, power is understood as economic and political, and interrelated in 
complex ways.  
2.3 A Three-Dimensional Approach to Power  
A few dominant perceptions of power in political science today interpret power 
as instrumental, structural or discursive. Combining these can yield a 
multidimensional assessment of power (Fuchs and Lederer 2007:3). Such a 
combined approach provides an analytical frame that treats different levels of 
analysis at the same time, taking into consideration both structural and actor-
specific dimensions of power, and material and ideational sources of such power. 
Fuchs and Lederer (2007:12) note how business has a range of ways for exerting 
influence. It can pursue political interests and exercise power through bargaining 
processes on the micro-level, on the level of the firm or various deals, or it can 
impose its interests on macro-level structures through the use of discursive power 
and social and economic relations. Various power dimensions offer alternative 
and complementary means to influence people and processes, and these acts may 
be understood as instrumental, structural or discursive power.  
19 
 
Instrumental power 
The instrumentalist understanding of power has its origin in the realist approach. 
This type of power is associated with Machiavellian thinking and fits well with 
more „basic‟ and traditional definitions of power, such as Dahl‟s familiar 
definition, „A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would otherwise not do‟ (1957, quoted in Fuchs and Lederer 2007:4). 
Similarly, Weber (2000:53) has defined this type of power as „the possibility of 
one or several individuals to implement out their own will in the social 
intercourse, also despite resistance from others‟ (my translation from the 
Norwegian edition). This interpretation of power is based on a methodological 
individualist approach, analysing direct and observable power relations between 
actors. Instrumental power related to business actors may be understood as when 
business actors invest resources in order to exercise influence in political 
processes, for example lobbying. The use of instrumentalist power by business 
actors is not a new phenomenon, but has escalated since the 1970s because of 
greater incentives for political decisionmakers to provide business actors with 
privileged access (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). This need is explained with 
reference to rising concerns about economic growth and the complexity of policy 
issues in the globalized economy (Newell 2004). Business actors have expanded 
their lobbying activities, where the considerable resources available to them tend 
to offer a competitive advantage over other actors (Fuchs and Lederer 2007).  
Structural power 
„Structural power‟ is more challenging to define than instrumental power. 
Structuralist approaches hold that power and its use must be analysed in relation 
to social and economic institutions and structures in society (Fuchs and Lederer 
2007:5). The focus is on the material structures underlying behavioural options, 
whereby decisionmaking is influenced, directly or indirectly. While 
instrumentalist power is likely to influence the output side of policy, assessing 
structural power focuses more on the input side. This view can be traced to Marx, 
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Althusser and Gramsci, and has been applied for example in considering the 
structural dependency of state elites on private-sector profitability and in 
emphasizing corporate bargaining power on government policy agendas of 
promising jobs and income (Cox 1987, Frank 1978, Wallerstein 1979 in Fuchs 
and Lederer 2007). We have an example of structural exercise of power by 
business today in public–private partnerships (PPPs), which  allow business 
actors to influence the kind of area for which rules are designed, as well as the 
actual design, implementation and enforcement of the rules – described by Fuchs 
and Lederer as active political structural power. The phenomenon of business 
structural power is more controversial than instrumental power, due to the greater 
empirical challenge of proving underlying power, as it enables and constrains 
actor choices without directly observable inducements or coercion. Controversy 
applies also to discursive power.  
Discursive power 
Discursive approaches to power adopt a sociological and relational view on 
power, where power is seen as a function of norms, ideas and societal institutions 
that are reflected in discourse, communicative practices and cultural values 
(Fuchs and Lederer 2007:8). This is substantially different from structural power, 
as the Marxist tradition emphasizes the material basis as the primary source of 
power. In the discursive dimension, power shapes identities and perceptions, and 
fosters the shared interpretation of a situation. It is thus held as a sophisticated 
form of power, which, in contrast to the directly observable power relations of 
instrumental power, is not as easily identified. Discursive power precedes the 
formation and articulation of interests in the political process, due to its role in 
constituting and framing policies, actors, broader societal norms, and ideas. It 
may prevent a conflict of interest from arising or even from being perceived as 
one, as expressed by Lukes (2005:27), „Is it not the supreme form of power to 
form other peoples very desires and wants!‟ Discursive power, and how it 
influences policy and politics, has been attracting more and more scholarly 
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interest (see Fuchs and Lederer 2004:8). Practices of discursive power may vary; 
some examples of where discursive power matters include the strategic 
promotion of certain ideas in the international system and the legitimacy of the 
international order, or related to nation-states‟ use of soft power (Nye 2004). 
Business invests heavily in ways of executing discursive power; indeed, 
this may be the most interesting and extensive development of business political 
role today (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). Actors in the political process may frame 
themselves according to a certain image; corporations may describe and thereby 
frame themselves as good citizens; or NGOs may frame other political actors as 
unreliable. Framing is a method that is part of the discursive toolbox of business 
power. Through discursive power, business influences and may even shape the 
cultural values and desire of the common people. This subtle way of creating 
interests is closely related to perceptions of legitimacy: in order to exercise 
discursive power effectively in the political process, actors require authority, and 
that links legitimacy and power. Closely linked to actor legitimacy is authority, 
which may be defined as the legitimate exercise of power (Bull and McNeill 
2007). In the globalised context expertise, moral standing and goal achievement 
are sources of authority.  
2.4 Power and Interest Groups  
The pluralist view
18
 sees policies as the result of different interest groups 
possessing resources which they use to exert influence, but with states as the 
main actors and politics as located within the governmental frame (Falkner 
2008). Free market and competition between groups are believed to lead to 
stability in politics over time, and business actors are seen as an interest group in 
line with others, like trade unions, religious groups or consumer groups. 
However, the business groups are not „just‟ another interest group (Lindblom 
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1977). Neo-pluralists assert that corporate actors operate from a privileged 
position compared to states and NGOs, as they have more material resources, 
which is seen as the dominant source of power. Business actors hold a special 
position in society due to their critical role as „providers of employment, sources 
of economic growth and stimulus for technological innovation‟ (Falkner 2008:4). 
This challenges the pluralist view that competition among and between interests 
groups will lead to an equitable social system over time; structural power makes 
it more likely that business groups will „outgovern‟ the needs of other groups and 
that their dominant resources will lead to a systematic favouring of business 
actors. 
On the other hand, the structuralist approach readily leads to material 
determinism – the belief that the most resource-rich actors will always get their 
way. This has proven not always to be the case (Falkner 2008). Concluding that 
business always has superior power is too categorical. Varying policy outcomes 
can be explained by the fact that political agency and discursive power can 
overcome structural impediments. In addition, business actors represent a 
diversified group. Tensions between and within business groups weaken their 
overall power, as challenging forces can use this tension to play corporate actors 
off against each other. Business power is thus a multifaceted phenomenon. In 
today‟s globalized world, business actors must face a wide range of civil society 
actors all seeking to influence norms and affect company behaviour by 
challenging their power and legitimacy.  
A analytical perspective for assessing business power should therefore be 
sensitive to the privileged material position of business, but also acknowledge the 
diversity of business interests, their countervailing forces and the conflict 
potential among them (Falkner 2008:6). The structural power of business will 
have to be established empirically in each case, including the analysis of how 
                                                                                                                                    
18 A line of political science developed for American politics, Robert Dahl‟s book Who governs? (1961) is a classic 
text.   
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different interest groups make use of discursive power. For further understanding 
the exercise of discursive and structural power, the term „soft power‟ may prove 
useful.   
2.5 Soft Power 
Power is easy to identify when there is an actor A, a state or a firm that directly 
exercises power over another actor B. Such an analysis assumes that actors are 
easily defined. However, in the case of structural power and discursive power in 
particular, actors may not always be readily defined, and use of instrumental 
„force‟ may be hard to detect, because power works in various ways to set the 
frames for what is discussed or believed as realistic options, in the case of 
structural power, and to form actor B‟s very own wants and perceptions in the 
case of discursive power. All the same, power which is not easy to identify is no 
less significant. Indeed, according to Lukes (2005), power is at its most effective 
when it is least observable.  
In political processes, state agencies, NGOs and business all engage in 
constant contests over the structures and processes that constrain and enable 
business activities. The concept of hegemony, deriving from Gramsci, can help to 
explain discursive power in relation to the resultant social order (Levy and 
Newell 2004). Hegemony works in a way that „frames thought and thereby 
circumscribes action‟ (Cox 2000:140). It may thus be understood as a subtle form 
of power which is not dependent on coercive and instrumentalist control of other 
actors. Gramscian ideas of hegemony and civil society here provide a conceptual 
link between the strategies of business actors and international relations, and can 
help to illuminate how the political economy of international governance is 
structured. In a situation of conflicting interests among groups in society, 
different groups will have an interest in establishing their representation of reality 
as the „obvious‟ and right view of reality (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). This 
demands a great effort, in terms of discursively working to make and defend a 
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hegemonic position. A hegemonic discourse will always be vulnerable to the 
political forces that it excludes, which will seek to challenge the dominant social 
order.  
„Soft power‟ is similar in substance, but not identical to, a combination of 
the second dimension of power- structural power, and the third dimension- 
discursive power. The expression was first applied by Joseph Nye (2004), and 
defined as the ability to obtain what one wants through cooption and attraction. 
 
More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that 
it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today‟s world, it is 
best to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is 
even more so in a global information age. (Nye 2004:1) 
 
Attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than 
producing an easily observable specific action (Nye 2004). The notion of „soft 
power‟ must be understood in contradistinction to „hard power‟, such as the use 
of coercion and payment. A nation with a high degree of soft power, and the good 
will that engenders it, will inspire others to acculturate, and thereby avoids the 
need for expensive hard-power expenditures. Soft power can be wielded not just 
by states, but by all actors in international politics, including NGOs or 
international institutions.  
According to Nye (2004), a nation-state‟s soft power has three main 
sources: its culture  –  if attractive to others; its political values – if the state lives 
up to them; and its foreign policies – when it is seen as legitimate and having 
moral authority. The success of soft power thus depends greatly on the actor‟s 
reputation within the international community, and its rise is related to 
globalization, which has changed the ways that actors may exert power on the 
international arena (Nye 2004). Today a state may not as easily pursue its 
interests using coercive hard power, but must play according to international rules 
in order to maintain goodwill and respect in the international community – 
although the objectives may be the same, whether soft or hard power is used.    
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2.6 Applying a Multidimensional Research Approach 
Fuchs and Lederer (2007) do not offer any specific examples of how to proceed 
with a multidimensional research approach. In line with their approach of 
understanding power as multifaceted, I hold that, for studying power as exercised 
in practice, by not only state actors in processes of international governance 
relations such as aid, we need a theoretical framework that is sensitive to power 
in its various forms, analysing the instrumental, structural and discursive 
dimension. Within these main types of power, actors may adopt a range of 
strategies to exert influence. Instrumental power, where actor A directly changes 
actor B‟s behaviour by force, would seem easier to identify, whereas structural 
and discursive power may influence actor behaviour in ways not be immediately 
clear to those involved. 
A tripartite analytical differentiation of power as a research approach is 
admittedly an ambitious goal, since studying three dimensions simultaneously is 
more demanding than the usual approach of applying only one power dimension. 
As a case of development policy, however, OfD represents precisely a nexus of 
different actors, involving several decisionmaking processes where all three 
forms of power may be present. Powerful individuals may influence choices of 
cooperation partners: an example of actor-specific instrumental power that does 
not imply hard force. Seeing OfD as a PPP opens for a study of how structural 
power is exercised. As OfD is a demand-driven programme, it also needs to 
maintain a good reputation; and the ways that OfD represents itself in line with 
the strong discourse of altruism in Norwegian aid make it relevant to analyse 
OfD‟s discursive dimension of power as well.  
With globalisation sources of power have changed (Nye 2004). The types 
of influence from business actors have increased and taken new forms, giving 
new political strength to business power (Fuchs and Lederer 2007). The 
perspectives adopted here as an analytical frame encourage studies of business 
power in its empirical manifestation in specific contexts. Much of IR theory has 
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been characterized by statist views, resulting in failure to grasp adequately the 
ways in which states and business actors may exercise power today. But having 
recognized the privileged position of business, we cannot simply adopt a 
structuralist approach to studying it. Despite the often superior material resources 
of business, its power has not remained unchallenged. Civil society‟s use of its 
moral authority, and opposing interests within the business world, open for 
influence from alternative sources of power.  
A limitation of the framework proposed here might be that it promotes a 
too strict analytical division between public and private actors. Most IR theory 
has contributed to an understanding of „private‟ and „public‟, „domestic‟ and 
„foreign‟ as binary oppositions (Brenner et al. 2003). According to Bieling (2007) 
such an analytical division risks ignoring that private and public actors are, in 
practice, interdependent. In this case study, the issue of „public‟ and „private‟ is 
complicated by the fact that some actors do not really fit into either category. 
Some of the actors defined here as „private‟ due to their objectives as profit-
seeking or pro-industry actors, such as Statoil and Intsok, are majority-owned or 
partly owned by the government, although not controlled by it. This blurs the 
boundaries between public and private. Because OfD represents a rather special 
case, it might be that even recent IPE contributions cannot provide all the 
answers for understanding its power dimensions.  
To conclude, an analytical frame for studying power related to policy 
formation of aid operating close to the commercial world and involving private 
partners in development will need to deal with various dimensions of the power 
available to state and non-state actors. Using the analytical framework presented 
here, this study assesses how different actors exercise power and exert influence 
through public–private aid cooperation, while also being aware of the forces that 
enable and constrain business power today. I will use the analytical tools to try to 
understand how various forms of power are applied by actors in OfD in ways that 
affect relations between the state and the market spheres in a way favourable for 
some of the actors – notably, for the Norwegian state and the petroleum industry. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
A research design is concerned with „turning research questions into projects‟ 
(Robson 2002:81). In order to answer the research question of what constitutes 
the OfD nexus and how it advances public–private relations, I opted for a flexible 
research design which is well suited to studying one or few related cases in their 
context (Robson 2002). My aim was to build an in-depth picture of the case, and I 
therefore chose a qualitative approach, which is good for highlighting nuances 
and giving broad and thick information about the case (Thagaard 2003), and a 
case-study approach, which allows for the use of a wide array of data (Creswell 
1998). Seeking to understand the informants‟ perceptions and motivations, I 
chose semi-structured interviews as the primary source of information during my 
fieldwork. In line with the methods of a flexible and qualitative research design, 
choice of theory and sharpening of the research question took form in an 
interactive process of analysis and thus influenced each other during the process. 
There is no overall consensus about how to conceptualize the conduct of 
research, even less for interdisciplinary research. In a specific research design, 
theory and method are closely connected to each other and to the phenomena 
being studied. There are many types of theory, and the choice of method makes 
some possible while excluding others. However, within the social science 
disciplines, such as political science and sociology, theories often have some 
similarities, despite the differences in their approaches. I take the stand of a 
critical realist, also described as a pragmatic approach, seeking a middle ground 
between constructionist and positivist approaches (Robson 2002). Critical realism 
tries pragmatically to apply the best theoretical and methodological approach to 
solving a problem, and thus goes well with a flexible research design. 
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3.1 Qualitative Method and Flexible Design 
 „Qualitative method‟ is a collective term for a range of research strategies 
including interviews, participatory observation, text analysis and more, all 
handling data which are not primarily figures or quantifiable information. These 
approaches are well suited where the field is complex or there has been little 
previous research (Robson 2002). They seemed the best approach to studying 
OfD – a new trend in aid, a new and little-researched phenomenon in Norwegian 
development. The OfD nexus also is a complicated field, with a multitude of 
strategies, actors and plans. Qualitative studies are also well suited to investigate 
„false consciousness‟, meaning actors who are unaware of the historical reality 
they engage in (Lincoln and Guba 1981: 2003).  
The qualitative approach further presumes systematic thought regarding 
the research progression and methodological choices during fieldwork; also 
essential are sensitivity and empathy to obtain an understanding of those being 
studied (Thagaard 2003). In qualitative method, the researcher must aim at 
theoretical breadth, meaning that both the researcher‟s and the various 
informants‟ understandings of the issue are coherently and consistently attended 
to (Thagaard 2003). This is done by presenting central tendencies in the material, 
what is typical, rather than a narrow selection which can give an inaccurate 
picture of the researched reality. I found this important to bear in mind when 
studying the politically sensitive themes of petroleum and aid, where actors differ 
in their perceptions of what is „right‟ and „true‟. 
In qualitative method, flexible designs are applied. Such designs must be 
rigorous in ways of collection data, doing analysis, and writing report, while at 
the same time letting the detailed design framework emerge during the study, 
through constantly revisiting the questions (Robson 2002). It is often said that in 
a flexible design the researcher is the main instrument (Thagaard 2003, Robson 
2002) because the analysis is performed by the researcher herself, not by tools or 
instruments. A flexible design normally includes data collection through a range 
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of techniques, such as interview, observation and documentary analysis. In this 
study, interviews were combined with elements of document analysis and 
observation, thus aspiring to data triangulation – a widely used strategy where 
information is drawn from multiple sources to enhance the rigour of the research 
(Robson 2002). Through applying several types of data, theories and methods, 
threats to validity and researcher or respondent biases can be reduced. My 
research design uses triangulation of data, as critical text analysis and observation 
are applied in addition to the main data source of semi-structured interviews, 
although the design is restricted to qualitative method  
3.1.1 The case study 
Case study is a type of flexible design that allows for detailed information on a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, supported by multiple 
sources of evidence (Robson 2002). I found this approach best suited for studying 
OfD and its cooperation with Ghana, as a case study is the study of a „functioning 
specific‟, or a „bounded system‟ (Louis Smith in Stake 1995), which may be a 
process, activity, event, programme, one or multiple individuals (Creswell 1998). 
Case researchers seek out both what is common and what is particular about the 
case. The approach is good for obtaining „thick‟ and detailed information about 
meaning, context and perceptions – precisely the kind of data needed to answer 
the research question of this thesis. Yin (2003:13) underlines the fruitfulness of 
the case-study approach for understanding complex social phenomena, as it 
allows one to retain „the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events‟. A case study was rewarding as studying OfD as a policy needs to 
illuminate the complexity of actors and agendas that meet or are combined in this 
nexus. 
Trustworthiness in a case study 
Case studies are meant to capture cases in their uniqueness; they depend on single 
or few cases and often non-standardization of many methods – so, it is often 
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asked, can one really generalize from case studies? (See, e.g., Robson 2002.) 
Generalizability refers to the extent to which findings in the enquiry can be taken 
as generally applicable outside the specifics of the situation studied. 
Trustworthiness is crucial for producing good research: researchers must provide 
convincing reasons why their research results are credible. The two most 
important tools for achieving such trustworthiness are validity and reliability 
(Robson 2002). Validity involves whether findings are really about what they 
appear to be. Reliability concerns the consistency or stability of interpretations 
and results – whether the investigation would produce the same results if 
repeated. Fulfilled in a satisfactory manner, these measures would make a study 
trustworthy and enhance the ability to generalize from it.  
Measures of validity and reliability were developed within traditional fixed 
designs for dealing with quantitative data, and there has been considerable debate 
as to whether these measures are applicable for qualitative data as well. Yin 
(1994) has convincingly argued that the purpose of case studies is not statistical, 
but analytical or theoretical representativity as the means for generalization. 
Generalization should not be emphasized in all studies; the commitment to 
generalize should not be so strong that the researcher‟s attention is drawn away 
from features important for understanding the case itself (Stake 1995). In practice 
there is a trade-off between ability to generalize and to give in-depth information 
of a case.  However, case studies can usefully be seen as small steps towards a 
grand generalization (Campbell 1975, in Robson 2002).  
3.2 Data Collection 
A key element for getting good data is purposeful sampling. A sample must be 
chosen for specific reasons (Creswell 1998). I decided on whom to interview 
after some introductory informal conversations – with one „junior‟ employee in 
OfD, a Norwatch employee whom I had previous worked with in editing 
Oljespill, a book on the scramble for oil in Africa, and a journalist in the 
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newspaper Klassekampen, who had written several articles about OfD. These 
meetings were helpful in choosing informants and preparing the interview guide. 
During the interviews I also asked for suggestions as to other persons to talk to, 
also referred to as „snow-balling‟, and some informants where chosen because it 
was evident from looking at meeting reports that they were involved in OfD 
activities that I wanted to discuss. My fieldwork period in Ghana lasted mid-
October to mid-December 2008, whereas fieldwork in Norway was split in 
conducting interviews before and after my stay in Ghana, with two interviews 
before, and the rest conducted from February to Mars 2009 and from January to 
March 2010. I selected informants from ministries involved in OfD in Norway 
and Ghana, and from petroleum corporations and petroleum industry related 
bodies. In addition I conducted interviews with civil society representatives in 
Ghana, ranging from a paramount chief to various NGOs and the World Bank, in 
order to understand the political situation. My final sample consisted of 31 
interviews, most of them were with people holding high positions in society. 
I used some document analysis, especially in preparation for the 
interviews. These documents were OfD web pages and working papers, Ghana‟s 
petroleum policy and petroleum master plan, as well as some internal government 
documents that I was able to obtain. As for official documents showing the 
communication between Norway and Ghana in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry‟s 
postal archive, I was given access to some, but denied access to others. In 
addition I used articles from various media, such as Financial Times, 
Klassekampen and Upstream Petroleum Magazine. Another useful text tool 
proved to be meeting plans and reports available on the Internet. These provided 
an overview of who had been present at important meetings, and I sometimes 
used this information to get in touch with people. For example, I had tried to 
contact Statoil for months to arrange an interview, but without success; instead, I 
simply got in touch with a person who had been present at activities that I wanted 
to discuss, and an interview appointment was set. In addition, I attended some 
meetings as an observer: the most important were the West Africa regional 
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seminar on data management in Akosombo, a joint donor meeting with OfD in 
Accra, and an Intsok/Statoil-hosted meeting on internationalization in the 
Norwegian petroleum industry in Oslo (see Appendix).   
 
Table 1 Information sources 
GROUP/ COUNTRY GHANA NORWAY 
 
Governmental Bodies 
 
11  interviews were done in 
this group, 6 in Norway, 5 
in Ghana 
 
Members of Ghana‟s 
Technical Oil and Gas 
Committee 
The President‟s Office (the 
Castle) 
Ministry of Energy 
Ministry of Finance 
EPA 
 
OFD Secretariat in NORAD 
OFD Steering Committee   
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ministry of Environment 
Ministry of Finance  
Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy 
 
 
Oil Companies and 
Industry Related Bodies 
 
7 interviews were done in 
this group, 4  in Norway, 3 
in Ghana 
 
GNPC 
Kosmos Energy   
 
 
Statoil 
Norwegian oil company 
Intsok  
 
 
Other Interest Groups  
 
14 interviews were in this 
group, 1 in Norway, 13 in 
Ghana 
 
WB, Isodec, Friends of the 
Nation (FON), German 
Development Agency 
(GTZ), Third World 
Network, Ghana Trade 
Union, Chiefs, journalists. 
 
Petrad  
 
Publish What You Pay 
(PWY) 
 
 
3.2.2 The interviews 
Interviews are about asking questions and (one hopes) receiving answers, and are 
flexible and adaptable tools for findings things out. Using follow-up questions 
and asking for examples can provide more interesting, richer answers. Through 
the interviews I aimed at responding to the informants‟ ideas and opinions in a 
neutral and equal manner. In preparation, I learned as much as possible about the 
interviewees before meeting them – background, working place and involvement 
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in OfD – in order to ask questions that were perceived as relevant to them. As my 
sample involved a broad range of informants from two different countries, I 
could not simply use the same interview guide for each meeting, but had to 
prepare and adjust for each separately. However, I do not feel this weakens the 
validity of the data, as all core issues were the same.  
I experienced a small change in how structured the interviews were from 
the beginning towards the end of the interview process. Whereas the first 
interviews were more a matter of informants answering my ready-made questions 
and following a more rigid interview guide, I gradually got better at listening to 
what was being said. This enabled a more relaxed atmosphere, and the interviews 
tended to be more like conversations around the most important themes. This 
freedom from the interview guide was possible because of my increased 
familiarity with the field and with interviewing. I experienced that fieldwork 
really is „the art of conversation‟ and also understood why the method of 
interviewing has been described as „the art of hearing data‟ (Thagaard 2002:87). 
Questions had to be asked in a way that would invite the respondent to give good 
and extensive answers. By showing interest, curiosity and a positive attitude, I 
could build trust – important in opening up for dialogue. That some interviews 
were undertaken in a more relaxed atmosphere, I found mostly positive, when it 
made possible a confidential tone; however, in one case, it was more 
constraining, when I felt that a powerful informant was undervaluing the 
importance of my questions. When listening to this interview later, I recognized 
this informant‟s attitude as „defensive‟ behaviour. 
3.2.3 Researching elites, time and getting access 
My interviews were with few exceptions with elites, people working in 
governments and corporations, often in high/leader positions. Researching 
upwards brings challenges of getting time and access, but can be beneficial, as 
understanding how decisionmakers think is important in order to be heard on an 
issue. „Elite people‟, however, are busy, and for interviewing about sensitive 
34 
 
issues like aid and business there is limited time to get people to open up. This 
may be a weakness of the data, although I was surprised at how many people 
wanted to talk, also about politically sensitive matters, especially when I 
demonstrated knowledge and familiarity with the issues.  
Gaining access and establishing rapport are important for getting good 
data. And physical and social logistics shapes access to the field and influence 
data‟s trustworthiness. The context of data collection can be as important in 
explaining the data as the data themselves (Robson 2002). Often, people I 
interviewed would suggest other people to talk to, and would even introduce me 
to them. Getting access and establishing contacts represented a rather different 
process and experience in Norway and Ghana. The stay in Accra was rewarding 
as I was fortunate enough to have several informal meetings with people who 
worked with OfD, embassy staff, and researchers. It was tempting to use names 
from people in the OfD programme to get access, but I avoided that, as it could 
give the impression of my being affiliated with the OfD or the government, 
which in turn could affect the data. I always made it clear that I was independent, 
not working for the Norwegian government or OfD, and that I was there to learn 
about Ghana and aid cooperation with Norway.  
Further practicalities included understanding codes of behaviour in Ghana 
for how to approach people and how to make interview agreements. A typical 
means of getting access and establishing contact in a case study is through 
gatekeeper informants and gaining confidence with the participants (Creswell 
1998). A „gatekeeper‟ is someone who is a member of, or has an insider status, 
with a cultural group, and who can serve as an initial contact for the researcher, 
leading the researcher to other informants (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, in 
Creswell 1998). In Norway I had connections to OfD and civil society through 
previous organizational work. Having a gatekeeper became important in Ghana, 
where cultural codes and few contacts made the social environment I wanted to 
visit more unattainable. Here one specific gatekeeper became a key to access the 
Presidential Office („the Castle‟), and being granted access to the Castle during 
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the first weeks of my fieldwork gave further access to governmental 
organizations. There is, however, one note of caution regarding gatekeepers: as a 
gatekeeper person usually has contacts within one type or circle of informants, 
the researcher must consider whether all types of informants are covered with this 
gatekeeper‟s connection; it may be wise to search for more than one gatekeeper. I 
would describe my process of establishing rapport as a matter of being persistent 
(and a bit lucky), approaching a lot of events and individuals to establish good 
contacts. 
Researcher’s Role  
Research is rarely value-free or politically neutral, but is founded upon the 
researcher‟s values (Robson 2002:72). During the research and writing process 
for this thesis I thought about my own role, my influences before meeting the 
field from a background of development studies and civil society work, all 
typically critical to the power of the oil industry. For the purpose of this project I 
needed to try to be neutral in dealings with all my respondents. Also the 
researcher‟s status, class and gender impact on the kinds of data informants give 
(Thagaard 2003). In Ghana my role was in cultural terms that of an „other‟, and 
that probably affected the type of data I obtained, although I cannot know how 
things would have been if I had been Ghanaian. For an „outsider‟ it is more 
challenging to establish trust in the interview situation, although it might make 
some informants open up, and I believe that being Norwegian gave me more 
access. Being a young female conducting fieldwork in a men‟s world,19 the 
petroleum sector, was both challenging and enabling. However, I experienced 
that it was possible to use this to my advantage. As a (young) woman, I found 
that many informants explained carefully and in detail how they perceived the 
issues in question. And in Ghana, I believe being a young „unimportant‟ woman 
had a less intimidating effect when talking about sensitive issues. However, in 
                                                                                                                                    
19 Of over thirty informants, only six were women. 
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other situations it was revealing my own knowledge of the field that helped 
informants to „open up‟. 
Reflections 
During the fieldwork I focused on understanding how Ghana‟s petroleum sector 
was arranged and administered, and which deals had been made with which 
foreign companies. I examined how many and who the „OfD people‟, the „expats‟ 
and experts in Ghana were, how long they stayed there, and why they were there. 
I tried to understand whether there was an opposition between Norwegian 
business interests and the interests of the Ghanaian state, and what objectives of 
the Norwegian government were (to be competitive, etc.). Other underlying 
questions were how to understand the actors‟ narratives and whether they had 
seemingly similar or conflicting frames of interpretation, whether OfD objectives 
were manifested in actual praxis, and how meetings and collaboration were 
arranged, examining language use through observation (when possible) and text 
analysis. Meeting people in Ghana was equally important for me as meeting the 
elites I was interviewing, in order to get a better understanding of the society in 
which OfD is operating. During my field I therefore chose to live with a family, 
who happened to be located in one of the marginalized parts of Accra, La. The 
contrast of living in impoverished conditions, while regularly visiting elite 
people‟s areas, increased my understanding of what it meant to be economically 
marginalized. That family became my doorway for trying to understand Ghanaian 
society. I also worked on a school project and served as an election observer 
during the 2008 presidential elections, as a part of a Canadian research team led 
by a Ghanaian whom I had previously interviewed in Norway, in their 
neighbourhood.  
Storage and analysis of data  
For the interviews I used a tape recorder, and data were stored both electronically 
and physically. In addition to data from interviews, observation and documents, I 
kept a fieldwork diary, writing down my approaches and the achievements of 
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each day, together with thoughts and reflections along the way. In doing the 
analysis, I went through all the material in sequences corresponding to the 
thematic organization of the thesis and in sequences corresponding to the 
outlining of questions in the interview guide. I noted what the informants 
expressed as relevant and what I understood to be relevant, and compared 
interviewees‟ statements, looking for coherences or discrepancies. 
Limitations 
Taking note of real-world constraints is important in an empirical research project 
(Robson 2003). This concern may be dealt with when making the research 
design, ensuring that choices of research focus are realistic in terms of the time 
and resources available. I had to be critical and selective in how to divide my 
time among informants, especially towards the end of the process. During 
fieldwork I was also given access to some non-official documents. These 
provided interesting sources of information, but could unfortunately not be cited, 
and were treated as background material. Regarding access to information, such 
as agreements between the Ghanaian state and oil companies, difficulties arose 
from norms of confidentiality in business culture and cultural norms of not 
sharing information in Ghana. A heightened focus on accountability has brought 
changes in norms of confidentiality, but in Ghana I found that there was 
confusion as to what governmental and business information should be accessible 
to civil society.  
3.2.4 Ethical conciderations  
Researchers have a responsibility with regard to how they treat the data. Access 
to data also means responsibility for how you present it and what you do with it. 
This was particularly important when discussing politically sensitive topics. I 
always made it clear that information from the interviews would not be misused, 
and in some cases I gave promises of confidentiality, although I kept an open 
record and used a voice recorder in almost all interviews. In one interview, the 
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informants wanted anonymity, because of caution about revealing their work 
practices, what they called their „intellectual capital‟. On one occasion, an 
informant with a previous bad experience had initially refused to be interviewed. 
This indicates the importance of proper handling of informants regarding 
interpretation and protection in accordance to ethical research rules. It also says 
something about the level of disagreement and distrust between oil industry and 
civil society groups. That said, I would maintain that important people in society 
have an (informal) duty to contribute to research on their field. A further ethical 
consideration concerned to which extent informants should be „included‟ in what 
the study was about. I found it important to be sincere regarding my research 
theme, since representing it otherwise could imply a risk of distorting data. 
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4. CREATION AND CONTEXT OF OFD 
In Chapter One I formulated the research question of what constitutes the OfD 
nexus, and how it promotes public–private relations. In Chapter Two I presented 
a theoretical framework for analysis, and in Chapter Three I outlined the 
methodological approach. In this chapter I discuss the rationale and context for 
creating OfD, by examining the two reasons for establishing the initiative 
according to OfD‟s website,20 and the concurrent trend of internationalization in 
the Norwegian petroleum industry. Two reasons were given for stepping up 
Norway‟s petroleum-related assistance: 1) a growing awareness of the negative 
situation of resource-rich developing countries, the „resource curse‟, and 2) that 
Norway is uniquely positioned to do something in this field. I will elaborate on 
the „resource curse‟ literature and discuss the idea of Norway as a country well 
positioned to provide petroleum-related assistance. That will entail examining 
„the Norwegian model‟ – a term widely used in various contexts: in development 
literature, peace building, sociological literature on welfare, and in management 
of petroleum resources. The Norwegian model for petroleum management and 
the Norwegian model for aid are relevant in this thesis. I will argue that the 
creation of OfD must be analysed in relation to the Norwegian government‟s 
objective of internationalizing the petroleum industry, but let me begin by 
pointing out that, when OfD was established in 2005, petroleum aid was not 
entirely new in Norwegian development thinking.  
4.1 Continuation and Steering Structure 
Petroleum-related assistance is given mainly by countries with strong political 
and commercial interests in hydrocarbons, and may be described as activities 
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aimed at improving the developmental impact of petroleum resources. Norway‟s 
petroleum-related aid is organized bilaterally, and focuses not on the allocation of 
money, but on capacity transfer and institution building. When OfD was 
introduced, Norway had already been engaged in petroleum-related assistance for 
some 30 years, mainly through Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), in cooperation with NORAD. This had 
been low-profile aid, familiar to few people (interview, Lunde).
21
 With the 
establishment of OfD came an increase, unification, integration and coordination 
of previous efforts. There was an acknowledged need for more focus on the 
financial and environmental dimensions of resource management, in addition to 
the previous practice of assistance to technical resource management, and so OfD 
included a financial and an environmental pillar in the programme. That required 
a different steering structure than before, involving the Ministries of Finance and 
the Environment, in addition to MPE, NPD and Petrad, and the two „regular‟ 
units for steering development programmes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and NORAD. This gave OfD a particularly complex steering structure. 
The OfD initiative operates in the intersection of altruistic and commercial 
interests, and has as an articulated goal that others shall benefit from expertise in 
the Norwegian oil industry. In addition to the programme‟s steering model, that 
makes it a ‘rara avis’ within NORAD. Further contributing to the impression of 
OfD as an anomaly in Norwegian development assistance is the fact that NORAD 
in OfD has employed mainly people from the petroleum sector to work within the 
secretariat of this development programme. The various actors in the steering 
group and the operative unit deal with differing dimensions of the „resource 
curse‟. 
                                                                                                                                    
20http://www.norad.no/en/Thematic+areas/Energy/Oil+for+Development/Oil+for+Development.127154.cms?show=a
ll 16.3.10 
21 Leiv Lunde was central in the creation of OfD: first as a researcher, responsible for the ECON Poivry report West 
African Oil – Curse or Blessing, then as state secretary under Development Minister Hilde Frafjord Johnsen, and 
finally as first director of the OfD programme. Lunde was criticized for being involved on „all sides of the table”.   
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4.2 Resource Curse, and the Hallmarks of Petrostates 
By past experience you could wish nothing worse upon a developing country 
than an oil find.
22
 
  
Time has shown that producing oil in commercial quantities is not enough to 
obtain welfare and development. Without an effective system for managing oil 
production and generating income to benefit the population, what should have 
been a blessing can quickly become a curse (Collier 2007). There is also a clear 
negative correlation between resource riches, like oil, and economic growth 
(Sachs and Warner 2000). Without exception, every developing country where oil 
has been found has seen living standards decline and people suffer. Many oil-rich 
developing countries have performed worse than their non-oil neighbours, despite 
the big cash flows generated from the oil industry (Ghazvinian 2007:14). For 
many countries, large stocks of natural resources have not contributed to 
development, but instead fuelled civil wars and political instability, resulting in 
higher levels of poverty (Collier 2007). Countries that depend on oil have been 
shown to be among the most financially troubled, most authoritarian, and most 
conflict-ridden in the world (Karl 2005). 
Despite the vast literature on the resource curse, there is no scholarly 
consensus as how to explain it. This could be problematic, as policy implications 
without a clear theoretical and empirical basis might lead to misplaced policy 
interventions. Various mechanisms of the resource curse may destroy the political 
and institutional fabric of a country, and several economic and social 
explanations have been offered as to why this occurs (Ghazvinian 2007:95). 
According to Østerud (2003), the „curse‟ is that the abundance turns into a 
comfortable cushion, leading to overstated demands and expectations, high 
consumption, poor economic discipline, optimistic borrowing and neglect of 
                                                                                                                                    
22 Financial Times 8 October 2003, regarding prospects of Chad–Cameroon pipeline project, quoted in Econ Poïvry 
report 2004:14 
42 
 
other industries. To give a coherent picture of the challenges of resource curse, I 
have here used Kolstad et al.‟s (2009) classification of resource curse in four 
main types which are seen as the most robust explanations: Dutch disease, 
patronage, rent seeking, and destruction of institutions. While these are different 
mechanisms, they are also likely to affect each other.  
  „Dutch disease‟ describes a situation when (natural) resources alter the 
industrial structure in a country in a way that in turn may reduce productivity and 
development (Kolstad et al. 2009). As the country becomes flooded with foreign 
currency from the export of natural resources, these artificially inflate the value 
of its own currency, making imported goods cheaper. This may lead to urban 
migration and declining agriculture production, and in the worst cases, foreign 
food import dependency – which not all can afford – and ultimately foreign aid 
dependency.  
  The second mechanism, rent-seeking behaviour, is described as the 
socially costly pursuit of rents (Svensson 2005). In extractive industries, like oil 
and gas, the revenues are disproportional to the cost of production, so there is a 
rent profit that accrues to those who control the resources. Also here the result is 
a drop in production, because entrepreneur talents engage in rent-seeking 
activities instead of running enterprises that create value; some forms of rent-
seeking activity also qualify as corruption. A state that gets most of its income 
from external sources, like oil and gas rent, becomes less dependent on its people 
to provide tax revenues, and that has rendered some rentier states less 
accountable to the people and society they govern (Kolstad et al. 2009). As 
political power and economic influence become especially concentrated in a 
rentier state, lines between the private and the public get blurred, and rent seeking 
as a strategy for wealth creation becomes rampant. Moreover, since the people 
are not involved in the actual production and wealth creation, they have a hard 
time claiming a share of the outcome. With oil revenues, politicians have access 
to vast sums of money, and some petro-states become more concerned with 
redistribution of oil money than with diversifying and expanding „the cake‟ (the 
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country‟s production) itself, leading to no real value creation in the country. This 
phenomenon has been termed the „allocation state‟ (Ghazvinian 2007:104).  
  The third mechanism, patronage, occurs when public resources are 
employed to secure political power. With increasing resources, the future utility 
of having political power will increase; as a result, politicians will choose 
policies that increase their own chances of remaining in power. This can include 
giving public-sector jobs to people to gain support, or investing in projects that 
provide political but not economic payoff. Also this type of leadership behaviour, 
with politicians exploiting their political positions for personal gain, must be 
characterized as corruption (Kolstad et al. 2009). This also helps explain the 
rampant militarization of oil states, or the survival of non-democratic regimes, 
often with external help. The international oil companies frequently help the 
elites in African petro-states to stay in power (Ghazvinian 2007). Oil has 
contributed to forming a type of state where the benefits of statehood are 
privatized, whereas state failures are public, to be shared by the masses. Lack of 
accountability in petro-states, and their disappearing role as providers of welfare, 
has led to a situation where non-governmental actors take over social 
programmes. An example is Angola, another OfD country, where the leaders 
have control and can increase their possibilities for accumulation. It is not a 
collapsed state, but a privatized
23
 one. The same regime that fails to provide for 
the country‟s common people engages successfully with the international 
community, which supports regime survival despite endemic poverty and the 
misuse of national resources (Ghazvinian 2007).  
The mechanisms of Dutch disease, patronage and rent-seeking behaviour 
all lead to weakening of governance systems and what Kolstad (et al. 2009) give 
as the fourth explanation for resource curse: the destruction of institutions. Given 
access to natural resources, and through the mechanisms described, politicians 
                                                                                                                                    
23 Privatized here means as opposed to public (not to be confused with „private‟ as elsewhere applied in this thesis to 
signify a part of business). 
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may destroy institutions, so that the actual effect of resource abundance becomes 
an undermining of democracy (Ross 2001).  
In addition to the general challenges of natural resource abundance, 
petroleum-producing states are made extremely vulnerable by challenges that 
relate to the characteristics of oil production. Exploitation of oil is expensive, 
capital-intensive and enclave-oriented: it creates few jobs, is centralized and more 
rent-producing than all other industries (Ross 2008, Ghazvinian 2007). The oil 
industry requires a relatively low number of workers, and though billions are 
invested in oil production in Africa, not much is actually spent in Africa. More 
jobs are created for highly qualified workers, often from the USA and Europe, 
and the purchase of technical equipment directs money flows to the big supply 
companies, also based in the West. And even if an African petro-state has well-
meaning leaders, high dependency on oil exports makes a country vulnerable to 
fluctuating oil prices. These factors may contribute to negative development in 
petroleum-producing countries, and to the resource curse. Indeed, the oil curse 
seems to have hit almost all oil-producing African countries in one way or the 
other. Most of the described resource-curse mechanisms emphasize weak 
leadership, failed institutions and poor governance as the underlying causes (Karl 
1997, Kolstad et al. 2009, Mehlum et al. 2006).  
4.2.1 The governance solution 
In the literature, problem is portrayed as primarily a governance issue. Kolstad et 
al. (2009) note how negative effects of resources seem conditioned on 
governance, and poor governance is described as „the mother of the oil curse‟. 
While „good governance‟ was a big buzzword in development-speak in the 
1990s, there are several limits to this approach. One problem is that 
underdevelopment is still discursively constructed so that the answer to poor 
development is (good) governance – meaning yet a way of measuring where „the 
West‟ is better than „the rest‟, so Westerners may take the expert role. Jones 
(2008:33) is critical that interventions proposed for dealing with the resource 
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curse have focused mainly on good governance: arguing that we have too little 
knowledge of governance, and that the links between good governance and 
resource curse are currently „hollow and devoid of practical content‟. With a 
focus on governance, management systems and administrative techniques are 
often treated as neutral and value-free phenomena to be implemented universally, 
regardless of the context (Turner and Hulme 1997), and „good governance‟ 
policies have been known to reduce democratic processes to technical and 
administrative matters (Bøås and McNeill 2003). Working with governance 
issues concerns deeply structural matters that are not easily addressed by an aid 
programme. Still, and despite sad examples of this strategy (Ghazvinian 2007), it 
seems that good governance is held to be the most important means of combating 
the resource curse.  
OfD as a ‘resource cure’? 
According to its website,
24
 OfD aims at helping developing countries to avoid the 
resource curse by focusing on capacity building and good governance. Through 
OfD, Norwegian experts provide advice and support to governments and to 
institution building in developing nation-states.  
Kolstad (et al. 2009) are skeptical to capacity building as an approach in 
development. They have asked whether the OfD programme may become a 
smokescreen for African regimes with no good intentions, and conclude that 
more resources must be invested in understanding the political economy of the 
recipient countries. In the case of a country with a self-serving government and a 
lot of oil, a demand-driven aid programme may not be the best way to secure aid 
that benefits development goals for the whole population. According to Collier 
(2007:46) African politics may be described as „the survival of the fattest‟, 
meaning that those in power will „eat‟ as much as they can, as long as they can. 
Bayart (1993) has asserted that African politics works differently from Western 
                                                                                                                                    
24 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/utviklingssamarbeid/olje-for-utvikling.html?id=446108 12 May 2010 
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politics, by what he calls the „rhizome state‟: a state focused on ensuring the 
succession of the head of state, which is seen as the whole art of governing in 
some countries. This may also indicate, despite the good rhetoric about 
governance, that corruption is not dealt with satisfactorily (Kolstad et al. 2009). 
The focus on revenues, resources and environmental management is held to be 
too narrow and sector-specific to tackle the major overarching themes of 
accountability and unfavourable incentives that are at the core of the resource 
curse; and capacity building and knowledge transfer do not in themselves lead to 
positive institutional change (Kolstad et al. 2009). The fear is that the OfD 
programme, in its current form, may help the elite in developing oil countries to 
get richer, rather than improving general conditions in the countries concerned.  
Concerning what may be achieved with capacity building, many of my 
informants were also critical. In MPE there was limited belief in what the 
programme could achieve in terms of institution building (Interview).  And as 
Wangen of Intsok put it:  
 
There is an exaggerated faith in what OfD can do in a cooperation country; 
OfD and Norway is after all normally only one of several partners. For real 
institution-building in the cooperation countries, the timeframes for projects are 
too short. Measuring the effect of it [OfD] on two to five years, it is not serious, 
nobody would think up something like this in Norway – for example, the effect 
of a Swedish project on Norwegian development, which consisted of ten 
million NOK and some workshops... but in developing countries, we do it‟ 
(interview, my translation).  
 
According to an evaluation report of Norwegian petroleum-related assistance 
prepared for NORAD, training programmes in cooperation countries and in 
Norway have been successful (NOARD Evaluation Report 2007).
25
 The 
evaluation also indicates some problems, the main one being that major 
institutional changes are almost impossible to implement in countries with an 
established petroleum sector where major revenues have already been generated. 
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In these cases, the effect may be to make the rich richer. The report concludes 
that long-term Norwegian commitment to oil assistance has been more successful 
where better institutional models are already in place or in „new‟ petroleum-
producing countries. This indicates that institution building has not been 
particularly successful. Also respondents working in the programme‟s steering 
group were sceptical to the possibility of actually achieving institution building 
through OfD (interview). It is, however, hard not to focus on institution building, 
when institutional failure is depicted as the problem. In her Paradox of Plenty: 
Oil Boom and Petrostates, Karl (1997) also notes the importance of good 
institutions in managing oil resources, and describes Norway as a shining 
example where oil has been well managed.  
4.3 Norway’s Unique Position: The ‘Norwegian Model’ 
The idea that Norway is uniquely positioned for providing petroleum-related 
assistance, the second stated reason for initiating OfD, is based on the belief that 
Norway is a rare success example of a democratic oil-producing nation. To 
understand the content of this statement, we should take a look at the Norwegian 
experience regarding the development of the oil and gas sector, a picture 
corroborated by Karl‟s (1997) description of Norway as more successful than 
most other petroleum-producing countries. Through decades of experience with 
oil and gas, Norway has accumulated wide expertise in petroleum management. 
Norway‟s experience is often portrayed as one story – what I call the popular 
story, as in the recent NRK
26
 documentary on the history of oil in Norway.  The 
popular narrative of Norway‟s oil adventure focuses on how the discovery of 
petroleum resources has had a massive impact on Norwegian society, lifting it 
from being a stable but poor country, to become one of the richest nations in the 
                                                                                                                                    
25 This NORAD evaluation report was written before Ghana became a cooperation country for OfD. 
26 NRK (Norsk rikskringkasting) is the state broadcasting system of Norway. Production of this documentary was 
supported by the oil industry. 
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world, all thanks to the great efforts of a few smart Norwegians in a critical 
period.  
A more nuanced approach, however, reveals that this popular story, as the 
expression of a „Norwegian model‟, encompasses several stories. The real story 
shows that the way Norway developed its petroleum sector is a complicated story, 
built on fortunate circumstances, not always following what are today called 
„best-practice‟ methods – and with incredible luck in discovering oil at a time 
when Norway could readily draw on experiences from other countries.  
To understand Norway‟s unique position we need an historical overview of 
what actually happened, one that does not merely replay the image of the 
Norwegian state as always taking all the right decisions. Nor is there one specific 
oil story: Norway‟s oil policies were formed through a democratic process that 
included extensive conflicts. Civil society groups will stress the democratic 
influence from NGOs, in particular the environmental movement; technocrats 
will focus on the establishment of Statoil; and social scientists like to talk of the 
(Nordic) welfare model. The Norwegian development model may, for example, 
stress how the Norwegian government has worked closely with NGOs to 
capitalize on their in-depth knowledge of the field and their local contacts. More 
recently, use of the Norwegian model has also been suggested as a means for 
internationalizing the petroleum industry through the aid channel (Ihlen 2007). 
These are but a few examples. 
There are a great many differences in what people refer to as the 
„Norwegian model‟: the expression is often used in relation to Norway‟s oil and 
gas sector, by the media and by many of the informants in this study. The use of 
the term has been criticized; both the feasibility and the motivations for using 
such a concept have been questioned. The idea that this is a purely „technical‟ 
model that could simply be applied to other countries is unrealistic, but the use of 
this expression still builds up the idea of the model as a transportable, 
transferable technical tool. The underlying concept of the Norwegian model 
builds on the self-image of Norway as a humanitarian great power (Leira et al. 
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2007) and the idea of Norway as holding a special position as a great energy 
nation – the one area where Norway can be said to have great-power interests 
(Obi 2007). 
4.3.1 The ‘do-good nation’ 
Norway‟s overall success, accompanied by democratic development and the well-
known Scandinavian welfare regime, has led to much talk of a „Norwegian 
model‟. The (well managed) oil industry has given the small but rich state an 
image of itself as a „do good‟ nation, as its wealth enables it to be a bigger actor 
on the global arena than its size should say. This has led Norway to engage in 
peacebuilding processes and aid promotion globally, activities that do much to 
shape the „Norwegian identity‟ today (Tvedt 2005).  
  Amongst other perhaps more obvious roles, foreign policy also contributes 
nation building at home (Leira et al. 2007). Images of what Norway is are 
constantly produced and reproduced through discourses on the domestic and 
international arena. One almost-hegemonic image is that of Norway as the 
altruistic helper and an example to follow. To some extent Norway shares this 
image with its Nordic neighbours, an image of being a „clean‟, decent exception 
from standard praxis in international politics and economics elsewhere in the 
world. This image has also worked as identity construction at home, as well as 
being presented to the outside as a model which others could do well to copy 
(Leira et al. 2007). 
Norway relates its „state branding‟ to peace, humanitarian and development 
policies on the international arena through the „South political system‟ (Tvedt 
2005). According to Tvedt (2009), this system consists of both development and 
foreign policies, with the former supposedly grounded in values and altruism, and 
the latter in realism and national self-interest. However, the relation between 
realism and altruism in international relations is more complex than this simple 
two-part division, which has characterized traditional analysis. I will elaborate 
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further on aid motives in chapter 6. But first we will look at the role of the 
petroleum sector in Norway.  
4.3.2 The ‘energy nation’ 
Petroleum has been developed in Norway since the 1960s, when the American 
company Philips first expressed its interest in activities on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. The Norwegian oil adventure had a rough start: even though 
foreign companies invested heavily and Norway borrowed massively, the first 
field, Ekofisk, did not come onstream until 1971. After the big oil price shock in 
1973, prices stabilized but exports did not go as fast as hoped. By 1977, Norway 
had become the most indebted Western country, with a debt as high as 47% of 
GDP (Mjøset 2005). But then, in 1979/80 oil prices went up again, and stayed 
high until 1986 due to the OPEC countries‟ cartel politics, making Norway‟s 
national debt easy to repay. In 1985, Statoil became more of a normal oil 
company, with the creation of Petoro
27
 to run some of Statoil‟s previous 
responsibility for managing the state‟s economic rent (Mjøset 2005). Becoming 
an oil-producing country involved structural, economic and international changes, 
as Norway went from being a net importer of oil and gas, to become one of the 
world‟s largest producers. Development has gone through phases with shifting 
degrees of power between the industry, politicians and the bureaucracy (Ims and 
Engelstad 2003). 
Several aspects of Norway‟s management sector for petroleum are seen as 
favourable. The integration of industry development and research is a successful 
trait of Norway‟s oil and gas management (Interview Intsok). The three-part 
management structure for the resources, with SDFI, Statoil and MPE, is central to 
the Norwegian model. SDFI and Statoil together own about 80% of the business 
on the Norwegian shelf (Andersen and Austvik 2000:5). The idea of securing 
                                                                                                                                    
27The company Petoro AS was created to take over Statoil‟s responsibility for the (Norwegian] State‟s Direct 
Financial Interest (SDFI), the organ responsible for managing economic interests of behalf of the Norwegian state.  
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jobs and employment in the oil and delivery industry, commonly referred to as 
„local content‟ in the oil industry, was in focus from the very beginning. The oil 
sector and the oil-related industry and delivery activities became extremely 
important, and the high degree of local ownership of resources is a key for the 
Norwegian success. 
Specific factors and decisions have formed what is often referred to as the 
Norwegian „Oil Fairy Tale‟. The main goals for the Norwegian petroleum 
industry were established in 1971, adopted by the Norwegian Parliament as the 
„10 oil political commandments‟ (Andersen and Austvik 2000:32). These stated 
that all oil activity on the Norwegian shelf were to be under national governance 
and control. As a consequence, the fully state-owned company Statoil and the 
Norwegian petroleum institute were founded in 1972, together with one private 
company, Saga, and one partly state/partly private company, Hydro. As a fully 
state-led company, Statoil became the most important political instrument in 
nationalizing the oil industry, creating the Norwegian model for oil and gas 
management and for controlling petroleum resources in Norway (Sejersted 1999). 
In the 1970s the then fully state-owned stock corporation Statoil was given many 
privileges. The use of concessions, a type of petroleum agreements where the 
government decide (behind closed doors) which companies to assign licences, 
was decisive for developing Norway‟s fields in the North Sea (Mjøset 2005).  
The context was special; in the 1970s Norway had a market-regulated 
economy, with regulations in place for distributing the revenues from economic 
rent to the state and other interest groups in society (Mjøset 2005). Norway thus 
had a strong state, integrated with a private commercial sector and a welfare state, 
already at the beginning of oil production. An open economy and a more 
developed welfare state were advantages. The state-active Norwegian model for 
organizing the petroleum sector was developed in the early 1970s, a time when 
the international framework (regulations and markets) strengthened the nation- 
states‟ possibilities for active control (Andersen and Austvik 2000). While the 
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1970s and the 1980s were an establishing phase, the 1990s and to now are better 
described as the harvesting phase (Mjøset 2005).  
4.4 Internationalization of the Norwegian Oil Industry  
According to the NPD, Norway produces 5.33 billions standard cubic meters of 
oil equivalents (smc o.e.)
28
 per year.
29
 New discoveries are still made on the 
Norwegian shelf, but the volumes of these are generally smaller. The US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) has forecast that Norwegian production will 
fall by 4% per year, and maintains that oil production peaked in Norway in 2006.  
 
Figure 1 Petroleum production in Norway 
 
Economic and political globalization create new conditions for steering 
strategies, so that effectiveness and competitiveness across nation-state 
boundaries have become central measures for what are good, legitimate solutions 
                                                                                                                                    
28 Scm o.e.= standard cubic meters of oil equivalents. The term o.e. is used to standardise figures of natural gas and 
oil production: www.npd.no/en/About-us/Information-services/Dictionary/ April 4 2010 
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in the formulation of Norwegian policy (Andersen and Austvik 2000:4). The 
international trend is towards bigger and more effective companies. With the 
privatization of Statoil in 2001, the Norwegian government implemented a 
strategy, setting out to make Statoil a multinational corporation in order to 
achieve internationalization (Andersen and Austvik 2000). This change in 
Statoil‟s „nature‟ was paradoxical, as it turned a company originally created to 
protect Norwegian national interests in confrontation with multinational oil 
corporations, into itself becoming an international company – of the type it was to 
provide protection from (Sejersted 1999). 
The fusion of Statoil with Hydro in 2007 was a further step in the strategy 
to make Statoil a transnational corporation, competitive on the global market. 
Statoil is today the only oil company in Norway. It produces 1.9 million barrels
30
 
a day, thus ranking among the seven or eight biggest companies in the world 
(interview, Statoil). While Statoil‟s resource base is still predominantly in 
Norway, a strategic goal of the company is to become a global player, and to 
increase its revenues from upstream activities in foreign petroleum markets 
significantly. Statoil now spends more on investments outside Norway, although 
its revenues are still generated mostly from the Norwegian shelf (interview, 
Intsok). 
Internationalization is a goal not only for Statoil, but also for the supply 
industry, which today earns nearly half of all its income from activities abroad 
(interview, Intsok). Among those I interviewed, all agreed that 
internationalization was important for the industry, though some doubted whether 
it was also important for the Norwegian state as such. An important tool for 
achieving internationalization is Intsok. It was created in 1997 as a partly state-
financed, industry-led body, working for a closer relationship and collaboration 
between the industry and the state (interview, Intsok). Intsok is important 
                                                                                                                                    
29 http://www.npd.no/no/Tema/Ressursregnskap-og-analyser/Temaartikler/Ressursregnskap/2009/ May 19 2010 
30Barrel is an American measure equalling 159 litres.  
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primarily for the many Norwegian service and supply companies, whereas Statoil, 
due to its size, operates on a more independent basis. To internationalize, Statoil 
builds alliances with other companies, in order to compensate for its relatively 
small size and to be more competitive. A main feature of this NOC-NOC strategy 
with new upstream markets is sharing experiences from Norway‟s history in 
petroleum development (StatoilHydro 2009). Internationalization of the 
petroleum industry is also a declared ambition of the Norwegian government in 
its Soria Moria declaration (2005–2009:60).  
 
4.4.1 The report that started it... 
OfD was launched after the completion of a report made by Econ Pöyry, West 
African Oil, a Curse or a Blessing?, during the second right-wing coalition 
government of K. M. Bondevik. This report analysed the dynamics of the oil 
sector, as well as social, political, economic development and security in West 
Africa, and was intended to guide Norwegian policymaking in this region:  
 
The background for OfD was a policy process in the MFA and in NORAD, 
based on a report conducted by Econ Analysis on request from the Africa Desk 
in the MFA in 2003/2004 (…) there was a focus on Africa and the strongly 
asymmetric relation between Norway‟s heavy focus with 13 embassies in the 
Eastern and Southern parts of Africa, compared to almost nothing in West 
Africa, while the economic interests of Norway are completely the opposite.
 
(Interview Lunde, my translation) 
 
The report states that West Africa has huge oil reserves, described as an „oil 
bonanza‟ for the region, and notes that „the international community is 
increasingly focused on helping this region‟(2004:7, my emphasising). Foreign 
investment in the petroleum sector reflects a confluence of business and 
geopolitics in the sense that the commercial interests of international oil 
companies often come together with the broader economic and security interests 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.npd.no/no/Om-OD/Infomasjonstjenester/Oljeordliste/ May 23 2010 
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of their home governments, „be it east or west, jungle or desert, it is a safe bet 
that where the drillers go, the politicians, strategists, and lobbyists are not far 
behind‟ (Ghazvinian 2007:8). This also has to do with the importance of the 
political dimension to oil companies: „if companies can rely on the governments 
to do their bidding, it can sharpen their competitive edge, and the more powerful 
the government, the greater the potential to the company‟ (Econ Pöyry 2004:7).  
4.4.2 The Norwegian ‘oil fairy tale’ continuing abroad?  
The Norwegian oil industry follows a capitalistic orientation and it has to expand. 
The pace of exploitation on the Norwegian shelf has been high, and the growth in 
oil prices has covered falling production in Norway in recent years (Andersen and 
Austvik 2000). To continue the Norwegian oil fairy tale, the companies must 
sustain their revenue levels, and therefore need to go abroad, earning a larger 
proportion of their revenues from other countries (Ryggvik 2001). The expansion 
frame is often presented as having an ethical foundation: Norwegian industry can 
export ethical (high) Norwegian standards – Norway should expand because of 
the good standards that Norway can bring to the world. This is demonstrated by 
the slogan „Oil for Development‟, indicating that everybody stands to gain from 
internationalization of Norwegian oil industry (Ihlen 2007), and opens up for 
linking the internationalization of Norwegian oil industry to the framing of „the 
Norwegian‟ as a „goodness regime‟ (Tvedt 2005).  
In interviewing the head of Intsok, I noted a certain reluctance to talking 
about the importance of Norwegian internationalization; moreover, interviewees 
in a Norwegian oil company stated that internationalization was „not very 
important or very successful‟ (interview, Norwegian oil company). However, 
recent Konkraft
31
 report, produced in the same timeframe as my interviews, 
asserts that internationalization has been successful for Norway; further, that the 
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Norwegian oil industry has to internationalize and that it should be a priority for 
the MFA that Norway has „a presence‟ in countries with considerable oil and gas 
reserves. The report goes on to state that the interplay between the various actors 
on the Norwegian shelf (state and industry) has been of considerable importance 
for the internationalization of the oil business. There is, however, a general 
assumption that internationalization of the supply industry has been more 
successful than of the oil industry itself (interview, Intsok), despite the fusion of 
Statoil and Hydro. 
4.4.3 The ‘Norwegian model’ revisited  
The Norwegian model is not a static model, but has changed and modified to 
changing conditions, national as well as international. A critical evaluation of 
Norway‟s oil assistance concluded that „the Norwegian model‟ had been too 
heavily promoted, leading to rejection of alternative models or to understand that 
the Norwegian structure might not be the best solution everywhere (Aspelund 
2006). There is now a greater awareness, or caution, amongst Norwegians in the 
development sector to consider OfD as providing a transfer of a Norwegian 
model. In the White Paper/Storting Report no 13, there is no mention of the 
expression „the Norwegian model‟ (Tvedt 2009). Likewise, OfD is clear in 
stating that the programme is about „sharing Norwegian experiences‟, and not 
promoting a Norwegian model. In practice, however, the presentation of Norway 
as the „expert country‟ seems similar to the idea of a model, and the mental image 
of a model is strong, so that the notion keeps re-appearing in discussions with all 
the involved actors. As a civil society respondent in Ghana put it, „I think that 
Norway has certain experiences to teach; of course, the Norwegian model is 
counted worldwide as a good model‟, another example is from my interview with 
GNPC‟s Director of Operations: 
                                                                                                                                    
31 Konkraft is a collaboration forum for ensuring competitiveness on the Norwegian shelf, involving the Norwegian 
oil industry association (OLF), Federation of Norwegian Industries, Norwegian Association of Ship-Owners and 
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… when we found the oil, the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi 
Annan, suggested to the President that oil can be a curse and it can be a 
blessing. Now you have made the discovery there is the time that we have to 
look at the whole industry, see how best we can refashion the industry, in 
matter to make it a blessing. So he said that the Norwegians have got a very 
good model, why don‟t you look at it? 
 
To my question, „have you heard talk of a Norwegian model?‟ another answer 
was „Oh yeah yeah, the expression Norwegian model is used everywhere in the 
Ghanaian oil discourse, but the problem is that nobody knows what it is about, 
except that it includes a future generation fund as a part of the policy‟ (interview, 
Isodec). In Ghana the expression „the Norwegian model‟ was widely used, but 
without much knowledge about what it is. In Norway on the other hand, people 
were more reluctant to speak of a Norwegian model in relation to OfD. Most 
would agree to that there is such a thing as a Norwegian model, although people 
in government and civil society had differing views as to what exactly it involves. 
The head of OfD stated in an interview with me that one does not use the 
expression „Norwegian model‟, focusing instead on sharing Norwegian 
experiences, but that we could still speak of a Norwegian model, which would be:  
 
(…) where there is a balance between international companies and the national 
state, that Norway in way has managed that balance, and that Norway has 
developed a trade and industry, connected to the oil and gas sector, which in a 
way is very productive. (Interview, OfD Director) 
 
The mention of balance between international and national companies, and that 
Norway has managed this, is an interesting statement, in view of the fact the 
Norwegian state controls 80% of the petroleum resources in Norway (Andersen 
and Austvik 2000). People from civil society tended to emphasize the Norwegian 
model as a society with high level of organization and pressure on the 
government (Ryggvik, conversation), and were also more sceptic towards use of 
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the expression. For example, according to Mona Thowsen of Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP) : „The Norwegian model is a concept that doesn‟t really hang 
together. (…) why do we use the concept of a model, unless we want to transfer 
something?‟ (interview, my translation). My interviews corroborate the view that 
the use of the expression signifies that Norway has a successful model that can be 
implemented in cooperation countries, although, on closer scrutiny, it becomes 
evident that doing so is very complicated. Some parts of the Norwegian 
experiences may be useful for cooperation countries, such as the three-part 
organization model for steering the industry, whereas other parts, such as national 
protectionism, the license system of concessions and building of local content, 
are more problematic, due to changed international regulations and recent 
advances in technology.   
4.5 (Un) Sustainable Self-Image? 
The Norwegian self-image sees Norway as an environmentally friendly and 
altruistic nation – a great humanitarian nation. The Norwegian/Nordic model for 
aid is held to be very altruistic, with few elements of commercial, political or 
military strategic interests.
32
 The OfD initiative, however, seems to represent a 
change. The underlying trend and the motivation for creating OfD is well 
described by the Econ Pöyry report (2004:31), which points out how innovative 
approaches and close cooperation across ministries and industry groups might be 
needed to sustain the dynamic development of Norway‟s oil complex, including 
crossing conventional boundaries between business promotion and development 
cooperation: „Certain holy cows may be up for slaughter.‟ These I interpret as 
referring to elements constituting the Nordic model, especially the idea that 
commercial policies and aid policies should not to be linked. Further, the report‟s 
proposed policy input (amongst others) to the Norwegian government 
                                                                                                                                    
32 http://www.dagbladet.no/2010/04/12/kultur/debatt/kronikk/bistand/11240925/ 12 April 2010 
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demonstrated a clear inclination to use aid means to promote business policy‟s 
goals, policy advice: 
 
Make the necessary steps to sustain a more proactive Norwegian presence in 
West Africa – commensurate with its regional/global significance and the level 
of interest among Norwegian companies, and in so doing, encourage further 
Norwegian investment in this region. (Econ Report 2004:32) 
 
The 2004 report addressed precisely the gap in lack of official connections to 
West Africa compared to Norwegian business interests in the same region:  
 
...a significant boost is needed in order to realize Norway‟s potential to 
contribute meaningfully to global efforts to improve oil management in West 
Africa. In so doing it is essential to address the coherence cracks in present 
Norwegian policies, by uniting the following three main policy branches 
behind a common agenda: foreign policy, industrial policy/business promotion 
and development cooperation. 
 
However, the ideal aim of using Norwegian private actors in aid, but not using 
aid as a Norwegian business political strategy, might be difficult to achieve at the 
same time (Stokke 1992:77). The policy goals for these three policy domains 
(foreign, industrial and development) differ, encompassing the goals of national 
interest, commercial interest, and advancing social and economic well-being. Yet, 
with OfD it seems that they can be united to achieve a common good for Norway 
and West Africa. The formulation from the Econ Pöyry Report, „the international 
society is increasingly devoted to helping West Africa‟, indicates how policy 
interests may be „wrapped‟ in a rhetoric of aid promotion. Causes for this shift 
away from the Norwegian model and towards a business-friendly attitude are also 
to be found in global neo-liberal trends. We may identify an increase in 
Norwegian economic motives for aid, and a nation-state actively participating in 
the global race for securing global oil resources.  
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4.6 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has nuanced the context and rationale for creating the OfD initiative. 
As a joint effort of a range of governmental and industry-related organs, the OfD 
nexus represents something new in Norwegian development. It coordinates 
various institutions in working with petroleum assistance, though these varying 
objectives. The OfD programme addresses the resource curse by aspiring to 
capacity transfer and institution building, although work with institution building 
is broadly acknowledged as a substantial challenge. The programme‟s elevated 
focus on good governance and technical issues leads to an apolitical approach to 
deeply political processes in cooperation countries. The real story of the 
development of the Norwegian petroleum sector differs from the popular story, 
for example Norway‟s protectionism by allowing for a high degree of state 
control of resources and the industry through the creation of Statoil, and the 
democratic dimension of pressuring government and companies, are important 
features of the „real‟ story, which are not promoted in the popular story. 
The oil industry produces one fourth of Norway‟s national GDP, and is the 
country‟s best-organized business sector. Both Statoil and the supply companies 
see internationalization as a next natural step. The expression „Norwegian model‟ 
may be useful in that regard, representing something that cooperation partners are 
interested in learning about. However, the international climate has now changed, 
constraining the possibilities of cooperation countries to copy some features of 
the Norwegian story on petroleum management, such as protectionism. Despite a 
stated rhetorical shift from talking about the Norwegian „model‟ to talking about 
Norwegian „experiences‟; the mental concept of a model remains and the 
expression is still used verywidely. The image of Norway as a humanitarian great 
nation is powerful on the international arena – although OfD, when we look 
behind the rhetorical facade, seems to represent a shift away from the image of 
Norway as an altruistic donor, making the image of the do-good nation hardly 
commensurable with the acts endeavoured by Norway as a petroleum nation.  
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5. OFD IN WEST AFRICA, THE CASE OF GHANA 
In the previous chapter I described and analysed some reasons for establishing the 
OfD initiative, holding that this must be viewed in relation to the 
internationalization of Norway‟s petroleum sector, and that the expression of the 
„Norwegian model‟ is a useful tool for Norway in that regard. In this chapter I 
will give contextualization to understanding the research question of whether 
OfD may advance public–private relations, by exploring the initiation of the 
project in Ghana, a donor favourite, seen as a particularly promising African oil 
producer. I aim at giving a nuanced picture of the economic and political 
situation in Ghana, assessing the role of OfD in handling the oil find in the early 
phase and with regard to some of the challenging aspects that the programme 
addresses. Relations between Norway and Ghana will be examined in terms of 
development cooperation and increased commercial cooperation, by reflecting on 
issues of negotiating power and stakeholders‟ differing objectives.  
In looking at how OfD became the most central donor on petroleum issues 
in Ghana, despite lack of long-established diplomatic relations between the 
countries, I argue that while initiating the programme, the Norwegians 
contributed to a perception of them as both altruistic and naive. Given Ghana‟s 
history of donors and aid dependency, and especially in light of the new oil 
discoveries, there is a desire among donors to contribute to an image of Ghana as 
an assistance success-story, although closer scrutiny reveals several notable 
obstacles to be overcome if Ghana is to become a pioneering example of an 
African successful oil producer. But we begin by looking at the growing Western 
interest in West Africa, and Norway‟s political and financial relations to the 
region.  
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5.1 Oil and Geopolitics in West Africa   
West Africa‟s proven oil reserves have doubled in recent decades, now 
constituting 10% of the world‟s remaining resources33, and is seeing increased 
international attention as a new and important energy market. The recent speed of 
growth in Africa‟s oil industry is due to the fact that it is one of the world‟s last 
under-explored regions, and that advances in technology, drilling and seismic 
now provide better access to the region‟s many deepwater areas.  
 
Since the early 90‟s advances in deepwater drilling technology and attractive 
contractual terms have helped turn Africa into the worlds last true El Dorado – 
a place where exploration blocks the size of France can still be picked up at an 
auction, and host governments lack either the experience or the technical 
capacity to impose burdensome constraints on drilling activity. (Ghazvinian 
2007:6).  
 
Oil exploitation may represent the largest-ever inflow of capital to the continent 
(Gary and Karl 2003). Collier (2007:47), however, warns: „if history repeats 
itself, this opportunity will be missed‟, and the pessimists hold that the stage is set 
for another missed opportunity (Soares de Oliveira 2007). The scramble has 
resulted in years of fast growth, big signature bonuses and blurred borders 
between politics and business.
34
 
In 2004, when the OfD initiative was being planned, oil production in West 
Africa was projected to increase by 50% or more before 2010, by which time it is 
likely to exceed 6 billion barrels a year – almost double Norway‟s production in 
2004 (Econ Pöyry 2004:3). Foreign investments in West African deepwater fields 
were expected to exceed 50 billion USD within the same timeframe, making the 
Gulf of Guinea the world‟s largest recipient of offshore hydrocarbon capital 
investment (ibid). Since 1990 alone, the oil industry has invested more than 20 
                                                                                                                                    
33 British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023769&contentId=7044915 March 9 2010 
34 http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/406/Risky-money 12.5.2010 
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billion USD in exploration activity and production activity in West Africa, and a 
rough estimate holds that towards 2010, one in every five barrel of oil on the 
world market will come from West Africa, making oil and gas Africa‟s major 
export article (Ghazvinian 2007:7). From having a lower geopolitical priority 
than Antarctica, Africa is now strategically important as an energy supplier. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that the USA has established a West Africa office 
(Africom) at the Pentagon, and has tried to establish a US military base  in  West 
Africa. What makes the African oil boom so interesting to energy security 
strategists in Washington, Europe and increasingly China is a series of opportune 
and unrelated factors concerning geography and, most importantly, politics 
(Ghazvinian 2007:9). 10% of the world‟s remaining oil resources might not 
sound much, but Africa‟s significance as an oil „play‟ – to borrow the lingo of the 
industry – concerns more than how many barrels may be buried under its 
cretaceous rock. The West wants diversification of oil supply, and African oil is 
seen as cheaper, better, more accessible, and available in increasing quantities. 
Oil in the Gulf of Guinea is of good quality, in the industry‟s parlance called 
„sweet‟ and „light‟, which in fact means better in environmental terms. African 
oil producers are also less affected by OPEC production regulations, as only 
Nigeria belongs to that „club‟. When the OPEC countries cut production to 
sustain high oil prices, the supply from outside OPEC rises to meet the increasing 
demand.  
The region‟s location is important. From the Gulf of Guinea, the way is 
short to the Americas and Europe (Econ Pöyry 2004, Ghazvinian 2007). Offshore 
oil production cuts transport costs and risks, and is held by oil companies to be 
easier than onshore production because it reduces the chances of political 
entanglements. But offshore production also provides limited benefits to the host 
nation, and is often described as the ultimate „enclave industry‟.  
Finally, the contractual environment in Africa is known as favourable to 
international oil companies, where their share of the profits is generally high. 
Most African countries use variants of production-sharing agreements (PSAs), 
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whereby a foreign oil company is given a licence to search for petroleum on 
condition that it assumes the initial costs of exploration and production, and will 
relinquish parts of the block according to a determined timeframe if oil is not 
discovered. If oil is found, the company will share revenues with host 
government, according to the negotiated agreement, once its initial costs have 
been recouped. According to Ghazvinian (2007), PSAs are often offered to 
impoverished countries that lack technical expertise and the massive capital 
investments needed to drill for oil by themselves.  
  Despite the benefits and potentials, the West African region also presents a 
challenging operating environment. The Gulf of Guinea is the world‟s second 
most dangerous waterway (Ghazvinian 2007:13). Where there is lack of taxation 
and voting mechanisms, oil companies in effect support regimes with little 
respect for democracy and human rights – and that may prove difficult for how 
their moral licence to operate is perceived by other actors and the international 
community. Unstable regimes also mean unpredictability, as well as insecure 
frames for cooperation: and that means a risk for oil companies, as exploring and 
developing oil fields have a long timeframe.  
5.1.1 Norway’s relations to West Africa   
Due to historical and cultural circumstances, including language and the fact that 
Norway is as a small country with limited diplomatic resources, Norway has had 
less diplomatic relations with (primarily Francophone) West Africa than with 
East and South Africa (Simensen 2003). The lack of a coherent and conscious 
Africa policy is now changing, and African affairs have never occupied a larger 
place in official Norwegian policy than now. The Norwegian Africa Policy 
Platform was launched in 2007, seeking a new Africa awareness in Norwegian 
policies, and Africa has been important in the current government‟s Refleks 
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project.
35
 Especially West Africa has been receiving more attention, as the region 
sails up as one of the world‟s key regions for oil and gas production. 
The Econ Pöyry report (2004) that formed the backdrop for OfD describes 
West Africa‟s regional comparative advantages, noting its openness to foreign 
investment, relative political stability, limited OPEC influence, low political risk 
(mostly offshore production), proximity to US and European markets, and the 
high-quality crude oil. The report goes on to state that oil will be a key factor in 
West Africa in the decades to come, at a time when North Sea oil production will 
already have peaked; it notes how Africa „fell off the map‟ after the end of the 
Cold War, but that West Africa is now „back in the super powers‟ geo-strategic 
calculations‟, and that „the international community seems increasingly devoted 
to helping Africa, at least those countries showing signs of improved leadership 
and governance (Econ Pöyry 2004:7, my emphasis). The report also stresses that 
West Africa‟s position as major oil supplier in the world will be increasingly 
important, and that the international security dimension of the continent‟s 
multiple challenges has become more pronounced as a result of the war on 
terrorism, spiralling migration patterns across the Mediterranean and how unrest 
in the Middle East affects oil prices.  
Europe provides more than half of all foreign investments in West Africa, 
with Norway among the most important European actors on Africa‟s oil and gas 
scene. Africa can in few years‟ time become Norway‟s largest investment region 
outside the EU (Hansen 2008). Norway invests and spends far more in West 
Africa than in Eastern and Southern Africa combined, including development 
cooperation, and Norwegian petroleum and supply companies invest more than 5 
to 8 billion NOK annually, with West Africa set to become a key market for the 
Norwegian oil industry (Econ Pöyry 2004). 
                                                                                                                                    
35 This project involves is a series of articles discussing Norwegian foreign policy. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill.html?id=478948 20 May 2010 
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5.2 Ghana Finds Oil- at Last 
In July 2007, Ghana struck what has been referred to as a world-class discovery 
of oil in deep water on the Jubilee field,
36
 named after Ghana‟s 50 years 
celebration of independence, and there have been frequent reports of good-quality 
findings on the Ghanaian shelf.
37
 At the time President Kufour said that the 
„black gold‟ would be the boost that Ghana needed to become an „African Tiger‟. 
Throughout Ghana, the excitement was notable. At the Office of Ghana‟s 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) in Tema, one could feel that change 
was coming. The city‟s harbour was busy with oil industry shipments, all 
equipment in the Petroleum House was renewed, people were happy and busy, 
and guests complained that they used to be wanted, but were now sidelined.  
Ghanaians and foreigners were moving to Ghana and Takoradi, the city closest to 
the Jubilee field, expecting to do business.  
The Jubilee field is situated off the shore of Ghana‟s western communities, 
and it covers parts of two blocks. One part is operated by the American company 
Kosmos Energy, the other is owned by the Anglo/Irish company Tullow Oil. 
Tullow is a medium-sized company; Kosmos is smaller. The oil discovered is 
„light‟, meaning that quality is good, and the field is also rich in gas. Due to 
Ghana‟s good reputation and the size and qualities of the oil find, the country has 
received more than 40 applications for oil exploration blocks since the 
announcement of the Jubilee Field (interview, GNPC), and Ghana has turned to 
OFD for support. 
Ghana has experience from extractive industries in the mining sector, but, 
as a Gymiah Boadi, aGhanaian professor in political science and director of 
Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) put it (interview): „We have 
lived with the gold for a long time, and that has not made anybody rich. Nobody 
is dreaming big because of gold, but everybody is dreaming big because we have 
                                                                                                                                    
36 http://www.petroleum-economist.com/default.asp?Page=14&PUB=279&SID=716588&ISS=25274 May 19 2010 
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oil.‟ That Ghana already has abundant natural resources which are not well 
managed feeds scepticism among NGOs about whether oil will in fact have the 
influence that people dream of.  
5.2.1 Ghana: the Black Star of Africa  
As the first African country to achieve independence from Britain in 1957, the 
World Bank‟s star pupil, and recently depicted as an African model of 
democracy, Ghana has often been an African pioneer. But, although Ghana was 
the first to achieve autonomy, it soon became the epitome of African decline. 
Economic management after independence was poor, and the country struggled 
through more than twenty years of military coups. Aid increased dramatically and 
aid dependency set in during the 1980s (Whitfield and Jones 2009). Rich in 
natural resources, Ghana exports cocoa, gold and timber, but has had little 
industry. The same percentage of the population is employed in industry today as 
at the time of independence – about 14% (Killick lecture, Accra). Poverty is a 
major challenge. Ghana was ranked 152 in UNDP‟s human development report 
2009,
38
 with 53.6% of the population living on less than 2 USD a day. Inequality 
is severe, with a Gini coefficient of 42.8.
39
  
Under British rule Ghana became the world‟s largest producer of cocoa. 
Thanks to the strong economic expansion after 1945 and the country‟s cocoa 
monopoly, Ghana had at the time of independence foreign reserves of 532 million 
dollars, but an economy dominated by foreign companies. President Nkrumah, 
who led Ghana to independence, focused on building up Ghanaian industry, 
which had been neglected during colonial rule, and invested in various factories. 
By the time of the military overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966, the state 
                                                                                                                                    
37For example:  http://www.upstreamonline.com/hardcopy/news/article208032.ece February 12 2010 
38 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 19.3.2010 
39 UNDP‟s Human Development Report 2009: the Gini measures countries‟ inequality ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 
implies full equity; the higher the value, the more severe is the inequality in a country.   
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sector had expanded considerably in an attempt to gain control of Ghana‟s private 
sector, then heavily dominated by expatriate businessmen (Appiah-Kubi 2001).  
Thereafter, military coups and various civil governments ruled: between 
1966 and 1991, Ghana had four military regimes and two civilian governments. 
This led to considerable policy discontinuity, with poor financial management. 
Ghana‟s growth rate dropped, from 4.1% per year in the 1960s, to –0.3% in the 
1970s. The decline was not reversed until Rawling‟s socialist-inspired regime 
started its Economic Recovery Programme in 1983 (Whitfield and Jones 2009). 
The same government introduced elections and a multiparty system in 1992, and 
Ghana is today seen as democracy in consolidation (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Report 2008). John Kufour and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led the 
state from 2001 to 2008, but power shifted to the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) led by John Mills, in the 2008 elections. The Kufour government 
improved the macro-economic situation, though it did little with inequality. 
Ghana now aims at becoming a West African hub of trade and expertise on 
petroleum issues, and at achieving middle-income status by 2020, despite being 
heavily reliant on foreign aid.  
5.2.2 Aid dependency and donor relations  
Foreign aid constitutes 11.7% of Ghana‟s GDP,40 and between 40 and 50% of 
government spending (Whitfield and Jones 2009). This aid dependency is a 
product of foreign exchange shortages and debt. It set in during Rawling‟s quasi-
military government, which sought to address the economic crisis with help from 
the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Tetteh 2003). 
The debt proved unsustainable as investments and reforms failed to bring the 
necessary foreign exchange and levels of growth.  
Ghana has gone through two periods of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) – from 1967 to 1971, and from 1983 to present, 
69 
 
implemented under military dictatorship (Jebuni 1995). Both SAPs were initiated 
due to economic decline and involved a movement away from a state-controlled 
economy to a liberalized one. The second period is generally described as 
successful, and Ghana is often referred to as the „WB‟s star pupil‟ of adjustment. 
The WB sees Ghana as the triumph of neo-liberalism, though it has not 
comprehended the forces driving the adjustment processes (Hutchful 1995).  
Jebuni (1995) argues that the second structural adjustment succeeded because it 
was sold to the public as a „bitter but needed medicine‟ for the country – 
however, this was at a time when the people were oppressed under a military 
dictatorship. The WB also spent twice as much staff and time in Ghana than in 
other African SAP countries (Hutchful 1995).  
Many wanted to support the portrayed successful story on economic 
reform, so aid increased dramatically in the 1980s. With few economic resources 
outside the aid system, it was hard for government to set the policy agenda and 
forge development strategies outside those of the donors. The SAPs of the 1980s 
involved considerable use of foreign experts and technocrats, in effect 
marginalizing the civil service. Working conditions were poor, many relied on 
donor resources to do their job, and civil servants would negotiate as much as 
they could on a loan – but in the end would accept an aid package even if it was 
not in line with the ministry‟s priorities (Whitfield and Jones 2009). WB and 
Ghanaian governmental staff perceptions of the economy often differed widely, 
according to an advisor to the NPP government, Kwamena Esilifie (interview). 
For example, the NDC resented privatization, which was part of the deal with the 
WB and the IMF, and this resulted in a large drop in aid in 1999 leading to 
inflation and collapse of the local currency. In the same year, Ghana experienced 
two external shocks: rising oil prices and a decline in world prices for Ghana‟s 
export main articles – gold, cocoa and timber. Shortages and energy crisis 
followed, and from 2003 to 2005 Ghana implemented the Poverty Reduction 
                                                                                                                                    
40 http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_aid_as_of_gdp-economy-aid-as-of-gdp June 6 2010 
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Strategy.
41
 The 1990s saw more and more NGO and media criticisms of 
government policy (Whitfield and Jones 2009).  
The NPP government came to power in 2001 with a strong development 
vision, but it also inherited the economic crisis, aid-dependent budget and donor 
agencies embedded in the workings of the state apparatus (Whitfield and Jones 
2009). The development vision was put on hold, and the government decided to 
implement the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) in 2004. 
Concomitant to this aid dependency came increasing donor demands and 
participation in policy issues, and strong incentives to comply with donor wants 
in order to obtain foreign exchange.  
‘The golden age of business’  
Rawlings had held an antagonist stance towards private sector. By contrast, on 
coming to power, Kufour declared his term „The Golden Age of Business‟ 
(Whitfield and Jones 2009). This involved creating a Ministry for Private Sector 
Development, with a new development vision focusing on „positive partnership‟ 
with the private sector together with an active role for the state. This emphasis on 
private sector development met heightened interest in the international donor 
community. However, donors accused the new ministry‟s Private Sector 
Development Strategy of lacking coherency and vision. For their part, 
policymakers defended the strategy, blaming donors of seeking to reframe it to 
suit their own wishes. In the end, the policy was changed largely as a means to 
secure donor funding, but the new strategy was negotiated outside Ghanaian state 
institutions, by international and Ghanaian experts, in for a where donors had the 
most influence. Civil servants are resource-stretched and private actors have 
businesses to run, but the raison d’être amongst donors is precisely to influence 
government policies. However, much time was spent on mediating among the 
competing interests of donors.  
                                                                                                                                    
41 http://webapps01.un.org/nvp/frontend!policy.action?id=130 20 May 2010 
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At the time of the oil find, Ghana was the first post-HIPC country to 
access the international capital market. It now has more diverse sources of 
capital, although traditional donors still constitute an important source of finance 
(Whitfield and Jones 2009). Improved economic growth and new financial 
sources from China and the international capital market give the recent NDC 
government more room to pursue development visions. Ghana‟s neo-liberal 
policies since 1983 have brought an opening of the economy to foreign capital, 
but leaving the country with a relatively small national take from its own mining 
industry. This is often blamed on ignorance, and many hope that oil will be a 
different story.  
5.3 Initiation of OfD in Ghana 
Turning to Norway‟s cooperation with Ghana, the partnership was a fact from 
2007, with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in February 2008. 
This came about after the UN‟s Kofi Annan had contacted and discussed with 
Norway‟s Minister for Development and Environment, Erik Solheim. The 
conversation is available on podcast, as the first of speeches and conversations 
with Norwegian ministers made available online by the government.
42
 This is an 
extract of the conversation:  
 
Kofi Annan: the desire to do it right is special in Ghana, the president and the 
parliament is eager to do it right. And I have also told them to not regard oil as 
a panacea for all our problems.  
 
Erik Solheim: Environment is important. 
 
KA: African leaders are increasingly aware that they are paying the most for 
pollution, I really wish you can set up something on this. 
 
ES: Norway is very very eager to share our advice on the oil sector.  
                                                                                                                                    
42http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/lyd_bilde/podkast/erik-solheim---rett-pa-traden/kofi-annan-ber-norge-om-
hjelp-til-oljefo.html?id=480936 21.3.10 
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According to the MoU, the cooperation would cover a wide area of cooperation, 
involving capacity building, strengthening of institutions, revising of laws, 
policies and tax regimes, and with a focus on tension areas, such as conflicts over 
land. OfD cooperation in the early phase in Ghana concentrated primarily on 
technical petroleum issues, such as assistance in developing the national Oil and 
Gas Policy and Masterplan, assistance with the plan for development and 
operation (PDO) on the Jubilee Field, and in making new petroleum laws. Among 
the first of Norway‟s activities was participating in and helping to arrange a 
conference in Accra – the National Forum on Oil and Gas Development in Ghana 
– on how to handle the new petroleum issues. 
You find oil – what do you do?  
After finding oil, Ghana‟s government arranged a National Forum. It was 
arranged in February 2008 with support and contributions from Norway, around 
the time of signing the MoU. At the Forum the idea was to gather national 
stakeholders and international expertise, and debate how to formulate oil policies 
and plans, including oil revenue management. The president put together a 13-
person group, Ghana‟s Oil and Gas Technical Committee, drawn mainly from the 
president‟s office („the Castle‟), and from Ghana‟s GNPC and relevant ministries. 
It was set up as a tool for organizing how to deal with oil, and members of this 
group were OfD‟s main initial contacts in Ghana.  
The Forum was criticized from the NGO side – first, for excluding 
important civil society groups from participating, then for discussing mainly 
technical issues related to government‟s capacity to develop the oil sector and 
fully maximize profits from generated revenues. A researcher affiliated with 
CDD, Kramon (2008), holds that the discourse on oil and the problem of the 
resource curse were framed incompletely, „preventing a robust discussion of 
strategies going forward‟ as discussions did not take up the political problems 
experienced by many oil-rich countries. The Forum focused mainly on 
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technocratic issues, consulting experts for best practices in order to avoid the 
resource curse – but not tackling the issues of patronage and greater corruption, 
centralization of power in the executive, weakening of institutions. Thus, writes 
Kramon (2008:1), „the question of Ghana‟s democratic development – and how 
to protect in the face of a potentially destabilizing windfall of oil revenue – has 
been seemingly avoided altogether.‟  
Ghana‟s main challenges in facing oil production seem to concern how, 
institutionally, to meet the oil challenges in terms of regulations for production, 
laws and organizational structure (including revenue management), and how to 
deal with environmental challenges. The overarching challenge has been to 
ensure that oil revenues benefit the country as a whole, while avoiding the 
negative effects of the resource curse in petro-states. According to OfD‟s 
objectives, these issues are all addressed. However, the programme cannot be 
implemented in a political vacuum. Let us take a closer look at the Ghana with 
which OfD is to collaborate.    
‘Political culture’  
Ghana is considered as a „hybrid regime‟ in the Economist Intelligence Unit‟s 
2008 democracy index.
43
 This is based on measurements where Ghana‟s best 
score is on electoral process and civil liberties, reflecting its relatively free press 
and transparency during elections; the lowest scores are in political participation 
and political culture, reflecting low voter turnout and the dominance of only two 
political parties. Decisionmaking is centralized within a small group of people, a 
feature reinforced by the role of donors (Whitfield and Jones 2009).  
Political culture, however, concerns more than large-scale measurements. 
Several Ghanaian informants spoke of what they referred to an „untouchable‟ 
culture, for example a Ghanaian consultant for the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ): „There is one law applying if you are in government, another 
                                                                                                                                    
 43 www.eiu.com 5 May 2010 
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if you are in opposition‟ (interview). „Centralized decisionmaking and 
hierarchical leadership structures sometime hampers the flow of communication 
from leaders to employees‟ (interview, oil company). The notion of a „culture of 
secrecy‟ (describing how leaders sometimes refuse openness, according to my 
interview with a GTZ consultant) was emphasized as hindering openness within 
organizations and outwards to the people:  
 
It is about political will, and about fear of giving people a weapon. Culture of 
secrecy is a mentality, a mind set. You take an oath when you work as public 
servant, so they are trained since the colonial days, to not give out information, 
because they have their mind set that it is criminal to give out information. This 
also comes from the period with military rule, everybody was always afraid, 
and you don‟t know what happens to you if you give information out.  
 
This reflects the complex reality faced by many civil servants working in Ghana. 
In this political climate, chances and suspicions of corruption are rampant. 
Corruption may be a sensitive issue to talk about – but it exists in all 
countries. Ghana is perceived as having less corruption than other African oil-
producing countries, according to Transparency International‟s corruption 
index.
44
 However, the oil industry as a sector is extremely exposed to corruption, 
and methods for corruption are becoming increasingly sophisticated, according to 
S.E. Heglund, responsible for Ghana in OfD and previously of Hydro (interview). 
To deal with this, OfD supports the EITI initiative – a coalition of governments, 
companies, civil society groups, investors and organizations established to 
advocate for transparency in extractive industries worldwide. It was introduced in 
2002, with Ghana as one of three pilot countries.
45 
However, the voluntary aspect 
of EITI decreases its potential, and risks reducing it to a rhetorical façade 
(interview). There has also been a warning that, with Ghana aspiring to become a 
regional financial hub, oil wealth together with corruption and lack of proper 
                                                                                                                                    
44 The corruption index measures perceptions of corruption, ranging from zero (most corrupt) to ten (least corrupt), 
Ghana is listed with 3.9, and Norway 8.6. (New Zealand came in first place, at 9.4.) 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table June 1 2010 
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regulations may turn the country into a tax haven,
46
 which would probably impact 
negatively on its development. A focus on institution building could address these 
themes, but OfD has been occupied with providing technical advice on petroleum 
production, in addition to supporting the EITI. 
Oil leads to ruined livelihoods? 
As pointed out by Kofi Annan in his discussion with Erik Solheim, there is 
increased awareness on environmental issues in Ghana, this has created worries 
among people concerning oil production. The co-existence of fisheries and 
petroleum production is one challenge. The Jubilee field is located 45 km off-
shore, at 1100 m. depth, amidst major fishing areas where subsistence fishing is 
the livelihood of the people. Little information was provided on how oil 
production would impact fisheries. The fishery uses many small canoes, and 
fishers claimed to be disturbed by petroleum activities. Conflicts between 
fishermen and oil workers at sea occurred early on, as the fish are attracted to the 
light and gather around the oil rigs, followed by the fishermen (interview, 
Paramount Chief Adjaye). Another environmental issue is avoiding harmful gas 
flaring. Developing a system for exploiting the gas demands large investments, 
but may have major environmental benefits and could mitigate national energy 
shortages. 
Environmental issues are increasingly addressed by OFD – in Ghana 
presumably with the assistance of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), but 
at the time of my fieldwork these issues had not been satisfactory deal with, 
although early production was underway, with floating production storage and 
offloading vessels (FPSOs). There seemed to be confusion regarding whose 
responsibility the EIA was and when it should be completed. OfD believed it to 
be responsibility of Kosmos, but Kosmos held it to be Tullow‟s responsibility 
(interview, Kosmos). The national government was criticized by local NGOs for 
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76 
 
not having completed an EIA before starting exploration and oil field activity on 
the Jubilee field. According to Jonathan Allotey, Executive Director of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), OfD activities on environmental issues 
involved paying for a trip to Australia to learn about EIAs and another to Norway 
to meet „useful agencies‟. But OfD‟s focus on the environment had had little 
actual effect on improving the situation. 
Including civil society 
Civil society has had important role in connection with the environmental and 
political challenges of oil in Ghana. Its work for mitigating poor leadership and 
corruption is increasingly acknowledged, and was stated as an OfD objective in 
2008. However, the concept of civil society is complicated: what or who is it? 
Ghana still has an active system of chieftancy, and, according to Mary Chinery 
Hesse, who is Chief
47
 advisor to President Kufour, the NPP government has seen 
chiefs as the true representatives of the people (interview). But their role is 
disputed, and many query whether they are actually accountable (interview, 
Isodec). There are no mechanisms to ensure accountability, but the chieftancy 
system holds an important role in the Ghanaian society.  
Contemporary civil society in Ghana is a part of longer processes 
characterized by inclusion, exclusion and manipulation of the idea of 
participation, based on factors such as party loyalties, ethnicity or military and 
civilian status (Whitfield 2003). A frequent answer in Ghana when talking about 
the inclusion of civil society was „what civil society was consulted?‟ If 
government consulted some people whom they saw as representing civil society, 
Ghanaian NGOs would often counter that those consulted were not „true‟ civil 
society representatives. In this landscape, consultations are subject to 
manipulation and control, based on government decisions as to who should 
participate, and when and how.  
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Limited access to information was perceived as a problem, and much 
information which ought to be open is not. Ghana‟s Freedom of Information bill 
has not yet been adopted. NGOs feel that this is deliberate, as it has been 
promised by each new government for ten years, and has been postponed by them 
all (interview Isodec). In connection with dealing with oil issues, informants 
mentioned the need for information and also of understanding the central themes, 
such as licensing and concessions, oil administration and tax systems. Without 
the proper information, it is hard to put pressure on the government. 
Through my interviews I found that Norwegian aid workers tended to 
overvalue the workings of civil society as a watchdog in Ghana; they had the 
impression that civil society was included because the Ghanaian government said 
so, but without asking the crucial question of who was included. There also 
seemed to be greater mistrust among Ghanaian stakeholders, which Norwegian 
aid workers might not readily understand or notice when working together with a 
few people and spending only a short time in the country. Norwegian NGOs have 
noted the lack of civil society inclusion in OfD programmes – not least since a 
strong civil society was an important element in the Norwegian model and our 
own history when developing the oil and gas administrative system (interview, 
PWYP).  
The OfD director mentioned the problem of supporting or including civil 
society in OfD cooperation: „It is a high risk strategy, for in the end it is, then you 
get, the governments in a country who doesn‟t like us giving money to the civil 
society in that country, but up until now we have managed to balance‟ 
(interview). This indicates that OfD has been taking care not to risk engendering 
negativity by pressuring local governments to include civil society, and that too 
much focus on civil society within the programme might be unpopular with 
partners. OfD has provided financial support to the international Revenue Watch 
Institute, EITI and other Norwegian donors, but does little do enhance the 
                                                                                                                                    
47 The title of Chief Advisor must not be confused with the chieftaincy, Chief Advisor is the President‟s „right hand‟. 
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inclusion of NGOs in Ghana, even though that might be a crucial factor in 
helping Ghana avoid the resource curse.  
5.4 Aid Cooperation and Negotiating Power  
Towards donors Ghana has been rather weak in negotiating power, although it 
has gained more authority and dialogue towards donors after the HIPIC 
(interview, Gyanni). Among the OfD objectives is to assist in strengthening 
governmental negotiating power towards companies, by giving advice on how to 
maximize government take. This implies advising on what petroleum laws and 
agreements are most beneficial. International oil companies often arrive with 
large teams of professional negotiators, whereas Ghana has little previous 
experience of negotiating oil contracts and few people with expertise in this field. 
However, Ghana‟s negotiating power towards the companies has improved after 
the oil resources were proven. Today, a company signing contracts takes a 
smaller risk, but has to agree to a higher governmental take in case of actual 
discoveries. In terms of development cooperation, Norway lacks long-established 
diplomatic bonds to Ghana, which means that Norwegians have generally been 
less familiar with Ghanaian politics, business culture, relations to civil society 
groups and the orientation of important actors in Ghana. All the same, with the 
OfD programme, Norway quickly became the central donor on petroleum issues 
in Ghana – which was surprising to some.  
5.4.1 ‘Ghana has only one brother, and the name of the brother is 
Norway’ 
After the National Forum in Ghana to discuss oil challenges, arranged with OfD 
assistance, a meeting was arranged between Ghanaian government officials and 
Norwegian aid workers. Here a Ghanaian asked how Ghana should behave in 
case of potential contributions from other donors. The leader of the Technical Oil 
and Gas Committee, Appiah-Adu, Head of Policy Coordination at the Office of 
79 
 
the President („the Castle‟), replied: „Ghana has only one brother, and the name 
of the brother is Norway‟, making it clear that Ghana regarded Norway as it sole 
aid partner on petroleum (interview Lind, Ministry of Environment). Norway has 
been placed at the centre stage on petroleum issues among donors in Ghana; it 
„had the ear of the government‟ (interview WB). However:   
 
The sudden arrival last year, at the highest level of the state, in the Castle, was 
a little bit astonishing for a lot of people, why they had got it, was it a 
tendering… procedure, why Norway was coming in without international 
competition, this was certainly a question mark. (Interview, Friedel of GTZ) 
 
Other donors saw Norway has having an advantage, as expressed by Friedel: „The 
Norwegian team had the bit advantage of being at the Castle and also on the side 
of the donors, so they had an excellent entry key for their inputs‟ (interview). 
Nevertheless, Norway‟s lack of long-established relations or permanent personnel 
in Ghana was seen as problematic: „they had also a disadvantage, namely that 
they were not posted here, they had no embassy here. But you cannot, with a 
joystick from Oslo, orientate the debate here‟ (interview, GTZ). This lack of 
knowledge was, according to one informant, what led Norway to put „all the eggs 
in Mary Chinery Hesse‟s basked‟48, as one informant put it (interview, WB). 
Hence, during the initiation of OfD in Ghana there was dissatisfaction among 
other donors because of Norway‟s role as the key donor, and also some 
dissatisfaction among certain parts of the Ghanaian government concerning how 
the cooperation started. Due to the centralized decisionmaking structure, with 
OfD working closely together with the Castle, other important parts of the 
government not located at the Castle felt left out – notably the Ministry of 
Finance. With limited information flow and in a political climate where 
                                                                                                                                    
48 Mrs. Chinery Hesse worked in the former president‟s office as Chief Advisor to the President, and was an 
important contact for the OfD programme. She was referred to as a very influential (equivalent to a prime minister) 
by the Norwegians, but as „one person, and far from the most influential‟ by other informants (Interview WB). 
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suspicions of corruption are rampant, this behaviour on the part of OfD was seen 
as inappropriate in the beginning.    
5.4.2 A donor meeting in Accra 
During my fieldwork in Accra I attended a joint donor meeting on petroleum 
assistance issues. The meeting was established and held by the British, after 
discovering that the Ghanaian government had asked for assistance on the same 
issue from both the Norwegian and the British side. While the Ghanaian 
government saw it as in their interest to get diverse kinds of advice, the British 
emphasized the need for coordination of aid, to avoid wasting time and resources 
– and to position themselves closer to the government. At this meeting 
representatives of all the traditionally important donors in Ghana were present: 
the UK, Germany, the WB, the IMF, USAID and also Canada, Japan and the 
Netherlands. Discussions concerned how to coordinate aid to Ghana on 
petroleum issues, who had been asked for what, and who wanted to contribute 
what. The Norwegians were seen as outsiders, and everyone was particularly 
curious to know what the Norwegians were doing. Norway, described as having 
good relation with the World Bank, USAID and the British, seemed positive 
towards this coordination.  
From spending time in Ghana and observing OfD and other Norwegian 
personnel working with OfD (see appendix 8.3), I feel that Norwegian aid 
workers have taken for granted certain beliefs and ideas about society that 
underpin their way of thinking and acting while in Ghana. This „Norwegian way‟ 
of seeing things might not be in accordance with the reality of a Ghanaian context 
– for instance, as regards ideas of openness, democracy or simply cultural 
conventions. In fact, several Norwegians working with OfD and an oil company 
stressed the difficulties of understanding the culture in Ghana. Lack of familiarity 
with Ghana makes one less able to understand cultural issues; and not being 
placed permanently in Ghana makes it more difficult to work together with other 
aid workers (interview, GTZ). Interviews corroborate my impression that the OfD 
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personnel know too little about the country where they are working. In Ghana‟s 
aid circles, the Norwegians are seen as naïve, no matter how good their intentions 
may be. However, that seemed to work as an advantage and not a drawback, and 
the Norwegians working in Ghana through OfD seemed aware of this impression, 
which they also reinforced themselves.  
Ownership in aid 
Due to its aid-dependency history, Ghana is seen as having weak ownership in 
aid. However, in the donor world, the term „ownership‟ is often used to mean 
commitment to policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen, rather than 
actual degree of control over policies that recipient countries are able to exercise 
over policy design and implementation (Whitfield 2008, briefing paper). The 
permanent negotiation process that has developed over almost all policies puts an 
immense burden on national administrative systems, which have to spend much 
time responding to donor initiatives and trying to work out their own priorities 
and steer projects towards their preferences. Aid dependency makes governments 
unwilling to take strong policy positions or chart a development strategy 
diverging from that of the donors, in fear of risking cuts in aid which can in turn 
undermine political support and cost a government the next election. In aid-
dependent countries donors still dominate decisionmaking over which policies 
are adopted, how aid is spent and what conditions are attached to its release. 
Difficulties in taking control over policies where aid resources were involved was 
described by an informant in Ghana‟s Ministry of Finance: 
 
With the negotiations, I think much of our weakness lay in the fact that we had 
not developed negotiation skills adequately, and then many times with a lot of 
negotiations there is not much flexibility to change things, it is aid (…) but you 
know, in the end of the day quite a bit of it is aid, and it is difficult to go out 
and say „I want it like this or this‟. (Interview, Gyanni) 
 
The OfD programme differs from most aid programmes by providing human 
capital, not financial resources. Several in the Ghanaian government and GNPC 
saw that as favourable about the Norwegian petroleum aid; they also felt that 
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Norwegians allowed them to be „in the driver seat‟ by presenting options, but 
letting the Ghanaians take the decisions. 
5.5 New Friendship – the Business Side  
A few Norwegian companies have been in Ghana previously, but their number is 
now increasing. Some companies have partner contracts on oil fields (such as 
Interoil) but these are small, and none have been operators. Statoil has visited 
Ghana and GNPC several times to map out business opportunities, in 2004/5 and 
again in recent years (interview, Statoil). In addition, various supply companies 
are active towards Ghana, as well as companies in other sectors. This was 
affirmed by the Norwegian consul in Ghana Morten Gade (email correspondence) 
although he added that he could not provide names, on grounds of business 
confidentiality.  
The Norwegian company Aker ASA has been in Ghana before, and was 
recently awarded an oil and gas production licence on the South Deepwater Tano. 
This is a large exploration block, about the size of the Norwegian county of 
Vestfold.
49
 The Aker ASA group encompasses many companies, including 
supply and oil companies. Aker ASA holds an 85% interest in the block; GNPC 
and the Ghanaian government own 10% carried interest, and a local partner, 
Chemu Power, holds 5%. If a commercially viable field is discovered, GNPC and 
the Ghanaian government can increase their stake to 25%. Deepwater Tano is 
located further offshore and at greater water depths than the large Jubilee, but it 
has much of the same geology and is thus promising. According to the deal, Aker 
ASA is to invest between 25 and 30 million USD in seismic surveys and data 
interpretation starting in early 2009, with drilling of the first exploration well 
scheduled for 2011.
50
 Also Aker use the story of „successful Norway‟ to promote 
                                                                                                                                    
49 www.akersolutions.com/Internet/MediaCentre/PressReleases/All/2006/AKPressRelease_1037650.htm 
50 http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article166034.ece 
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themselves, emphasizing that this is something that they can bring to Ghana. The 
then-chairman of Aker ASA, Langøy, announced
51
: 
 
The award by GNPC and the Ghanaian authorities represents recognition of 
Norway's oil and gas expertise and a vote of confidence in Aker's capabilities. 
(... )The project generates exciting opportunities for several Aker companies. 
Aker has played a key role since the opening chapter of Norway's modern 
history as an oil producer. Aker's broad industrial capabilities have continued to 
develop through new technologies and projects worldwide. We are now sharing 
this wealth of experience with the government and people of Ghana. 
 
However, when writing this thesis, the Ghanaian government has made it clear 
that it wants Aker ASA out of Ghana, claiming that the licence is not valid.  
When the licence was awarded, Aker ASA rated Ghana as „very 
competent‟, but later they referred to Ghana as a „banana republic‟ after they had 
been declared evicted.
52
 Why the Ghanaian government demanded that Aker 
ASA withdraw has been variously interpreted. According to the former, Aker 
ASA had not registered properly according to Ghanaian laws. This happened 
even though this contract was held to be more favourable for Ghana than the ones 
initiated prior to the discovery of oil. The problem seems to have been that 
Ghana‟s partner company Chemu was a „ghost‟ company established by members 
of the Kufour government, in order to access the oil resources, and thus this 
represented a case of corruption. Aker ASA stated that it was the shift of 
government that caused problems, since it was the parliament under the Kufour 
government that had ratified the licence. This might be an example either of an 
unpredictable operation environment, or of Aker failing to register properly: 
views differ. The parties are now trying to solve the case by recourse to legal 
means. The law referred to by the new government concerns the obligations of 
                                                                                                                                    
51 http://www.myaker.net/text.cfm?path=1&id=226&lid=3 June 10 2010 
52 http://e24.no/lov-og-rett/article3542897.ece 24.3.2010, and 
http://www.petro.no/modules/module_123/proxy.asp?D=2&C=29&I=13483&mid=20 24.3.2010 and 
http://www.dn.no/energi/article1850169.ece 24.3.2010 
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companies to conclude an agreement with a Ghanaian partner in order to operate, 
which points up the issue of local content.  
Local content  
Huge investments will be made in developing Ghana‟s oil resources, but many 
fear that these investments will not remain in the country. In the words of 
Director of GNPC, Thomas Manu: „If all the contractors, all the suppliers are 
foreign, the investments will go there‟ (interview). OfD‟s Norwegian partner, 
Intsok, is sceptical to overrating local content, as local companies may not be the 
most competitive, and including them might raise costs of the projects (interview, 
Wangen, my translation). However, Norwegian experience indicates that the 
long-term importance of creating local content can be decisive. Having low rate 
of industrialization is not an advantage for Ghana, as it was being able to convert 
an existing shipping industry that helped Norway to establish a national 
petroleum industry cluster. The Ghanaian government recognizes local content as 
an important feature, but see problems in obtaining this, because Ghanaians still 
lack the necessary skills (interview Gyanni). According to the procurement rules, 
Ghana may prefer a national company under otherwise equal conditions – but 
with today‟s advanced technology, it is hard for Ghana to be competitive. Also 
current WTO regulations of protectionism restrict governments‟ ability to prefer 
national companies if they are not competitive, and Norway supports the 
liberalization of energy services under the WTO (Kristoffersen 2008). Making 
capacity and know-how transfer a part of production agreements is one way that 
Ghana can aspire to creating local content, but where government and company 
interests may differ – as they do, in several regards. 
5.5.2 Conflicting aims 
Any overly hasty production start is disadvantageous because it is likely to affect 
the longevity of the field and be more harmful for the environment. Today only 
40 to 60% of the oil is extracted from the ground, on average in the world, and 
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increased oil recovery (IOR) has become a major issue (interview, Heglund of 
OfD). Whereas oil companies want to cream the field – taking out the easily 
exploitable oil, and then move on to new fields – host country governments 
(should) want to realize the full potential of the resources. These objectives may 
be conflicting, as noted by the GNPC Director (interview):    
 
The oil companies want quick returns, while the country wants the ultimate of 
the resource. The initial stages of the deals are made a lot by the companies. 
GNPC and Ghana wants to use the full potential of the resource, and therefore 
wants the companies to invest more. (…) having invested the money when the 
oil is found, they now want to increase the investment and clear the field as 
quickly as possible and move on, and you want to find out the ultimate value. 
You are long term in nature, they are short term, you see. Even during 
negotiations the whole thing is based on risk and return, they see more risk and 
want more return, but you don‟t see as much risk, and want to give less return.  
 
However, the Ghanaian government has acted quickly to start early oil 
production, although the legal framework and EIA is not ready: this was the view 
of the donors, including OfD. The government‟s rush to start production is 
understandable. The country has many good causes that need funding; a further 
motivation stems from high early spending and budget deficits. However, 
Norway did the same – although that is not part of the „official oil story‟ of 
Norway, and OfD‟s shared experiences. In Ghana, a sense of urgency and fast-
track development are shared by the operators and GNPC. This has somewhat 
undermined the plans for development and operation (POD) for Jubilee, as some 
information was not yet available when the document was submitted.  
We should note that oil companies tend to rate the GNPC‟s institutional 
quality and negotiation force as higher than those of the government or NGOs. 
Where the companies refer to GNPC as having „so much competence‟ the 
Norwegian government and Ghanaian NGOs see it as less competent, „not even 
knowing what they are doing most of the time‟ (Interviews). The companies 
portray Ghana‟s negotiators as highly skilled. This enhances the credibility of the 
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negotiations, where the outlining of production agreements including the shares 
of profit are determined.  
As noted, the distribution of concessions is a much-debated issue in the oil 
world, and various systems are in operation. The two most applied are open 
bidding rounds versus closed assessment systems, also referred to as 
„discretionary‟. Ghana is currently using the same model as Norway, a 
„discretionary‟ system which provides the government with good control of 
which companies are awarded licences. But as a „discretionary‟ system is not 
transparent it is seen as more vulnerable to corruption. A bidding round system is 
promoted due to the focus on transparency, but it gives the host country less 
control. The company with the highest bid wins the license, but this might turn 
out to be a company with no good intentions of staying long or developing local 
content, this goes for example for Kosmos in Ghana. These only want to make 
discoveries, sell them for profit and move on. This indicates a double moral on 
the part of Norway, as the „discretionary‟ licence system applied in Norway did 
serve to further the state‟s control of the oil sector and which companies were 
allowed to operate on the Norwegian shelf. But although this system has worked 
well for Norway, OfD advises Ghana to choose an open bidding round system. 
5.6 Mainstream View of Ghana: Desire for a Success Story  
Ghana is widely viewed as a peaceful oasis in a region engulfed in turmoil. 
Among OfD staff there is the belief that Ghana has chances of becoming a 
success, a different example of an African oil country, avoiding the resource 
curse: „Ghana has an historical chance to make things right‟ (interview, OfD 
Director). Ghana is increasingly seen as a model for peaceful democracy, as by 
Norwegian Minister for Development and Environment, Solheim: „Ghana takes 
the Lead Shirt again‟53 (my translation).  
                                                                                                                                    
53 Solheim in the Norwegian daily VG, 14 February 2009 
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The widespread wish to see a successful African country seems to bring a 
downplaying of the fact that reality does not always fit the desired image. 
Studying the sociological factors that underlie peace in Africa, Ayelazuno (2007) 
asks how people can have political freedom, but not socio-economic freedom. He 
argues that the relative peace in Ghana, achieved through successful elections and 
the installation of liberal democracy, will remain fragile unless the state takes 
seriously its social protection responsibility towards marginalized groups. Ghana 
has been promoted as a success story of neo-liberal economic reforms and 
transition to liberal democracy by an uncritical international media and the 
mainstream „transitology‟ literature. As a result, Ghanaian leaders have tended to 
seek refugee under this image when criticized at home for the economic hardship 
that their neo-liberal policies have wrought on most Ghanaians (Ayelazuno 
2009). Several of my respondents pointed out that the good reputation of the 
leadership serves to distract attention from problems in the country. For example: 
 
(…) there is a situation that the reputation of the Ghanaian government in the 
world is much better than the reality, ‟cause Kofi Annan was a good, Kufour is 
a more or less honest guy, therefore the reputation is very good, but when you 
look inside, the budgeting process of Ghana, the control and democratic 
control, the weak parliament, which has no domestic accountably role at all, 
when the transparency in the starting oil (…) there is quite a lot of 
improvement possible. (Interview, GTZ consultant) 
 
Many informants expressed concern that donors want to see Ghana as a 
successful country, especially those working in NGOs. According to the 
Ghanaian consultant to GTZ, „Aid donors, they want to say, Ghana is a good 
story, and they want to be in on it, but it is not good for us, because they don‟t 
want to hear the truth, to have critical reports‟ (interview). Donors want to work 
in a country where things are „going well‟. This is also favourable for companies, 
meaning less questions about having a moral licence to operate in the country.  
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5.7 Concluding Remarks 
West Africa has a new important geo-political role as an oil supplier to the West. 
This is has not gone unnoticed by the Norwegian government, which has up-
scaled investments and development focus in this region. Ghana‟s oil boom has 
taken place at a time of greater attention to the challenges of resource richness, 
providing an opportunity to learn from the experiences of other oil producers, as 
well as from own experiences with extractive industry. A democratic governance 
system and stabilized growth are advantages for Ghana, but low industrialization 
rate is a challenge for creating local content. Ghana has had a weak negotiation 
position, but is now becoming more sophisticated in negotiations with donors, 
sidelining traditional major donors on the issue of petroleum, and has taken a 
stronger negotiation stand towards foreign oil companies as its oil resources have 
been proven. However, there appears to be a certain institutional deficit for good 
management of oil: Ghana has few people with high skills and experience in 
these issues, low transparency and a centralized decisionmaking system. OfD 
aims at addressing this, although institution building is deemed hard to achieve, 
and there was limited belief among Norwegians that institution building could be 
achieved within the programme frames in Ghana. OfD addresses some of the 
major challenges facing Ghana: resource management, environmental issues and 
the inclusion of civil society. However, the greatest focus has been on technical 
petroleum issues. On transparency and inclusion of civil society, OfD 
contributions have come in forms that have not had direct effect; as for 
environmental issues, there had been no effects at the time of this enquiry. In the 
early phase of discovering oil, Norway played a considerable role, as the central 
donor. Norway seemed to use and reproduce the perception of being a well-
meaning but naïve donor. This image engenders good will – as well as placing 
Norwegians beyond criticism for how they proceeded in introducing OfD in 
Ghana, without respect for the „aid architecture‟ in the country, and with scant 
awareness of other groups within the government than the President‟s own team. 
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6. ASSESSING PUBLIC–PRIVATE RELATIONS IN OfD  
In chapter four I argued that the establishment of the OfD initiative in 2005 was 
commercially and geopolitically motivated, and concluded that the concept of 
„the Norwegian model‟ has been useful in promoting Norway abroad. In chapter 
five I described the beginnings of OfD in Ghana in 2008, noting how Ghana has 
increasingly been seen as a Norwegian partner in both aid and business. There I 
concluded that the representation of Norway as the altruistic but naive donor was 
beneficial for OfD. In this chapter I analyse whether/ how OfD serves to promote 
public–private relations. Here I will describe the role of private partners in OfD, 
and assess whether the initiative has had importance for the Norwegian petroleum 
industry and whether business is likely to influence OfD work/policies through 
involving private actors in the aid. I further explore the research question by 
analysing relations and practices of cooperation among the three main actors of 
this case study: the Norwegian state, its petroleum industry, and Ghana. The 
focus is on relations between the Norwegian state and the petroleum industry. I 
will consider power dimensions in OfD, asking whether they indicate that the 
government has become „junior partner‟ to business, and analyse how aid may be 
understood as a powerful business-political strategy for Norway in a globalized 
world. My argument is that the Norwegian state seeks strategies that can ensure 
continued growth for the country‟s petroleum sector, while maintaining its 
concerns about integrity. I also reflect on some issues in the debate on aid 
motives and the inclusion of the private sector in development assistance, proving 
a context for understanding OfD and analysing it as a public–private partnership 
(PPP).  
90 
 
6.1 Aid as Foreign and Domestic Politics 
OfD aims at using the expertise of the Norwegian petroleum sector to promote 
development in poor countries, through providing aid in yet another form. 
Foreign aid has impacted the world economy since the end of the Second World 
War, when it emerged in the wake of the changed conditions after decolonization. 
With the Cold War came fears of the threat of Communism, in turn leading to the 
creation of geographical bonds for foreign aid, closely linked to images of „us‟ 
versus „them‟ in world politics (Tuathail and Dalby 1998). From the beginning, 
establishing an economic world market that could provide opportunities for 
Western business, trade and commerce was among the motives for aid (Simensen 
2003). Today, aid has become an important component of the world economy, 
linking „developing countries‟ to the „developed‟ ones and affecting the policies 
of nation-states.  
In Norway, missionaries provided the first initiatives for aid, based on 
humanitarian and Christian norms (Stokke 1989). Foreign aid influenced and 
formed Norway‟s perceptions of the world, soon becoming a central instrument 
of foreign policy, a means to promote national ideals and interests, and of general 
international self-assertion (Leira et al. 2007). At home, aid provided an 
important constituent part of the Norwegian self-image (Tvedt 2003). In relation 
to the size of its population, Norway has had a large aid industry ever since 1960, 
with thousands of Norwegians working in over 100 countries, and large amounts 
of financial resources being devoted to foreign aid (Simensen 2003:13).  
Norway stands out among the top donors of the world, contributing some 
1% of national GDP. Though greatly concerned about how much aid is given, 
Norway has been less concerned about the effects of its assistance (Leira et al. 
2007). Aid is seen an expression of Norwegian good-will, and consequently 
perceived as a „good thing‟. Any criticisms have largely been rejected, as 
criticism of aid soon becomes criticism of the Norwegian self-image. The 
development debate has largely been structured in line with the view that what 
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makes an act „good‟ is the intention behind it: thus, given the premise that aid is 
fundamentally praiseworthy on ethical grounds, criticisms have been dismissed as 
morally reprehensible. This moral foundation for development policy in Norway 
is supported by all parties in parliament (except the far-right Progress Party). The 
debate over Norwegian aid programmes thus has a specific context, one in which 
some criticisms are voiced, and others not.  
The view of Norwegian aid as an incontestably good and honourable thing 
was asserted from the beginning: „Norway should appear a pure benefactor and a 
true friend of developing countries, without self-interests‟ (Simensen 2003:274). 
Aid should not be tied to Norwegian goods, and Norway should choose 
cooperation countries where there had been little Norwegian involvement, 
avoiding those where Norwegian commerce was already established. This image 
of an altruistic donor is important for achieving trustworthiness within the 
international community, and it became essential that nobody should question 
Norway‟s intentions (Leira et al. 2007). However, to the extent that people 
actually believed in Norway as a pure „do-gooder‟, it was a self-delusion. In fact, 
more than half of Norway‟s aid between 1952 and 1975 went to paying off 
Norwegian deliveries and personnel (Simensen 2003).  
Numerous studies exist of foreign aid, its impact on development and its 
motives and allocation (see e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000, Berthelemy 2006). A 
country‟s aid policy is the result of many processes, involving multiple actors 
(Stokke 1989). Thus an aid policy can be understood as a nexus of processes, 
open to influence from different actors, with differing interests at different stages 
in its making. The main elements that influence a country‟s development policies 
are social and political norms and private-sector interests; aid and development 
policies are influenced by the same domestic and international sources as are 
other policies (Stokke 1989). Empirical studies show that altruistic, political and 
commercial motives all matter for aid allocation (Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
These motives are often intertwined, but it is possible to distinguish between 
altruistic motives and self-centred motives (Stokke 1989). Self-centred 
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approaches are geared either to satisfying political and strategic interests 
(implying political motives), or to satisfying commercial interests (implying 
economic motives). In Norway, aid policies are generally held to be dominated by 
altruistic motives, even though altruism goes counter to general assumptions 
about what motivates states (Bull and McNeill 2007). Recently, the private sector 
has achieved a more prominent role in aid policies – but does that also mean 
greater influence on the policies? 
6.1.1 Private sector in development and PPPs 
The trend towards greater inclusion of the private sector began with UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan‟s Global Compact in 2000. The Compact aimed at 
drawing on business resources for the provision of public goods, by encouraging 
commercial actors to adopt sustainable and socially responsible practices. Kofi 
Annan voiced appreciation of the role of the private sector in a way that the UN 
had not done before (Bull and McNeill 2007), and the Johannesburg World on 
Sustainable Development was partly about legitimizing the role of business in 
development (Zadek 2004). One result of this trend has been the growth of 
public–private partnerships (PPPs). 
The term is frequently used in the development debate, but there is no 
consensus as to what a PPP actually is. Every society seems to have distinguished 
between „public‟ and „private‟, often implying a tension between the two 
(Parsons 1995). The term „private‟ is diffuse, sometimes applied to signify a part 
of „business‟, at other times a part of „civil society‟. In this thesis, the focus is on 
PPPs involving cooperation with private business. PPPs in development involve 
relationships between state actors and commercial actors, and various types of 
PPPs may be identified, depending on the relationships of financial and 
organizational structure (Hodge and Greve 2005). I have here adopted the UN 
definition of PPPs: 
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voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both State 
and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a 
common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and 
responsibilities, resources and benefits. (From Bull and McNeill 2007:5) 
 
Views also differ regarding how to interpret PPPs. They have been seen as purely 
financial and organizational relationships, but also as a continuation of 
privatization, described as the „last chapter of the privatisation book‟ (Coghill and 
Woodward 2005). In the latter sense, PPPs may be seen as contributing to the 
institutionalization of the existing – neo-liberal – order (Bull and McNeill 2007). 
But, unlike the case with privatization, governments have generally been able to 
pursue PPPs unopposed, indeed almost without having to justify their use 
(Coghill and Woodward 2005). This may be because PPPs seem to claim a 
middle ground between the dominant mid-20
th
 century idea of nationalization, 
and the dominant idea in the 1980s and 1990s: privatization (Hodge and Greve 
2005). As an aid programme with a stated goal of drawing on business expertise 
and involving businesses in its work, OfD exemplifies the trend towards 
including the private sector in development, and I will argue that it may also be 
seen as a PPP.   
6.2 Public–Private Interaction through OfD 
In the initial phases of OfD, it was thought that private companies would have a 
more central role in the organizational structure than what in fact became the 
result. The original plan was to include Norwegian companies (Statoil, Hydro and 
potentially Aker Kværner
54
 in a reference group, actively involved in the 
programme, and the Compact was discussed as one type of model (interview, 
Lunde). The companies‟ participation was discussed at a meeting between 
Minister of Development, Erik Solheim, and the chief executive officers of what 
were then Norway‟s two most important oil companies, Helge Lund of Statoil 
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and Eivind Reiten of Hydro. It was acknowledged that conflicts of interests 
would arise in OfD work, and that to minimize them, openness and clarification 
was a key point (meeting résumé, MFA). The original idea for including the 
private sector was then abandoned, due to two beliefs: that there would be a 
higher risk of conflicts of interests; and that it would be difficult to convince 
other parties – especially NGOs and international oil companies – that double 
roles could be properly managed. Due to the political importance of the oil 
industry and the Argus eyes of NGOs on this industry, a more cautious model 
was instead attempted.  
Nevertheless, in OfD work today, many industry-related organizations – 
like Intsok, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE), and the company Statoil – are asked to host 
delegations from OfD cooperation countries and to assist by providing 
technological expertise on resource management. None of the industry-related 
actors receive remuneration, but contribute their own resources (often described 
as limited) in order to assist the programme in its aid activities (interview MPE, 
Intsok and Statoil). They should therefore be considered voluntary cooperation 
partners to OfD.   
However, in OfD work-plans and presentations
55
 a range of Norwegian 
institutions are listed as cooperation partners. Some are industry-related, like the 
Ministry of Petroleum (MPE), the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), 
Petrad and Norwegian embassies. But neither Statoil nor Intsok is mentioned, 
although in practice both are partners to OfD. That becomes evident from a look 
at meeting plans– for example, the visit of Ghana‟s Oil and Gas Technical 
Committee to Norway in May 2008, where meeting Intsok was on the agenda, 
                                                                                                                                    
54 Today known as Aker Solutions, a company in the Aker ASA group. 
55 http://www.norad.no/Satsingsomr%C3%A5der/Energi/Olje+for+utvikling 12 May 2010 
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and in particular Statoil was given extensive space and time. OfD has a short set 
of guidelines
56
 for how to deal with industry partners. We may note:  
 
OfD shall not use the resources of the oil companies in institutional 
cooperation programmes with regulatory authorities in cases related to 
licensing, upstream contracts or fiscal frameworks.  
 
This means that Statoil should not be included in aid activities that involve 
counseling on petroleum fiscal laws or processes regarding cooperation 
countries‟ licenses, as that might entail a double role, giving Norwegian industry 
advantages. However, interpreting these rules and applying them in practice may 
not always prove so simple. Statoil‟s role in relation to OfD is ambiguous, as the 
Norwegian government is the major owner (through the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy), while Statoil is mandated to operate as a private company, and the 
power of Statoil is repeatedly taken up as an issue in the Norwegian debate.  
According to former Minister of Finance Per Kristian Foss, Statoil was at 
times (before privatization) so powerful that people asked if it was not the 
company that governed the state instead of the other way around (Kristoffersen 
2007:74). Even after Statoil was privatized, the bonds between the company and 
Norway‟s political leaders/the MPE have remained close. As Håvard Narum has 
pointed out, today‟s way of organizing Statoil‟s ownership is like „letting the 
foxes mind the geese‟ (Aftenposten, 21 May 2010). Recent examples of Statoil‟s 
power are the government‟s technological breakthrough, referred to as a 
„moonlanding‟, regarding CO2 capture and storage at the gas-powered plant at 
Mongstad, where the government proposed full implementation from 2014, only 
to postpone it to 2018, as Statoil had originally demanded. Another recent 
example concerns the environmentally harmful oil-sand projects in Canada, 
where, despite having majority ownership, the Norwegian government is unable 
                                                                                                                                    
56 http://www.norad.no/Satsingsomr%C3%A5der/Energi/Olje+for+utvikling 
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to restrict Statoil. News commentator Arne Strand
57
 concludes, „when Lund 
[Statoil director] says jump, the government and the Storting jump.‟ 
 But in some regards Statoil‟s interests may not differ that much from those 
of the Norwegian government. The Norwegian state has strong economic 
interests, owning shares in many companies (in addition to Statoil it has shares in 
companies of the Aker group), and is also the third largest investor in British 
Petroleum (BP)
58
 through the State Pension Fund. The Norwegian government is 
interested in securing a strong petroleum sector of its own to contribute to 
economic growth, and uses the rhetoric of the importance of successful 
Norwegian companies for the state in providing innovation, job creation and 
wealth production for securing and sustaining the welfare state. This can be 
linked to how global neo-liberalism and the push for internationalization change 
the formation of politics, in the favour of the big companies.  
6.2.1 An arena for serving the industry? 
The overall goal of the petroleum industry was simply put by the head of Intsok: 
„we try to sell what we have in this country‟ (interview Wangen, my translation). 
Internationalization of the petroleum industry is seen as important factor for 
securing future growth in the petroleum industry (as argued in chapter 4). At 
Statoil, internationalization was held to be „important for everybody, as the world 
gets more global and competition increases‟ (interview, Kløve). A member of the 
OfD Steering Group from the Ministry of Finance agreed that internationalization 
was important for the industry, but doubted whether it was also important for the 
Norwegian state (interview, Rasmussen). The role of OfD for the petroleum 
industry is indicated in Konkraft‟s report no 4 (2008:10), Internationalization:   
 
Having a Norwegian presence in countries with significant petroleum resources 
has also proved an important factor in the internationalization of the Norwegian 
                                                                                                                                    
57 http://www.dagsavisen.no/meninger/article486500.ece 
58 The Norwegian State owns 2% of the shares (the majority owner holds 5%). 
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petroleum cluster and several government ministries have collaborated in the 
„Oil for Development‟ initiative.59 
  
The report further points out that OfD is not primarily an arrangement for the 
industry, but that the industry has „significant experience to offer‟.  
Operating in Ghana contributed to an increased focus on Ghana from 
Norwegian companies, as well as a better understanding of Norwegian industry in 
Ghana. Knowledge of the foreign business environment is valuable in the „oil 
world‟. This context was further described by Wangen of Intsok:  
 
If you take Ghana, what Norway has contributed, many [Ghanaians] have 
travelled in Norway, and that is a good starting point. I starts with relations. 
Then I‟m not saying anything about possibilities for corruption, I‟m only saying 
something about understanding the business opportunities and trying to do 
business. (Interview, my tranlation) 
 
Here it is a matter of the valuable effects of knowledge, reputation building and 
what may be referred to as the door-opener role. Many informants in the 
government and OfD described these unintended side effects, „the law of 
unintended consequences‟ (interview, OfD Director Nore) and „the baker‟s 
babies‟ (interview, Rasmussen). This brings in the question of whether OfD 
constitutes a case of conflict of interests. 
6.2.2 Dual roles and false consciousness 
The potential for conflicts of interest through OfD is widely acknowledged, as 
indicated by Lunde, who had a major role in creating the programme: „this [OfD] 
is great politics, it demands greater awareness and control‟ (interview). A role 
conflict may be „narrow‟ or „broad‟ sense, from the level of the specific firm or 
deal/contract scale, as against on policymaking at the bilateral level.  
A conflict of interests occurs when an actor is involved in multiple 
interests, one of which might corrupt the motives for an act in one of the other 
                                                                                                                                    
59 http://www.konkraft.no/default.asp?id=983 12 February 2010 
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interests. That is what I describe here as a role conflict in a „narrow‟ sense. An 
example would be when the government acts as facilitator for a company like 
Statoil, by providing access to data or contacts. As mentioned in the introduction, 
concerns were voiced in the Financial Times (FT) about possible dual roles that 
the Norwegian government could face through the OfD programme. In this 
article, FT noted the views from multinational oil companies, who pointed out 
that Norwegian companies, through OfD activities, might gain access to 
information in the oil sectors of the cooperation countries – information that 
could be used to commercial advantage. That is the type of conflict of interest 
that the OFD guidelines address. 
However, there can also be role conflict in a broader sense. This is less 
obvious than, and does not necessarily represent, a role conflict in the narrow 
definition. Not only are upstream oil companies part of the internationalization of 
Norway‟s petroleum sector: this sector also involves large supply companies 
which in fact have been more successful than oil companies in terms of 
internationalization. OfD seen as a strategy for facilitating Norwegian business 
interests, while claiming to do development, represents a double role – and one 
that not all the involved actors themselves may even be aware of, because the 
mixing of agendas/objectives is implicit in the creation of the programme itself.  
Finally, for many of OfD‟s cooperation partners, coming from countries 
where NOCs are fully controlled by the government, it might be difficult to make 
a distinction between Statoil as a company and the Norwegian state – to them 
they appear as the same. Norway claims to have a strict separation between the 
company and the authorities – indeed, it is one of the points emphasized in the 
story of „the Norwegian model‟, with the tripartite organization of a state-
company (Statoil), authority (the Petroleum Directorate) and owner (the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy). Yet, on closer scrutiny, the Norwegian state‟s 
facilitating actions for the company indicate that the division between the 
company and the political leadership is blurred also in Norway.  
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Conflict potential  
The tough competition today among international oil companies for getting 
licenses – with most of the remaining oil located in politically unstable areas, and 
some 90% of the remaining oil resources owned by NOCs – may help to explain 
why the industry sees governmental cooperation as so important. But in this 
international setting where NOCs become stronger and control more resources, 
other oil producers might not be so pleased about the Norwegian government 
negotiating with governments in oil states, as this is seen as beneficial for 
Norwegian industry. In this international climate, OfD encouraging countries to 
attempt a protectionist/nationalist model, as Norway did, is a difficult point – it is 
not in Norway‟s interest, nor in the interest of other Western oil countries either, 
and doing so might make Norway unpopular (interview, Lunde). In this context 
my data corroborate Falkner‟s (2008) view that conflict potential among 
companies can act to limit business power. In the case of the Norwegian company 
in Ghana, another company – the Texas-based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 
– alerted the media to Ghana‟s choice of Aker ASA for the license to the 
deepwater Tano block, calling it inappropriate. The issue of Norway‟s potential 
dual roles emerged with suspicions of why the Norwegian company had been 
granted the Tano license, expressed in Ghanaian and Norwegian press, indicating 
that close governmental relationships through petroleum aid between the 
countries had been decisive.
60
 Competition among companies provides an 
incentive for them to speak up when other companies are seen as not playing „by 
the book‟ and gaining advantages thereby. 
Does it matter? 
In the view of Norwegian Minister of Development and the Environment, Erik 
Solheim, potential role conflicts should not lead to abandoning OfD projects in 
countries where Statoil or other Norwegian companies have interests, because 
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Norway can also be expected to make positive contributions in countries where it 
does business. But where Norwegian oil experts are involved, there will always 
be an underlying issue of double roles. 
 
It is a fact that it is hard to find Norwegian oil experts that do not in one or 
another way have self-interests in Norway‟s internationalization project 
succeeding commercially. It is also a fact that the Norwegian foreign policy 
machinery has gradually become more and more joined up with Norwegian oil 
interests. (Ryggvik 2007:42, my translation) 
 
The Norwegian ideal of keeping aid separate from economic motives was not, 
however, shared by all informants. As several Ghana-based interviewees pointed 
out, mixing aid and commercial interests was simply „business as usual‟ in 
Ghana.  
 
For example, if a country produces water pumps, then the next day they will 
knock on your door and explain to you that their pumps are the best in the 
world. So wherever you have development cooperation you have a certain 
mixing of commercial interests, and this goes in particular for the oil industry. 
(Interview, GTZ).  
 
In Norway this is never so openly put, and was even referred to as a taboo: 
„People in Norway look the other way when economic interests are mentioned 
together with aid‟ (Bernander, Director of Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise at Commerce‟s conference on aid (Næringslivets bistandskonferanse) 
on Africa, 2010). Despite this, government has established an aid programme 
which combines precisely industrial and development objectives. Does this mean 
that market forces have taken precedence over the Norwegian state in 
policymaking?  
                                                                                                                                    
60 This was denied by those responsible for awarding the contract, who asserted that a Norwegian company had been 
chosen in order to get variation on the Ghanaian shelf, not only American and English companies.  
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6.3 Government as ‘Junior Partner’ to Business?  
Professor of history and former chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, 
Francis Sejersted, describes Norwegian politics and the oil industrial complex as 
a situation where the „more business-oriented considerations have become ruling 
also for the politicians‟, and asserts in light of this that the government has 
become a „junior partner‟ to business (1999:49). There are in essence three ways 
in which business actors may influence OfD policies: through the use of 
instrumental power, for example as lobbying; through structural power, for 
example agenda-setting and introduction of private standards; and through 
discursive powerm, by getting other actors to behave as desired through forming 
shared values. Divisions between them are however not absolute.  
6.3.1 OfD as a source of networks  
Contacts and information are important for doing business in the petroleum 
industry. In relation to OfD, there are several openings for instrumental 
influence
61
. My interviewees referred to a specific example in the case of Ghana, 
where a Norwegian company contacted OfD for tips on how to proceed in that 
country.
62
 Opportunities for companies to call on OfD when considering a 
country are facilitated by the OfD strategy of hiring retired personnel from the 
petroleum industry; as expressed by the Director of OfD, „I am preoccupied with 
people who know the business‟ (interview, Nore). Having former business 
associates from oil industry in OfD lowers the threshold for approaching them.  
When working in cooperation countries, OfD-related personnel may also 
get requests regarding business establishment. As an associate within Norway‟s 
Ministry of the Environment (ME) put it, „OfD countries may present a request 
                                                                                                                                    
61 The boundaries between instrumental and structural power may be unclear at times, network is in a sense a form of 
structural power, but it opens for use of instrumental power.  
62 This person working in OfD happened to be the individual previously in charge of oil exploration in Ghana for the 
Norwegian company Hydro, which at that time was offered the winner-ticket block that became the famed Jubilee 
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about Statoil coming to that country, and then it may happen that we say that to 
Statoil‟ (interview, Lind, my translation). This indicates how close relations of 
the political and commercial spheres can be beneficial for creating networks, with 
network being an important part of the oil game. OfD may thus have importance 
for the industry by virtue of its being a visible and knowledgeable actor 
connected to potential market countries. 
MoUs 
Establishing cooperation agreements, „Memoranda of Understanding‟ (MoUs), 
contributes to providing networks; such MoUs can be seen as tools for industry. 
Whereas Statoil denied that MoUs were of any significance to them (interview, 
Kløve), others mentioned the valuable role of MoUs for companies: „Statoil 
typically encourages MoUs‟ (Econ Pöyry 2004:11). A cooperation agreement 
with another government entails official visits, often with ministers or other 
important people, and provides meeting interfaces. MoUs provide an arena where 
companies employ instrumental power and influence politics, and then use this 
for gain entry into a market country. This constitutes a door-opener role. Further 
MoUs have potential problem-solving effect. Should political changes or 
unforeseen events occur, a government agreement can provide people and 
increase chances of sorting things out – the trouble-shooter role.  
The door-opener and trouble-shooter roles are also assigned to embassies, 
who can serve as meeting places. They work for business policy aims and OfD, 
and thus have double roles as responsible for aid ventures and as entry points for 
business. One way a country‟s business sector can affect politics is by influencing 
the establishing of embassies, often in line with a country‟s economic interests. 
The embassy role was also described as a door-opener: „it is another setting if we 
show up with the ambassador than with some other type of agent‟ (interview, 
Statoil), and a trouble-shooter. If difficulties materialize in a country, embassy 
                                                                                                                                    
field. But Hydro lost faith in it and sold it, not long before the discovery was made. Several informants mentioned 
 
103 
 
personnel can provide people to help sort things out for the industry. As 
explained by the OfD director, if a foreign-policy problem emerges, „we throw it 
over to MFA, and then they kick in‟ (interview, Nore). There has been talk about 
setting up a Norwegian embassy in Ghana because of the increased cooperation 
(interview Musæus, Councillor at Embassy in Nigeria, Petroleum and 
Commercial Affairs).  Establishing embassies is an arena where business may 
exercise instrumental power by influencing where they are to be located. 
6.3.2 Structural power: agenda-setting and introduction of private 
standards? 
As a PPP involving private sector experts and employing personnel with a 
background from the oil industry, OfD is a potential arena for structural power. In 
the cooperation between Ghana and Norway, the provision of technical advice to 
the petroleum policy and on the POD of Jubilee has been the most emphasized 
part of the cooperation thus far, and where Norway has had greatest influence.
63
 
Assistance is provided through visits to and from both countries. For the visit 
from Ghana‟s Technical Oil and Gas Committee to Statoil in May 2008 there was 
a tripartite programme, says Brynjulv Kløve of Statoil, one of those who hosted 
the delegation (interview). The first part involved learning about Statoil; the 
second part was about the Norwegian model; and the third focused on how Statoil 
works to obtains licences, as well as how Statoil works as a company. A visit to 
Statoil has two main functions:  
 
They [visiting delegations from cooperation countries] want to learn how an oil 
company operates, in order to learn more of the internal thought processes. And 
it is an opportunity for the Norwegian government to show what we have got. 
After all, we are Norway‟s best showcase. (Interview, Kløve)  
 
                                                                                                                                    
that the future of Hydro could have been completely different had it not been for this bad decision. 
63 The model for financial steering that Ghana has adopted is further away from that advised by Norway. 
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For Norway, having a well-known and successful company like Statoil serves to 
attract attention. People come to visit and learn from it; some come in hopes of 
establishing business cooperation. This contrasts with the OfD guideline of not 
using Statoil in cooperation that involves regulating authorities.  
When the delegation of Ghana‟s Oil and Gas Technical Committee visited 
Norway, the same people hosted the official delegation who are also responsible 
for mapping out and making suggestions to Statoil‟s board as to whether Statoil 
should invest or go into Ghana. The Ghanaian Oil and Gas delegation also 
consisted of some very important people, such as Ghana‟s Director of the 
Ministry of Petroleum, Gyamfi, and people with high positions in Ghana‟s 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC).
64
 These are all influential in the 
decisions that will later be made, through a non-open „discretionary‟ system of 
license awarding, as to which companies will be assigned licences on the 
Ghanaian shelf. Thus, OfD has facilitated a meeting of decisionmakers and 
influential people in this industry – a clear example of the close bonds between 
OfD and the oil industry in Norway and Ghana. Statoil here has an agenda-setting 
role, and decides on advice to policy input to the Ghanaian delegation.    
Also illustrative of OfD closeness to petroleum-related agencies in 
Norway is the fact that coordinating responsibility for OfD in the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is located in the Section for Industrialization and 
Industry (INI), the ministry‟s contribution to internationalization of the energy 
industry. Confronted with this, informants replied that it was for purely 
„practical‟ reasons, as INI is the section with most previous knowledge of 
„dealing with‟ foreign countries – through promoting internationalization. Once 
the idea of the initiative is accepted, that could seem the logical place to put it. 
Nevertheless it points up the close link between advice on policy inputs from 
                                                                                                                                    
64 GNPC has the role of a petroleum directorate and a company, meaning the boundary between the company‟s 
political and commercial factions are unclear.  
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OfD and what must be seen as pro-internationalization forces in the Norwegian 
state apparatus.   
Between structural power and discourse 
Using Norwegian oil specialists‟ advices may result in the adaption of private 
standards in Ghana‟s oil industry. Having personnel with a background from the 
oil sector is positive, from the OfD perspective, with a view to making relevant 
expertise available to developing countries. But this also has a downside to the 
extent that OfD staff are less familiar with developmental processes, including 
how to work with governance issues. The OfD staff I interviewed seemed highly 
knowledgeable about the petroleum industry, but less so when it came to 
development and the societal processes of governance and development.  
In the oil business world, applying the label of „business‟ to something 
seemed to make it more legitimate, downplaying the moral issue. As to whether 
informants deemed it morally right for Norway to earn vast sums of money on 
African oil-producing countries with weak democracy or little respect for human 
rights – in some cases benefiting from these countries‟ lack of national control 
over resources and in part contributing to uphold undemocratic regimes – the 
answer would be, „but, that is business!‟ There is a downplaying, or neglect, 
when it comes to discussing the power of commercial actors around OfD and in 
developing countries. Many working in government and OfD under-communicate 
the level of ethical and practical dilemmas arising from this. People with a 
lifetime of experience from the petroleum business are more likely to hold 
„business values‟ and perceive the neo-liberal consensus as a „commonsense‟ 
issue – a natural perception of how things are supposed to work. This contributes 
to OfD‟s apolitical approach to development work.  
6.3.3 Altruism and the power of discourse  
What motivates private actors to participate in OfD, and contribute with their 
„limited‟ resources in order to provide aid? Answers from my interviews with 
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OfD staff, Norwegian governmental agencies and industry actors all indicated 
altruism. As put by Statoil, „that simply has to do with goodness, we 
[Norwegians] have so much and we are generally good and honourable, so we 
want to share‟ (interview, Kløve). 
In the public debate in Norway, OfD is repeatedly presented as altruistic, as 
in White Paper/ Storting Reports no 13, Climate, Conflict and Capital: „our 
efforts are grounded in solidarity‟ (2009:5), and no 15, Interests, Responsibility 
and Opportunities: aid and humanitarian policies „are grounded in values with 
basis not in self-interest, but in humanity‟s common interests‟ (2009:11). 
Norwegian government officials (re)assert that OfD is based on purely altruistic 
motives; it is „motivated by doing developmentally-profiled work, and is not 
something that takes consideration to Norwegian companies or Norwegian 
industry, or other actors, or NGOs or anything else‟ (interview Lunde, my 
translation). Also the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, has asserted: 
„Norway does not have any interests in this [OfD], only to do development.‟65  
According to government officials in Ghana and GNPC, one reason why 
Ghana chose Norway as their main cooperation partner on petroleum was that 
Norwegians were perceived as having valuable experiences to draw on. But 
equally important was their perception of Norway as being „less dangerous‟ and 
letting Ghanaians be more in „the driver seat‟, by presenting options and letting 
Ghanaians choose for themselves what to do) (interview, Gyanni of the Ministry 
of Finance and the President‟s Oil and Gas Committee, and GNPC Director 
Manu). Most Ghanaians are sceptical to altruism as an aid motive, but Norway is 
seen as being less self-interested than many others. A common perception of 
donors and of Norway was expressed by Yao Graham, Director of Third World 
Network (interview): 
 
                                                                                                                                    
65The impact of Africa – political partner and global actor. arranged by MFA and Nobel Peace Centre. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/impact_africa.html?id=557884 20 May 2010 
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–  Do you think aid is driven by altruistic motives?  
 
–  I say all donors have interests they pursue.  
 
– Do you think it‟s the case that Scandinavian donors are more naïve?  
 
– Not necessarily. We are aware of bribing from Norwegian companies (...) this 
shows a state of double standards. But I still make the general claim on two 
grounds, the Scandinavian countries do not have the vested interests that ex 
colonial powers, and two, Scandinavian countries have good systems and we 
want to learn from you, and if you gain something from it that is legitimate.  
 
In addition to the sense of Norway as an altruistic donor, Norwegian government 
officials and companies also present their companies as acting with a higher 
moral standard than others when doing business. This conviction was not shared 
by all Ghanaian interviews, however. The GNPC Director had had dealings with 
Norwegian companies earlier: 
 
Norwegian companies are not any better when they are working internationally. I 
have had negotiations with NorskHydro before. I‟ve dealt with Statoil before. 
What is making them behave properly in Norway? Civil society, government 
regulations, and because they are being scrutinized. (Interview, Manu) 
 
Despite such mixed experiences of Norway and generally negative experiences 
with donors, Norway has succeeded in marketing itself as an altruistic donor with 
little self-interest. Few Ghanaians believed that Norway was purely a well-doer, 
except from a few who had been part of OfD cooperation and referred to the 
programme in terms of OfD‟s own expressions and rhetoric. These tended to state 
(to me at least) that Norway really was an altruistic donor. There might be two 
reasons for this: either they have accepted the „Norwegian story‟ of altruism, or 
they have a genuine belief that it is true – or most likely, a combination of the 
two. The success of creating the story of „the altruistic donor‟ and „the 
Norwegian model‟ exemplifies discursive power. 
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6.4 Aid as a Business Political Strategy 
The rhetoric of universal values and actors free of interests and power is an 
immense source of legitimacy in a world otherwise filled with conflicts and 
interest-maximization (Tvedt 2003). That Norway has strong commercial 
interests, first and foremost through its petroleum sector, is under-communicated 
in the Norwegian development dialogue. Contradictions between Norwegian 
humanitarian politics, foreign politics and business politics are not openly 
discussed. Policy recommendations that were given to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and led to the creation of OfD, are not reflected in the public debate in 
Norway. There is thus a discrepancy between what the programme is represented 
as doing, and the governmental and industrial objectives that motivated its 
creation.  
Norwegian aid through the OfD initiative meets all of Nye‟s (2000) 
sources of „soft‟ power: a desirable culture (Norway is perceived as rich and 
attractive to others); attractive political values (Norway is seen as more altruistic, 
with little corruption and as „less dangerous‟); a foreign policy characterized by 
moral authority (OfD aid is a perceived as a legitimate involvement in Ghana‟s 
petroleum sector). To exercise soft power, the state needs legitimacy. Norway‟s 
representation of itself provides the state with authority, in terms of sources of 
legitimacy (Bull and McNeill 2007). It is represented and perceived as a holder of 
expertise, with high moral standing and as a goal achiever, having „succeeded‟. 
Norway has discursively established its role internationally with a high level of 
integrity. In particular, authority has accrued from combining the image of an 
„altruistic donor‟ with the attractive knowledge industry expressed as „the 
Norwegian model‟. 
This is important, since recognition of resource curse challenges and the 
poor record of many oil companies in developing countries have meant that 
companies increasingly need a license to operate, politically but also in terms of 
legitimacy (interview, Lunde). OfD contributes to give Norway such a moral 
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license to operate. By defining its activities as „doing good‟, the programme 
provides Norway with the moral right to be involved in a country. Altruism may 
be seen here as a foreign policy instrument that promotes the national interests of 
Norway. The OfD initiative thus provides the Norwegian state, as the holder of 
economic, technical and political expertise which contributes to attractiveness, 
legitimacy to establish itself in difficult market countries, or in countries where it 
has had little in terms of diplomatic relations, such as Ghana.  
The Ghanaian state seems to have more constrained ways of exercising 
power, compared to donors and Norway, although Ghana‟s increased economic 
role and geopolitical importance has provided a stronger position. While Ghana 
would (perhaps) have been best served by nationalizing its petroleum sector – not 
unknown in several other developing countries – that would be is difficult, as 
Ghana is still dependent on making alliances in aid and business in order to gain 
the technical know-how and capital investment required to exploit the oil 
resources in the first place. Neither is nationalization the advice offered by 
Norway, and Ghana cannot control what is presented to it as policy advice from 
Norway. 
Stokke (1989:162) has argued that Norway, as a middle-sized power in 
international politics, uses the means available to it to promote its own agenda; 
and that, as a small country with an open economy, Norway has an interest in the 
establishment of an international regime for maintaining international peace and 
economic stability. The OfD initiative contributes to operational environments 
that are „friendly‟ and suited to Norwegian business actors, and thereby increases 
the competiveness of its industry.  
6.4.1 Public–Private Relations in the Age of Globalization 
With the increased globalization, commoditization and privatization aimed at 
short-term profit since the 1970s, competitiveness has become a crucial factor to 
succeed in the world of global business. This period has seen the growth of 
international companies, with at least two Norwegian companies in this category: 
110 
 
Statoil and Aker ASA. In this globalized context, there is on one hand state 
autonomy, but on the other, nation-states face the structural dependency of 
capitalistic reproduction. This contributes to a blurring of the division between 
„public‟ and „private‟. In the case of OfD, the public and private, the economic 
and political, and the domestic and foreign are in policy practice deeply 
intertwined. A separation between them must be seen as a result of social 
processes and political decisions of how actors wish to present the situation. That 
in turn relates to how key concepts in foreign politics are framed today. 
This globalized setting is increasingly determined by key actors‟ 
understanding of energy-political contexts, connections and alliances, where the 
discourse of „security of supply‟ has become more and more important for 
framing the shared supply of the Western states (Kristoffersen 2007). The 
confluence of business and geopolitics explains the growing role of the USA in 
West Africa (Gazvinian 2007), and can probably explain also Norway‟s 
increasing interest in West Africa.  In this contemporary context, some see state 
power as increasing (Weiss 2003). But most scholars concur that business is 
gaining the upper hand over the state. Indeed, many see states as being 
reconstituted as „competition states‟, meaning changing conditions to facilitate 
their commercial activity (Bieling 2007, Cerny 1990).  
The state–globalization debate has not been dealt with extensively within 
the limited scope of this thesis. On the fundamental question of whether 
globalization weakens and „hollows‟ out the state, I would assert that OfD may be 
seen as exemplifying a business-oriented transformation of statehood, rather than 
a weakening of the state‟s role. It exemplifies a case where the state has acquired 
an active role as facilitating and mediating for its business interests.  
The trend of including business in governance and development plans 
must be seen in this setting. States even depict developing state and oil industry 
competitiveness as beneficial for a country‟s distribution of welfare, presented in 
the rhetoric of maintaining the state‟s financial redistributive strength for the 
public good. The OfD initiative is a plan and an idea where strategies of industry 
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and development and foreign politics meet. In this institutionalized frame, state 
and private actors cooperate, working together to reach a common goal – or 
different goals but applying the same means. According to the classification of 
PPPs presented above (Hodge and Greve 2005), OfD may be seen as a PPP with 
looser financial bonds, as there is relatively low investment and little risk 
involved, but as having a nearer organizational relationship, due to the closeness 
of Statoil and industry-led bodies to politics and governmental agencies. As a 
PPP, OfD can be thus be understood as an arena where business can influence 
policies by exercising rule-setting power, benefiting from its position in material 
structural contexts. This corroborate Fuchs and Lederer‟s (2007) 
conceptualization of PPPs as active political entities that provide opportunities 
for business actors to influence the input side of policies, thus contributing to the 
structural power of business.  
As such an arrangement, the OfD initiative seems to contribute to greater 
neo-liberalization. It may thus be understood as the Norwegian state‟s „answer‟ to 
the increased demand for international competitiveness and presence in countries 
of importance to Norway‟s economic interests. In this globalised context, the 
sources of legitimacy and authority are changed. The private sector in 
development has heightened importance as an idea that can provide the 
legitimization, authority, and attractiveness that business partners represent today. 
Power in the global information age is changing. In the democracies of the West 
is has become less tangible and less directly coercive than it was in the past (Nye 
2004).  
6.5 Concluding Remarks: OfD as a Win–Win–Win of 
Energy and Aid?  
In this case study, the main groups of actors with power are the Norwegian state, 
the Norwegian oil industry and the Ghanaian state. These form a threesome, 
interacting and influencing each other. The exercise of power within this 
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threesome may be found in three dimensions: instrumental, structural and 
discursive. All of these may be exercised within the OfD nexus, but I would hold 
that that the nexus is primarily an arena where structural and discursive power are 
exercised: structural power through networks,
66
 and partnership with private 
sector, which brings the public and the private spheres together and opens for 
influence on agenda setting and potentially introduction of private standards. 
Discursive power involves how OfD, Norway and „the Norwegian model‟ are 
represented and perceived in the public debate at home and abroad. 
In Norwegian foreign and development politics, interests and values are 
increasingly connected in a way that serves to blur the borders between domestic 
and international politics. OfD is a strategic part of Norwegian foreign policy, 
where issues of role conflicts may and do occur. Through its practices, OfD may 
be beneficial to the Norwegian petroleum industry. Reputation building, the door-
opener role and potential information flow are most important, in addition to a 
trouble-shooter role. In Ghana there is also clearly interest in working together 
with Norway, signalling that Ghana sees itself as gaining from the cooperation, 
while remaining aware of and protecting its own interests. OfD may or may not 
have a dual role, or a potential for conflicts of interest – but this is not necessarily 
damaging to the cooperation countries involved. It is other Western oil companies 
that dislike the advantages accruing to Norway from this cooperation, as the dual 
role puts Norway in a favourable position.   
So far OfD has produced advantages for Norway, by providing an interface 
and acting as a door-opener for the industry. Norwegian oil and oil-related 
companies and the Norwegian state alike benefit from OfD. As far as I can tell, 
the OfD secretariat works on the basis of altruistic motives. The motivations for 
the programme are a complex mixture of altruism and self-interest. However, the 
motivations for the programme are difficult to disentangle, because Statoil and 
                                                                                                                                    
66 Network, however, may open up for use of instrumental power, such as lobbying of where to put embassies or 
which countries to choose. 
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Norway are interconnected, both as decisionmaking bodies and as beneficiaries 
of OfD. Ghana almost certainly benefits from OfD. Norwegian industry seems, in 
the case of Aker ASA in Ghana, to have benefited from OfD, and the Norwegian 
state thus benefits from OfD. It is therefore easy to understand why it has been 
promoted: all the three most relevant actors like it – the Norwegian government, 
the companies, and Ghana.  
We have also seen how, in the case of OfD, the public–private separation is 
a misconception, a myth, as the „public‟ and the „private‟ actor‟s goals overlap 
more than they conflict. It is thus an institutionalized coherent strategy for both 
industry, foreign and development objectives. The design of OfD as bringing 
political and commercial spaces together in interactivity promotes public–private 
relations and is constitutive of OfD as having a dual role in Norwegian foreign 
politics. OfD may well be understood as an exercise of „soft‟ power in the 
interests of Norway, which again can be understood as a case of well-concealed 
„hard‟ power. Many of those contributing in the programme may genuinely not be 
aware of this themselves – it can at times be an advantage to be naïve.  
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7. CONCLUDING CHAPTER: REASSESSING OFD 
This thesis has offered a contextualising and understanding of the OfD nexus, its 
actors and strategies, and whether or how it has institutionalised practices that 
alter relations between the state and market sphere in Norway. To study this I 
chose a case study of OfD‟s initiation in a cooperation country, Ghana, with a 
focus on identifying the actors and their sources of power. The research material 
has been organized around three chapters: an analysis of motives for creating the 
OfD initiative; a description of how the cooperation has proceeded in the specific 
case of Ghana; and thirdly an analysis of how dimensions of power have been 
exercised within OfD. This concluding chapter presents an analysis of how 
findings are interpreted in this thesis, to indicate how we can understand the 
research question in light of this. Lastly I offer some reflections on the 
methodological challenges and usefulness of theory, and conclude by considering 
the broader significance of this study. 
7.1 OfD and the Case of Ghana 
Petroleum-related aid has become popular in Norwegian foreign aid. Here 
Norway has a „comparative advantage‟, even though it distributes relatively little 
in terms of financial resources. The Norwegian government sees it as positive 
that Norway shares its experiences of petroleum sector management with 
developing countries. Norway‟s oil expertise is, however, very well suited to the 
conditions of Norwegian society: an open economy in a small country that 
benefits from being a trade liberalist. This stands in contrast to the picture that 
emerges from studying Norway‟s petroleum history, and what Norway has 
practised itself. Rather than an open economy, national protectionism and 
controlling the Norwegian petroleum sector through Statoil were central to the 
Norwegian model. The international environment since then has changed, making 
it difficult for countries to copy the protectionist features of the Norwegian story. 
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In today‟s international petroleum climate, Norway‟s OfD is cautious about 
advising developing countries to follow protectionist politics. The OfD 
programme emphasizes „sharing Norwegian experiences‟, but in daily practice 
the image of a „Norwegian model‟ (to be copied) remains important. This serves 
as a discursive tool for representing Norway as attractive and knowledgeable, 
motivating petroleum producing-developing countries to become involved in 
Norway‟s OfD programme.  
However, the programme has been resented by international oil companies 
who see Norway as gaining a competitive advantage from being close to the 
administrations of petro-states. Through OfD, Norway advises and influences 
petroleum policies and regulations in petroleum-producing developing countries. 
This contributes to create good will for Norwegian companies; it provides 
meeting spaces, information and knowledge about potential markets and business 
associates, and helps in establishing operational environments that happen to be 
well suited to Norwegian companies.  
Ghana has become a core cooperation country for OfD, with Norway as 
the central donor from the „beginning of oil‟ in Ghana. The discovery of oil might 
represent an opportunity for Ghana to achieve its developmental goals and 
decrease aid dependency – if it could overcome the institutional and managerial 
deficits that have badly affected earlier extractive resources, and the challenges of 
petro-states. OfD is indeed concerned with the challenges of the resource curse in 
Ghana. But the programme does not challenge the neo-liberal world order or the 
legitimacy of the market; its approach to governance issues has remained 
technical and a-political, where the challenge is in reality a deeply political one.   
Aid debates are full of endless discussions about how to make aid work, 
but without mentioning the „big elephant in the room‟: the fact that one reason 
why aid fails to contribute to development may be because that is often not the 
main motive for providing aid. To make aid work we need a better understanding 
of the context in each cooperation country, but also more research on the 
allocation mechanisms of aid cooperation and why a particular type of aid is 
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provided. A more systematic and detailed analysis of the motives involved in 
petroleum-related aid could prove very useful.  
This study has provided a nuanced analysis of the motives behind OfD. I 
have argued that creation of the programme was motivated also by the aim of 
internationalizing Norway‟s petroleum industry. In line with the analytical 
backdrop to the creation of OfD (the 2004 Econ Pöyry report), three policy 
branches are involved behind the common agenda of OfD: foreign policy, 
industrial policy/business promotion and development cooperation, with 
distinctly different policy goals. The goal of foreign policy is to serve the national 
interest; industrial policies serve commercial interests; and development policy 
focuses on promoting social and economic well-being (Stokke 1989). In light of 
this, I have enquired whether and how OfD acts to promote public–private 
relations in Norway. 
7.1.1 Providing new spaces for state and market? 
OFD is a rara avis in Norwegian development. The initiative has a complex 
steering structure and hires personnel with a background from the petroleum 
industry to run its daily operations. This is a nexus constituted of actors and 
strategies, made into a policy and an institution, coordinating several agencies 
involved with petroleum assistance – though these have varying objectives. One 
motivation for the programme has been to take advantage of the industry‟s 
experience, drawing on private actors. In terms of its practices, OfD is a PPP with 
close relational bonds of partnership. As a PPP, it allows for the exercise of 
structural power, while the discursive power of the Norwegian state is 
constitutive as a source of legitimization for these acts. The OfD nexus promotes 
public–private relations in Norway by providing a common arena for the state 
and market spheres in the context of an aid programme. It is thus somewhat of an 
anomaly as regards Norway‟s (self-) image as a purely altruistic donor.  
In practice, OfD serves commercial interests linked to Norway‟s industrial 
policy, and foreign policy objectives of being a notable actor on the international 
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arena, while it claims to be working solely to advance social and economic well-
being – the main development policy objectives of Norway. In OfD cooperation, 
public and private actors would appear to have congruent policy aims; although 
the industry-related organizations (e.g. Statoil, Intsok and Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy) have commercial policy objectives, NORAD has (in principle) 
purely humanitarian objectives, and the Norwegian state has commercial 
objectives but sees it in its interest as a middle-sized power to be perceived 
internationally as a „humanitarian great nation‟. This status gives moral authority 
on the international arena, and the image of a „pure do-gooder‟ is thus important 
for sustaining legitimacy as a source of power, at home and abroad. In my view, 
the material interests that motivated the creation of OfD have indeed been 
politically understated. 
7.1.2 Usefulness of theory and generalization 
In undertaking this study it soon became clear that mainstream IR would not 
provide all the answers to understanding power dimensions and policy objectives 
in the OfD programme. IPE, with its focus on relations between state and market 
actors and including a political and economic view on power, proved more 
helpful. The perspective of interest groups provides a useful understanding of 
business actors, their sources and constraints to exercising power. Seeing power 
as a multifaceted phenomenon is crucial for grasping all of the OfD power 
dimensions. In order to understand the changed relations between state and 
market and the trend of including business in development that OfD represents, I 
found it necessary to include some perspectives on globalization and neo-
liberalization. A full theoretical treatment of these phenomena is beyond the 
scope of this brief thesis, but I would hold that they provide a necessary frame for 
understanding the research question.  
The case of OfD is particularly challenging for analysis. Power is easy to 
detect when actor A makes actor B do something that B does not want to do. 
However, in the case of OfD, actor A is hard to define – is it the Norwegian state 
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or the oil industry? The two are at times difficult to disentangle. The theory 
framework does not seem to fully grasp the interconnectedness of private and 
public actors in this case. And actor B, Ghana, does not perceive itself as being 
„forced‟: after all, receiving aid and advice is in many ways excellent – making 
OfD an unusual example of the exercise of power. 
This is an exploratory study of a rather unique case: public–private 
relations in the OfD nexus in the context of aid cooperation with Ghana, with 
interviews as the primary source of information. This study alone would provide 
limited scope for generalization. However, I believe it has provided some 
important insights on how the coupling of industry objectives to Norwegian aid 
policy can be seen as problematic. These findings may stimulate the investigation 
of other projects in a similar manner, in particular PPPs in development involving 
commercial actors.  
7.2 Concluding Remarks  
The thesis is intended as a contribution to the scholarly debate on the increased 
use of private actors in order to achieve development. The discourse of global 
neo-liberalization has led to the proliferation of arrangements where business 
actors work together with nation-states. This study corroborates the view that 
business is increasingly seen as a political actor, and that it is widely believed that 
cooperation between public and private actors is necessary to achieve societal 
goals of sustainable development, resulting in new patterns of cooperation that 
create new forms of governance. The OfD programme represents a neo-liberal 
turn in Norwegian development, as the policy aims at achieving Norwegian 
political business and development goals within the same frame of governing, 
where trade and commerce have increasingly become drivers for development 
policy. The mix of policy agendas in itself is not a new phenomenon, but the way 
in which it is institutionalized through the OfD initiative represents something 
new in Norway‟s development landscape.  
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We have seen how Norway‟s interests and power structures are complex, 
and that the state‟s interests vary in time and space. Norway‟s interests change 
because Norwegian industry changes, and it is in this light that we may 
comprehend the increasing coupling of industry and state policies today. This 
study directs its critique primarily at how the Norwegian state has organized aid 
coupled to commercial interests. OfD is here understood as an example of 
advanced public–private relations in Norwegian foreign aid policy.  
The OfD strategy has been possible thanks to widespread perceptions of 
Norway as a successful petroleum country: being able to receive advice from 
such an actor is an attractive proposition for many. The aid programme rhetoric 
of letting cooperation countries be „in the driver‟s seat‟ does not conflict with the 
initiative‟s function to serve as a door-opener for the industry: on the contrary, 
the positive image created reinforces the door-opener role. OfD is thus 
successfully implemented as aid, but functions as a sophisticated soft-power tool 
for the Norwegian state and industry. I argue that the initiative is an arrangement 
for increasing the competitiveness of the oil industry while, apparently, acting 
within the boundaries of the image of Norway as the „Great Humanitarian 
Nation‟.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Interview overview 
Informant Affiliation Location Date 
Andy Mormon, George 
Sarpong  
Kosmos Energy, Petroleum Company Accra 11.12.08 
Adjaye Nzema Paramount Chief, Ghana Takoradi 24.11.08 
Appiah Adu Director of Oil and Gas Technical Committee, Ghana Accra 04.11.08 
Ben Asante Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, GNPC Accra 21.11.08 
Brynjulv Kløve; Mari 
Skarholt 
Statoil  Oslo 9.2.10 
Daniel Batidam GTZ Consultant, Good Financial Governance Accra  04.12.08 
Don Kris   Director of Friends of the Nation, Western Communities Takoradi
  
25.11.08 
Gero Friedel  German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Accra  04.12.08 
(confidential: 2) Norwegian oil company Oslo 27.02.09 
Mangowa Ghanney Ghanaian Ministry of Finance, member of Oil and Gas 
Technical Committee 
Accra  10.12.08 
Yao Graham Third World Network Accra 08.12.08 
Gulbrand Wangen Intsok Oslo 10.02.09 
Apiagyei Gyamfi Director of Petroleum, Ghanaian Ministry of Energy, 
Member of Oil and Gas Technical Committee 
Accra 10.12.08 
Gymiah Boadi Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Ghana Accra  12.11.08 
Halvor Musæus Embassy Councillor, Nigeria, Petroleum and 
Commercial Affairs. OfD, West Africa Coordinator 
Akosombo 18.11.09 
Ingrid Rasmussen  OfD, Steering Committee, Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance 
Oslo 19.03.08 
Jonathan Allotey Head of Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA) Accra 01.12.08 
J. D. and N. Eshun Chief Fishermen, Ghana  Sekundi 25.11.08 
Kathy Bain  World Bank Accra 20.11.08 
Kofi Wayo NDC politician, Ghana  Accra 09.12.08 
Kwamena Esilifie Advisor to the NPP government, Ghana Accra 02.12.08 
Leiv Lunde Former head of OfD (responsible for ECON report) Oslo 10.03.09 
Mary Chinery Hesse
  
Chief Advisor to the President, ‘the Castle’, Ghana Accra 12.11.08 
Mona Thowsen PWYP Norway Oslo 13.10.08 
Dr. Nii Moi Thompson Executive director Ghana Development Policy Institute  Accra 11.11.08 
Petter Nore OfD, Director  Oslo 21.01.09 
Steve Manteau  Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) Accra 03.11.08 
Svein Erik Heglund OfD official, responsible for Ghana Oslo 06.10.08 
Terje Lind OfD, Norwegian Ministry of the Environment Oslo 30.03.09 
Thomas Manu  Director, operations, GNPC, Ghana Tema 21.11.08 
Yaw Baah Ghana Trade Union Accra 03.12.08 
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8.2 Interview Guide 
1. Norwegian aid  
– How do you think Norwegian aid is conceived internationally? 
– Is Norwegian aid different from other donor countries or institutions? (Ex. 
multilateral organizations or other countries?) 
– Is there such a thing as an altruistic motive in aid? What is Norway‟s motive for 
engaging in aid projects?  
– What is „The Norwegian model‟? When is it relevant to use such an 
expression? 
– Can this model/these experiences be transferred to Ghana?  On which parts of 
the Norwegian experience does OfD focus on sharing? 
 
2. Oil for Development 
– What is OfD? Background? Vision? 
– Is OfD different from other aid programs? How? 
– What is „good governance‟? How is „good governance‟ operationalized in 
OfD? 
– How is „ownership‟ treated and secured in OfD? 
– How is „capacity building‟ achieved? „Knowledge transfer‟? What challenges 
do you see with this type of aid? 
– When and how is it important to include civil society in OfD projects? 
– How important is local content? Who is responsible for creating local content? 
At what stage is it important? 
 
3. Oil for Development in Ghana  
– How was OfD initiated in Ghana? Is Ghana different from other OfD 
countries?  
– How is aid organized in Ghana? How does the OfD program fit into this? 
– Are there „mutual interests‟ of Norway and Ghana in the petroleum sector?  
 
4. Norwegian Political Economy (part of interview guide in Norway) 
– Is it necessary to increase oil extraction to ensure the Norwegian welfare state?  
– Is what is best for the oil industry also what is best for Norway?  
– What is more important in Norway – consensus on petroleum policies, or 
developing of new policies?  
– Does Norway have a special responsibility for achieving sustainable 
development? And do Norwegian private companies share this responsibility? 
– Can we use an expression like „sustainable‟ when we talk about the petroleum 
industry? Or when we talk about OfD? 
– How important is internationalization for Norwegian oil industry? How 
successful is internationalization? 
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– How powerful is the Norwegian oil industry? Are there limits to companies 
influence? Can Statoil give neutral advice? 
– What can be the mutual benefits of private and public interests through oil for 
development? How does Oil for Development relate to internationalization? 
 
5. Ghanaian Petroleum Industry (part of interview guide in Ghana) 
– What is the role of Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC)? How strong 
is Ghana‟s negotiation force towards other companies? 
– What role is given to civil society groups and the media in Ghana?  
– What are conflicting areas in the Ghana because of oil extraction? How are 
conflicting interests treated? 
8.3 List of Activities I Observed  
1. A first trial meeting between civil society and the oil industry in Norway 
(referred to as „a small catastrophe‟, showing how difficult communication 
between these main groups of actors is.)  
2. The First West Africa regional OfD seminar, run by Petrad. The seminar 
focused on data management in the oil industry.  
3. A donor meeting in Accra with OfD, a coordination of all the most 
important donors in the field of Oil and Gas in Ghana, hosted by the 
British Consulate, after discovering that the Norwegians and the British 
were asked to assist Ghana with the same matter (the development plan of 
the Jubilee Field).  
4. Seminar on internationalization in the Norwegian petroleum industry 
arranged by Intsok and StatoilHydro. 
5. NORAD and ME meeting on EIA and SEA in OfD cooperation countries. 
6. Fishermen and Fish Saleswomen Workshop in Takoradi, and Fishermen 
Chiefs Meeting, also in Takoradi, run by the local NGO Friend of the 
Nation, to discuss how oil would change their community and what the 
government in Ghana was doing.   
7. OfD meeting with Norwegian key departments and Paul Collier, 
discussing responses to resource curse.  
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8.4 List of Documents used for Analysis 
1. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Norway and Ghana 
2. Ghana‟s Petroleum Policy 
3. Meeting reports (MFA, Norway) 
4. Programmes OfD activities; visit of Ghana‟s Technical Oil and Gas 
Committee to Norway, 2008.  
 
8.5 Meetings and Documents to which I was denied 
Access 
Meetings: Meetings between GNPC, OfD and the Ghanaian Government and 
meetings between the Ghanaian Ministry of Energy and Norwegian consultants 
from OED. These meetings were said to be confidential.  
 
Documents: Regarding Norwegian official documents in the postal archives of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I got the following rejections:  
 
1. Concerning the draft framework document „Utkast til rammeavtale mellom 
Norge og Ghana om petroleumssamarbeid‟. (Reason: not final document) 
2. Concerning on „Norske olje og gass interesser i Ghana‟. (Reason: was 
being dealt with internally in the ministry) 
3. No access to negotiated contracts between the Ghanaian state and 
international oil companies, including the Norwegian contract.  
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